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Applying firm attention theory to assess the antecedents of firm participation in regulatory processes

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Abstract

This study applies firm attention theory to explain how factors including regulatory inspection ratings, media coverage of regulatory issues, new regulations, and the political activities of opposing interest groups influence firm participation in regulatory processes. Findings suggest that firm political participation is driven by factors that attract firm attention to political processes as well as by factors that threaten to draw stakeholder attention to political processes and firm operations. These relationships are explored by examining automobile manufacturer participation in National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration rulemaking comment periods.

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Notes

  1. 1 NHTSA Safecar.gov exploratory focus group: The role of safety in recent vehicle purchases. Docket No. NHTSA-2004-19104.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Business, James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA, USA

    David Eduardo Cavazos & Matthew A. Rutherford

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  1. David Eduardo Cavazos
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  2. Matthew A. Rutherford
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Correspondence to David Eduardo Cavazos.

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Cavazos, D.E., Rutherford, M.A. Applying firm attention theory to assess the antecedents of firm participation in regulatory processes. Rev Manag Sci 11, 395–410 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-016-0191-2

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