Abstract
An irrational strong importance of taxes in an individual’s decision-making behavior is one of the most popular assumptions about the behavioral effects of taxation. However, empirical research about this phenomenon is rare. In a study of German physicians, this paper analyzes whether tax aspects are over weighted in entrepreneurial decision-making. Furthermore, factors that may influence the irrational decision-making behavior of actors are analyzed. As research method, a conjoint analysis is used that permits measurement of the relative importance of tax aspects in decisions. The first result of the study is that the majority of the respondents (practicing physicians) misestimate their own marginal tax rate. The main result of the study is that––in comparison to the neoclassical model of rational maximization of consumption utility––most of the respondents overweight tax aspects. No evidence can be found for any relationship between indicators of a possible tax aversion (e.g., low satisfaction with the tax system) and attention to tax aspects in the decisions analyzed.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
As an exception, the contrary is possible: if e.g. an investment is tax privileged for a low tax rate while being as good as the alternative for a higher tax rate, then an overestimation of the tax rate can lead to an irrational underweighting of the tax influence in the decision calculus.
The dimension in which the questions are presented (percent or Euro) may affect the results, cf. McCaffery and Baron (2003). This is why we chose percent for the first and Euro for the second decision problem.
This is the case e.g. for the choice between investments in physical assets and financial investments. Nonetheless, the misperception of the relevant personal tax rate will distort the choice between saving and consumption even in a consumption-based individual tax system, because this misperception will lead to a misperception of the endowment and so cause a “pseudo income effect”.
Dietrich et al. (2008) use the term “perceived tax rate” for the subjective estimation of the tax rate.
However, it is possible that respondents answered the question with the objective of making their behaviour appear irrational.
References
Adam D (1998) Über den Konflikt zwischen Steuersparmodellen und der Einkommensmaximierung nach Steuern. DStR, pp 54–56
Andreoni J, Erard B, Feinstein J (1998) Tax compliance. J Econ Lit 36:818–860
Armstrong JS, Overton TS (1977) Estimating non-response bias in mail surveys. J Mark Res 16:396–402. doi:10.2307/3150783
Barberis N, Thaler R (2003) A survey of behavioral finance. In: Handbook of the economics of finance, vol 1, pp 1051–1121
Bareis P (1997) Niedrigere Steuersätze durch Verbreiterung der Bemessungsgrundlage. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 2:85–95
de Bartolome CAM (1995) Which tax rate do people use: average or marginal? J Public Econ 56:79–96. doi:10.1016/0047-2727(93)01409-4
Bernheim BD, Rangel A (2005) Behavioral public economics: welfare and policy analysis with non-standard decision makers. NBER working paper 11518
Bobek DD, Hatfield RC, Wentzel K (2007) An investigation of why taxpayers prefer refunds: a theory of planned behavior approach. J Am Tax Assoc 29(1):93–111. doi:10.1521/jata.2007.29.1.93
Bonner SE, Davis JS, Jackson BR (1992) Expertise in corporate tax planning: the issue identification stage. J Account Res 30(Suppl):1–28. doi:10.2307/2491190
Carroll JS (1987) Compliance with the law: a decision-making approach to taxpaying. Law Hum Behav 11(4):319–335. doi:10.1007/BF01044744
Chen K-Y (2005) An economics wind tunnel: the science of business engineering. In: Morgan John (ed) Experimental and behavioral economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 133–167
Cooper C (2006) Mis-selling fears over offshore bond spree. Sunday Times 4
Day GS (1972) Evaluating models of attitude structure. J Mark Res 9:279–286. doi:10.2307/3149538
Dietrich M, Kiesewetter D, Moosmann S (2008) Schwedische Direktinvestitionen in Deutschland und in Österreich––Eine empirische Untersuchung der “gefühlten Steuerbelastung”. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 9(1):62–82. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2516.2007.00262.x
Eggesiecker F (1981) Steuerersparnis als Anlagemotiv. Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, pp 205–220
Eichenberger R, Frey BS (1993) Superrationalität oder: Vom rationalen Umgang mit dem Irrationalen. In: Herder-Dornreich P, Schenk K-E, Schmidtchen D (eds) Neue Politische Ökonomie von Normen und Institutionen, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 12. Mohr, Tübingen, pp 50–84
Feld LP, Frey BS (2006) Tax compliance as the result of a psychological tax contract: the role of incentives and responsive regulation. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics of the University of Zurich, working paper 287. IERE, Zürich
Franck E (1995) Die ökonomischen Institutionen der Teamsportindustrie: Eine Organisationsbetrachtung. Wiesbaden, DUV
Fujii ET, Hawley CB (1988) On the accuracy of tax perceptions. Rev Econ Stat 70(2):344–347. doi:10.2307/1928321
Green PE, Rao VR (1971) Conjoint measurement for quantifying judgemental data. J Mark Res 8:355–363. doi:10.2307/3149575
Green PE, Srinivasan V (1978) Conjoint analysis in consumer research––issues and outlook. J Consum Res 5:103–123. doi:10.1086/208721
Green PE, Srinivasan V (1990) Conjoint analysis in marketing: new developments with implications for research and practice. J Mark 54:3–19. doi:10.2307/1251756
Gustafsson A, Herrmann A, Huber F (2003) Conjoint analysis as an instrument of market research practice. In: Gustafsson A, Herrmann A, Huber F (eds) Conjoint measurement––methods and applications. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 5–46
Haberstock L (1976) Die Steuerplanung der internationalen Unternehmung. Gabler, Wiesbaden
Hair JF, Black B, Babin B, Anderson RE, Tatham R (2005) Multivariate data analysis. Pearson, London
Hauschildt J, Wacker WH (1974) Zum unangemessenen Gewicht steuerlicher Gesichtspunkte in unternehmenspolitischen Entscheidungsprozessen. StuW, pp 252–254
Holt B (2001) Besteuerung und unternehmerische Entscheidungsprozesse. Integration, Organisation und situative Faktoren. DUV, Wiesbaden
Hüsing S (1999) Subjektive Steuerwirkungen und ihre Implikationen für die Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre. Duncker und Humblot, Berlin
Johnson RM (1987) Adaptive conjoint analysis. In: Sawtooth Software Inc. (ed) Proceedings of the sawtooth conference on perceptual mapping, conjoint analysis and computer interviewing. Sun Valley, pp 253–265
Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler RH (1991) The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias. J Econ Perspect 5(1):193–206
Kaltschütz A (2004) Die große Steuerreform––notwendig und durchführbar. ifo-Schnelldienst 11(2004):11–23
Kling S (1992) Abschreibungen und Investitionsverhalten: Eine empirische Analyse. Frankfurt a. M. Verlag Peter Lang
Lotter W (2006) Spar dir das. Brand Eins 7:48–57
Louvière JJ, Woodworth G (1983) Design and analysis of simulated consumer choice or allocation experiments: an approach based on aggregate data. J Mark Res 20(4):350–367. doi:10.2307/3151440
Luce RD, Tukey JW (1964) Simultaneous conjoint measurement: a new type of fundamental measurement. J Math Psychol 1:1–27. doi:10.1016/0022-2496(64)90015-X
McCaffery EJ (1994) Cognitive theory and tax. UCLA Law Rev 41:1861–1947
McCaffery EJ, Baron J (2003) The humpty dumpty blues: disaggregation bias in the evaluation of tax systems. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 91:230–242. doi:10.1016/S0749-5978(03)00026-8
McCaffery EJ, Baron J (2004a) Framing and taxation: evaluation of tax policies involving household competition. J Econ Psychol 25:679–705
McCaffery EJ, Baron J (2004b) Thinking about tax, USC CLEO research paper no. C04–10. University of Southern California, Los Angeles
McCaffery EJ, Slemrod J (2004) Toward an agenda for behavioral public finance, USC law and economics research paper 04–25. University of Southern California, Los Angeles
Mehr RI (1968) Tax-sheltered annuities: purchase decisions. J Risk Insur 35(2):207–226. doi:10.2307/250831
Milliron VC (1985) A behavioral study of the meaning and influence of tax complexity. J Account Res 23(2):794–816. doi:10.2307/2490838
Milliron VC, Toy DR (1988) Tax compliance––an investigation of key features. J Am Tax Assoc 9(1):84–104
Plott CR, Zeiler K (2005) The willingness to pay/willingness to accept gap, the “endowment effect”, subject misconceptions and experimental procedures for eliciting valuations. Am Econ Rev 95(3):530–545. doi:10.1257/0002828054201387
Roberts M (1998) Tax accountants’ judgement/decision-making research: a review and synthesis. J Am Tax Assoc 20(1):78–121
Sausgruber R (2002) Ursachen und Wirkungen von Steuerillusion––eine experimentelle Untersuchung zur Wahrnehmung von Steuern. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Schmitting W (2007) Ein neuer Höchstsatz der degressiven Abschreibung––ein wirksamer Investitionsanreiz? Z Planung Unternehmenssteuerung 18:109–121. doi:10.1007/s00187-007-0019-y
Schmölders G (1965) Finanzpolitik, 2nd edn. Springer, Berlin
Sigloch J (1993) Investition––Zum Einfluß steuerlicher Fördermaßnahmen auf das Investitionsverhalten. In: Hauschildt J, Grün O (eds) Ergebnisse empirischer betriebswirtschaftlicher Forschung. Zu einer Realtheorie der Unternehmung. Schäffer-Poeschel, Stuttgart, pp 423–444
Traub S (1999) Framing effects in taxation––an empirical study using the german income tax schedule. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg
Tversky A, Kahnemann D (1986) Rational choice and the framing of decisions. J Bus 59(4):251–278 Part 2
van Aaken A (2007) Begrenzte Rationalität und Paternalismusgefahr: Das Prinzip des schonendsten Paternalismus. Engel Chr, Englerth M, Lüdemann J, Spiecker I, Recht und Verhalten. Tübingen, Mohr (Siebeck), pp 189–230
Wagner FW (1992) Neutralität und Gleichmäßigkeit als ökonomische und rechtliche Kriterien steuerlicher Normkritik. Steuer und Wirtschaft, pp 2–13
Wilcox RT (2003) Bargain hunting or star gazing: investors’ preferences for stock mutual funds. J Bus 76:645–663. doi:10.1086/377034
Wittmann F (1986) Der Einfluß der Steuern auf die Investitionsentscheidungen der Unternehmen––Eine empirische Analyse. Campus, Frankfurt
Acknowledgments
We thank Mario Rese (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) for the suggestion that we apply the conjoint analysis to the measurement of behavioral tax effects and for valuable comments. For helpful remarks we thank Maik Dietrich, Henriette Houben, Silke Hüsing and two anonymous referees as well as the participants of the 32nd meeting of the accounting commission in the Verein für Socialpolitik (April 2007 in Vienna).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendices
Appendix 1
Questionnaire
2.1 Conjoint analysis
2.1.1 Survey object 1: financial investment with differing returns
Assuming that your bank offers you the following investment opportunity: You pay an amount of 30.000 Euro today. A year from today, your bank will pay back the money including interest. You have to pay different taxes with regard to the interest income. The interest income can be
-
tax free
-
partially (half) taxable
-
fully taxable
Please rank the following investments as such that the investment you prefer most is ranked first and the investment you prefer least is ranked last.
Investment no. | Rate of return before taxes (%) | Taxable part of the rate of return (%) |
---|---|---|
1 | 4 | 0.0 |
2 | 2 | 0.0 |
3 | 4 | 100.00 |
4 | 3 | 100.00 |
5 | 2 | 50.00 |
6 | 4 | 50.00 |
7 | 3 | 50.00 |
8 | 2 | 100.00 |
9 | 3 | 0.0 |
2.1.2 Survey object 2: acquisition of products/services
Certain expenses are not tax deductible, e.g., fines for violating road traffic regulations on business trips. Other expenses are only partly tax deductible, for example entertainment expenses. You have acquired a product that has to be paid now. The payment differs with regard to
-
the amount of expenses which can be 40, 60 or 70 Euro.
-
its tax deductibility which can be not tax deductible (as fines), 70% tax deductible (as entertainment expenses) or 100% tax deductible.
Please rank the following investments as such that the variant with the least burden is ranked first and the variant with the most burden is ranked last.
Variant | Amount of the expense | Tax deductability |
---|---|---|
1 | 60 | Not tax deductible |
2 | 40 | Not tax deductible |
3 | 60 | 100% tax deductible |
4 | 50 | 100% tax deductible |
5 | 40 | 70% tax deductible |
6 | 60 | 70% tax deductible |
7 | 50 | 70% tax deductible |
8 | 40 | 100% tax deductible |
9 | 50 | Not tax deductible |
2.2 Tax rate
Your taxable income increases by 100 Euro. Please estimate your additional amount of tax (income tax, solidarity surcharge) in Euro. Please indicate an estimate even in the case that you are not 100% sure.
Note: We deliberately do not ask you for your income. By the way: we cannot calculate your income from your estimation without further information (e.g., marital status). — Euro
2.3 Tax aversion
All things considered, how does the politics come up to your expectations with regard to the following public duties and responsibilities? (scale: 1 = does not come up to my expectations at all; 7 = fully comes up to my expectations)
-
Public spending policies
-
Public health care policies
-
Tax policies
-
Tax accounting rules for physicians.
2.4 Tax savings motives
To save taxes I invest even if it is not necessary for my doctor’s practice in a business sense. (scale: 1 = fully disagree; 5 = fully agree).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hundsdoerfer, J., Sichtmann, C. The importance of taxes in entrepreneurial decisions: an analysis of practicing physicians’ behavior. Rev Manag Sci 3, 19–40 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-008-0023-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-008-0023-0