A Better Argument for Tawḥīd?: Philosophical Discussions of Divine Attributes in the Sharḥ Al-ʿaqāid Tradition

Abstract

This study focuses on al-Taftāzānī’s discussion of the ontological status of divine attributes in his Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid and aims to demonstrate that al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) reluctantly and ambiguously proposed formula that divine attributes are possible by themselves and necessary by God, which itself is an adaptation of Avicennian formula about the ontological status of the divine intellects, received much more recognition after a more sophisticated and advanced version of it was introduced to Sunnī kalām tradition by al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390). His improvements generated a considerable amount of intellectual interest within the subsequent commentary and super-commentary tradition and were then refined by the later commentators, a crucial development which has been almost entirely neglected in the modern scholarship. This study further argues that the orientation of post-classical kalām extends to the point where it embraces a specific formula promoted by the Falāsifa to refine Sunnī theory about the ontological status of the divine attributes. Consequently, Sunnī theology deliberately adapted a previously rejected theory to one of its most exclusive and core subjects, that is the discussion of the divine attributes. This study will also show that dramatic transformations in the approach and the structure indicate that Sunnī kalām, especially in Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid commentaries and super-commentaries, was significantly influenced by philosophical theories and was required to adopt both the vocabulary and the framework fashioned in philosophical debates on a greater scale after its first transformation due to al-Rāzī’s influence. Because of the voluminous commentaries and super-commentaries on Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid and their extended coverage of a variety of subjects, the current study limits itself to al-Taftāzānī’s Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid and its super-commentaries by Musa Khayālī (d. 862/1457) and Ramazan Efendi al-Ḥanafī (d. 1025/1616?).

The Early Ashʿarīs Approach and Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī’s Formulation

The ontological status of God’s attributes has been a subject of considerable controversy within various schools of the Islamic tradition since its inception. These debates have involved numerous participants, spanning from the kalām schools and the Ṣūfīs¹ to Falāsifa. Despite the existence of multiple studies on this intricate issue, contemporary scholarship has shown limited attention to the Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid tradition. The present study will introduce this neglected tradition, point out to the vigorous debates and analyze the distinctive arguments fashioned within this tradition.

The present study seeks to address this scholarly gap by shedding light on the often-overlooked Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid tradition. By exploring this tradition, the study will elucidate the vigorous debates that have taken place and analyze the distinctive arguments that have been formulated within it. Through this investigation, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the complex and nuanced discussions surrounding the ontological nature of God’s attributes within the broader context of Islamic philosophy and theology.

The Muʿtazila school, which adopted a strict interpretation of the principle of tawḥīd, demonstrated an uncompromising stance against the notion of God possessing uncreated, eternal attributes distinct from His essence. According to their viewpoint, such an acceptance would imply the existence of multiple eternals, which they considered a direct violation of Islam’s foundational principle of tawḥīd. They, therefore, firmly rejected the ascription of any eternal attribute to God and stood implacably committed to God’s oneness, resolutely maintaining that divine essence (dhāt) and attributes are identical and one. For the Muʿtazila, the apparent distinction between the divine essence and attributes is merely a matter of perspective; in reality, they are intrinsically one and the same.²

Conversely, the Sunnī kalām tradition also formulated a comprehensive theory concerning divine attributes. In stark opposition to the Muʿtazilī perspective, Sunnī theologians firmly rejected the idea that divine attributes and divine essence are identical and unified. However, simultaneous to their rejection of the notion that divine attributes are independent and detached from the divine essence, they also did not embrace the idea that these attributes are independent of the divine essence and detached from it. Rather, the Ashʿarī theologians presented a distinct perspective, contending that divine attributes do not equate to the divine essence, nor are they entirely separate from it. Their principle can be formulated as follows: “The attributes are neither His essence itself, nor are they anything extraneous to His essence”. Despite their eternality, they are neither identical to His essence, nor different from or other than His essence.

Positing the reality and eternality of divine attributes while maintaining their distinctiveness from the divine essence raises critical inquiries concerning the nature of their distinctiveness and the coherency of upholding both their eternality and the principle of tawḥīd simultaneously. Should one assert that divine attributes are real and independent entities apart from the divine essence, a problematic consequence would emerge: the multiplicity of the Necessary Existent. Such a multiplicity would inherently conflict with the foundational principle of tawḥīd. Upholding the idea that divine attributes are either unreal or identical to the divine essence, however, would lead to the negation of attributes altogether. This denial would have significant implications for Sunnī kalām, as it has historically prided itself on its unwavering defense of divine attributes. By rejecting the reality and distinctiveness of divine attributes, Sunnī kalām would risk relinquishing its privileged position as staunch proponents of the divine attributes (aṣḥāb al-ṣifāt) within the Islamic tradition.³

This dilemma bred a significant challenge for Sunnī theology, and devising a sound argument to resolve the conflict proved to be a perpetual quest. In response to this challenge, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) emerged as a pioneering figure by introducing an explanation that embraced elements of what appeared to be an impasse. He postulated that the divine attributes are possible by themselves and necessary by God, thus providing a solution that sought to maintain Sunnī kalām’s credibility after several earlier endeavors made by his predecessors to devise a coherent theory.

Preceding al-Rāzī’s contributions, the Ashʿarī theologians were well cognizant of the challenges involved in substantiating their position, and in response, they endeavored to construct a plethora of arguments in its favor. Notably, the initial strides towards formulating a comprehensive and refined theory were initiated by Abū al-Ḥasan Ashʿarī (d. 324/935–36) himself. Through meticulous examination, he expounds upon the viewpoints of diverse scholars and sects, thoroughly presenting their perspectives in his various works, followed by a rigorous critique based on both the religious texts (naṣṣ) and rational arguments. According to Ashʿarī, God’s attributes are by no means similar to those of a created being, and, therefore, are not created. He further contends that it is not possible for an attribute, whichever it might be, to encapsulate within itself the meaning or existence of another attribute. Moreover, Ashʿarī argues that the divine attributes are inseparable from God’s essence. For instance, the attribute of knowledge is manifest through the wisdom of God, thus rendering it inseparable from His essence and precluding the possibility of considering it as an independent entity:

Granted that the work of wisdom proves that a man has knowledge, it does not, therefore, prove that the knowledge is distinct from Him, just as, though it proves that the man is knowing, it does not prove that he is in any way distinct. Moreover, “dissimilarity” means that one of two things can be somehow separate from the other. Hence, since there is solid proof of the eternity both of the Creator and of His knowledge, it is impossible for them to be two distinct things.⁴

In this passage, Ashʿarī presents a line of reasoning based on efficient wisdom. He illustrates that when considering an operating agent, such as a carpenter, it is evident that the agent possesses knowledge. However, from this observation, it is untenable to deduce that knowledge exists as a separate and distinct entity in its own right. Rather, the logical inference leads to the understanding that the attribute of knowledge merely subsists within the carpenter and is inherently inseparable from him. Through this analogy, Ashʿarī establishes the notion that the divine attributes, akin to knowledge in the case of the carpenter, are not detached or independent from God’s divine essence. Nonetheless, an alternative perspective may contend that due to the lack of independent existence, the divine attributes could be readily regarded as identical to God. In essence, if an attribute does not possess a distinct existence, could it then be considered indistinguishable from God’s essence? This line of reasoning raises the possibility of adopting the Muʿtazilī standpoint on the divine attributes, a position firmly rejected by Ashʿarī based on what he deemed to be solid grounds. Consequently, Ashʿarī foresaw the inevitable implications of this viewpoint and staunchly repudiated it:

Among the proofs that God is knowing by [some sort of] knowledge is the fact that He must be knowing either by Himself or by a [kind of] knowledge which cannot be Himself. Now, if He were knowing by Himself, He Himself would have to be knowledge. For, if one said that God is knowing by a quality distinct from Him, he would have to say that this quality is knowledge. But knowledge cannot be knowing, nor can the knower be knowledge, nor can God be identified with His attributes. Do you not see that the way in which one knows that knowledge is that by it the knower knows? For, the power of man, by which he does know, cannot be knowledge. Hence, since the Creator cannot be knowledge, He cannot be knowing by Himself. And if that be impossible, it is certain that He is knowing by a knowledge which cannot be Himself.⁵

Ashʿarī’s stance against the Muʿtazilī perspective on the divine attributes is unmistakable, as he vehemently rejects the notion that these attributes are identical to God and finds the Muʿtazilī doctrine unconvincing and incoherent. The Muʿtazilī position necessitates the acceptance of a principle that an attribute must encompass the meanings and functions of all other attributes, rendering their argument untenable. Consequently, the divine attributes cannot be regarded as identical to one another or be equated with God.

Numerous other Ashʿarī theologians also adhered to these principles. For instance, in his work al-Tamhīd, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) engages in a hypothetical discourse with the Muʿtazila, reproaching them for their misappropriation of terminology, and reaffirms the Ashʿarī doctrine:

When you say “Knowledge of the Eternal (glory be to Him) is dissimilar from Him”, if you mean that knowledge of the Eternal (glory be to Him) is different from Him and it is from one genus and He is from another, this is already proved to be impossible. For, the evidence indicates that God’s knowledge is no other than Him… If you mean by the dissimilarity that there is the utmost disparity between Him and the attribute of knowledge, emphasizing that they are not interchangeable or reciprocal, and that the attribute does not merit what God deserves, and not everything ascribed to God can be ascribed to the attribute, then this proposition holds true in its intended meaning, despite not being precisely uttered, as unanimously concurred by scholars.⁶

Having highlighted the deficiencies in the Muʿtazilīs’ comprehension of the subject, he seizes this occasion to expound upon the Ashʿarī stance concerning the matter:

As previously illustrated, we have provided evidence for the existence of these attributes as belonging to God and have [also] established that they cannot be generated in God. This conclusion is derived from the fact that such generation in God would necessitate them to be attributes of the genus of created entities, thereby implying the existence of opposites in a manner similar to attributes found in created entities. Furthermore, this proposition implies that God would have been ascribed with attributes that are contradictory and opposite to those with which He is [currently] described. If that were to be the case, these opposing [attributes] would be eternal, necessitating that The Eternal (the Exalted) could not be described with His existing attributes and would be incapable of generating specific acts that serve as evidence of His omniscience or omnipotence over living beings. In the invalidity of this proposition, one finds corroborative evidence supporting the eternality of the attributes.⁷

During the initial stages of the problem’s evolution, the most prominent Muʿtazilī argument centered on the definition of eternity as a shared similarity between the divine essence and attributes, asserting that such a perspective would directly contravene the principle of tawḥīd. According to this line of reasoning, if both the divine essence and attributes are considered eternal, they would necessarily possess the most singular divine attribute: deity (ulūhiyya).

The Ashʿarīs offered a counterargument by contending that shared similarities between two entities, regardless of their nature, do not inherently entail any causation (taʿlīl). This is because similarity (tamāthul) does not possess the qualities of either a mode (ḥāl) or an intention (maʿnā) that could serve as grounds for deductive reasoning. Furthermore, even if one were to hypothetically consider similarity as an indicator of causation, it would not lead to a definitive position. For instance, the Muʿtazila themselves acknowledge that knowledge and ignorance necessitate completely different propositions (aḥkām), despite sharing certain similarities.⁸

Ashʿarīs countered that shared similarities between two things –whatever those might be– do not necessitate anything. Similarity (tamāthul) is not something that can be utilized to deduce any kind of causation (taʿlīl) because similarity is neither a mode (ḥāl) nor an intention (maʿnā). Further, even if the similarity was regarded, for the sake of argument, to indicate some kind of causation, it still will not entail a particular position. For example, knowledge and ignorance necessitate totally different propositions (ahkām), as the Muʿtazila confess, even though they have similarities. Thus, ʿAbd al-Malik b. Yūsuf al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), among others, refutes this claim put forth by the Muʿtazilīs:

And subsequently, they [Ibn Jubbāī and later Muʿtazilīs] said that sharing the most specific attribute necessitates sharing the rest of the attributes. Building upon this principle, they formulated numerous inferences, which, however, lack validity. This line of reasoning encounters a flaw, as it would render impossible any instances of dissimilar entities sharing common attributes. As dissimilar entities do not share [the attribute] of utmost specificity, this would negate the possibility of them sharing any common attribute. Such a conclusion aligns with the principle that when the cause is absent, the effect is also absent.⁹

Al-Juwaynī adheres to the conventional Ashʿarī standpoint, while simultaneously refuting the Muʿtazilī principle. To substantiate his position, he endeavors to demonstrate that two dissimilar entities can indeed share common attributes. As an illustration, he points out that blackness and motion do not possess the same utmost specific attribute, yet they do share certain common attributes, such as being accidents, created, and existing. However, al-Juwaynī asserts that the absence of the cause (sharing the most specific attribute) does not necessarily imply the absence of the effect (sharing the rest of the attributes). Consequently, al-Juwaynī concludes that the Muʿtazilīs’ claim is baseless.

Juwaynī’s argument proves to be deficient, nevertheless. Since the proposition in the Muʿtazilī argument is only conditional, not biconditional (whether logical or mathematical), and, as such, cannot be validated through its reciprocal. Consequently, since the Muʿtazilī argument does not possess biconditional attributes, it can be partitioned into two separate conditionals and logically inferred. Thus, it is not appropriate to draw the conclusion that “whenever the cause is absent, the effect must also be absent”. As the Muʿtazilī principle does not claim “if and only if two things share the most specific attribute, then they may share the common attributes”, the sharing of common attributes might be attributed to another cause and can be independently justified.

In Ashʿarī kalām, a significant paradigm shift emerges concerning the treatment of divine attributes through the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Among the multiple changes he proposed, his key contribution was to describe the attributes as relations (al-nisab). This principle was associated with a formula whereby the attributes can be regarded as possible in themselves and necessary by the essence (dhāt) of God:

Undoubtedly, these specific relations (al-nisab) and ascriptions (al-iḍāfāt) called as ‘the might’ and ‘the knowledge’ are not self-sustaining things. On the contrary, they cannot exist unless there is a self-sustaining essence (dhāt) to which those attributes are ascribed. Thus, we say: they are in need of something else which makes them possible beings in themselves. Therefore, they need a cause, and there is no cause other than God’s essence. Thus, this specific essence necessitates (mūjib) these relations and ascriptions. It is not rationally impossible for this essence to directly necessitate them. [However,] it is also not rationally impossible that this essence necessitated some attributes, whether actual or relational (al-iḍāfiyya), and subsequently, these attributes necessitated these relations (al-nisab) and ascriptions (al-iḍāfāt). These narrow pathways lie beyond the grasp of human intellect, making them unattainable.¹⁰

Indeed, al-Rāzī acknowledges the inherent limitations of human understanding when attempting to grasp the ontological nature of divine attributes, allowing for a margin of error in this regard. Nevertheless, the concepts presented in his discourse laid the groundwork for subsequent developments in Sunnī kalām. Although this notion of the divine essence being the necessitating cause (mūjib) has certain limitations, it bears significant implications. Furthermore, characterizing a divine attribute as possible in itself and necessary by its cause constitutes a groundbreaking step towards integrating the Avicennian formulation “possible in itself, necessary by its cause”. Thus, it marks a pivotal advancement in the discussion of divine attributes within Sunnī kalām.¹¹

The Problem of Divine Attributes in Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid Tradition

al-Rāzī’s proposed formula gained wide recognition only after a more sophisticated and advanced version was introduced to Sunnī theology by al-Taftāzānī in his commentary on al-Nasafī’s al-ʿAqāid. al-Taftāzānī’s improvements to al-Rāzī’s formula generated considerable intellectual interest within the subsequent super-commentary tradition and were refined by the later commentators.

Al-Nasafī’s Formulation and al-Taftāzānī’s Commentary

Abu Ḥafs ‘Umar b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī, a highly regarded Māturīdī scholar, offers a concise yet proficient encapsulation of the Sunnī creed in his highly esteemed work, al- ‘Aqāid. Its encompassing yet easy style contributes to al- ‘Aqāid’s authority as an essential guide to the creed. Simple yet rich, the book has attracted an enormous amount of public and intellectual attention.¹² Despite the considerable number of commentaries and super-commentaries—approximately seventy—that have been written on al- ‘Aqāid, the genre has been relatively overlooked in modern scholarship.

Al-Nasafī’s treatment of the question of divine attributes, while relatively concise, holds significant prominence in his work as one of the most comprehensive and extensively covered themes. Following his affirmation of God as the originator (muḥdith) of the universe, al-Nasafī proceeds to expound upon God’s attributes and features:

The originator of the universe is Allah, [He is] the One, the Eternal, the Living, the Omnipotent, the Knowing, the Hearing, the Seeing, the Desiring, and the Willing. He is not [categorized as] an accident, body, or atom; neither is He a formed entity, limited, numbered, portioned or divided; nor is He a compounded existent. His existence does not reach its end in Himself. He transcends description by quiddity or quality and remains unconfined by physical placement. Time does not exert influence over Him, and no likeness is found to Him. His knowledge and power encompass all things.

God possesses eternal attributes that subsist in His essence. These attributes are not Him, nor are anything other than Him. Among these attributes are the knowledge, the power, the life, the might, the hearing, the seeing, the willing, the desiring, the doing, the creating, the sustaining, and the speech. He speaks with a kind of speech that is an eternal attribute of Him and not characterized by letters and sounds. It is a quality that is incompatible with silence and deficiency. Allah, the exalted, speaks through this [attribute], [issuing] commands, prohibitions, and revelations. The Qur’an is the uncreated speech of Allah, inscribed in our codices, preserved in our hearts, recited by our tongues, and heard by our ears, yet it does not reside in them.

Creating stands as an eternal attribute of Allah. It is His act of bringing the universe and all its constituents into existence, [not eternally], but precisely at the moment of their being. In our perspective, this [attribute of creating] exists distinct from the created entities. Willing, on the other hand, is an eternal attribute of Allah, subsisting in His essence.¹³

Al-Nasafī’s exposition maintains precision and clarity, firmly reasserting the Māturīdī position, a stance that is also, to a great extent, endorsed by the Ashʿarīs.¹⁴ Notably, the text lacks any discernible philosophical influence, serving as a clear indicator of its intended purpose and target audience.

Two centuries after al-Nasafī, the commentary Sharḥu ʿAqāid al-Nasāfī (Commentary on The Creed of al-Nasāfī) by Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī¹⁵ garnered significant attention and gave rise to a distinct genre, inspiring over sixty ḥawashī (super-commentaries). The reasons behind the tremendous response to al-Taftāzānī’s commentary can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, its unique methodology stands out. Al-Taftāzānī set out to produce a commentary that is not only straightforward and simple but also intellectually stimulating, presenting sophisticated proofs without perplexing the reader. In pursuit of this objective, he developed a distinctive writing style that encompasses thorough discussions of various themes and effectively addresses contemporary challenges.¹⁶

As part of his undertaking, al-Taftāzānī faces the responsibility of distinguishing himself from the Muʿtazila and the Philosophers. In this context, he conscientiously associates the Muʿtazila with the Philosophers, recognizing the need to differentiate his own approach from their perspectives:

… Subsequently, they [the Muʿtazila] became excessive in the science of kalām and stuck with the fringes of the Philosophers in many of their principles and conclusions.¹⁷

Yet, referring to its topics and problems, he also admits that the post-classical kalām is intertwined with philosophical elements:

When philosophy was translated into Arabic, adherents of Islam delved into its teachings and sought to challenge the Philosophers on areas where their ideas deviated from the divine law (al-sharīʿa). To achieve this, they blended a significant portion of philosophy with kalām in their pursuit of comprehending the goals of philosophy and subsequently refuting it. This led to the incorporation of numerous aspects of physics, metaphysics, and even mathematics within kalām, blurring the distinction between theology and philosophy, except for its [kalām’s] inclusion of matters exclusive to revelation (al-samʿiyyāt). This marks the emergence of the kalām of later theologians (al-muta’akhkhirīn).¹⁸

In his commentary, al-Taftāzānī incorporates numerous philosophical elements, as will be demonstrated later. However, he seeks to clarify that this inclusion is not an innovative departure but rather a common practice in later kalām. Moreover, he endeavors to gain the support of his readers regarding these insertions and reassure them of the legitimacy of his methodology. Consequently, he underscores that his approach aligns with al-samʿiyyāt, thereby distinctly setting it apart from Muʿtazila methods. As he introduces novel elements in his Sharḥ to further develop kalām, he awaits an open-hearted and open-minded reception from his audience, encouraging them not to be astonished or perplexed by these additions.

Al-Taftāzānī addresses the issue of the divine attributes on two different occasions within his work. The first instance arises when he expounds upon the divine feature of eternality. After affirming that The One (al-Wāḥid) is the originator of the universe, he proceeds to establish that He is also eternal:

[The creator of universe is] the Eternal: This passage presents an explanation that arises as a necessary consequence of what is already known. It stems from the understanding that the Necessary Existent cannot be anything other than eternal, indicating that His existence has no beginning. Were He originated, preceded by non-existence, His existence would inevitably contingent on something else. [For this reason,] some [scholars] even posited that the Necessary Existent and the Eternal are synonymous [terms], but this assertion is not entirely accurate since [these] two concepts (mafhūm) differ in meaning. Nonetheless, the present subject pertains to their synonymity in the sense that they are co-extensive terms. It is argued that the term “eternal” is more general than “necessary”, as it applies to the attributes of the Necessary Existent, while “necessary” does not apply to the attributes. The multiplicity of eternal attributes is deemed possible, whereas the true impossibility lies in the plurality of eternal essences.¹⁹

In this passage, al-Taftāzānī emphasizes the conceptual distinction between “eternal” and “necessary”. While both terms are used as predicates regarding God, he cautions against the misapprehension that they are identical concepts, aiming to prevent any confusion. Since their logical comprehension differs, they are predicates of different beings and cannot be used interchangeably. The term “eternal” has broader applicability than “necessary”, as it can be ascribed to both God and His attributes, whereas “necessary” does not possess such extensive application. Al-Taftāzānī emphasizes the gravity of mistaking these concepts, as he will elaborate further in the subsequent paragraph:

Some later theologians (al-muta’akhkhirūn), such as al-Imam Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Ḍarīr (d. 666 H./1268) and his followers, explicitly asserted that the Necessary Existent by Himself is Allah and His attributes. They substantiated the principle that everything which is eternal is also a necessary existent by itself with their argument that if the Eternal were not a necessary existent, He would be a possible non-existent (jāiz al-ʿadam) per se, and need a determining principle (mukhaṣṣiṣ). Therefore, He would have been originated (muḥdath). Because, by the originated, we only mean the one whose existence depends on the creating act (ījād) of something else. However, they raised a counter-argument to their own position, contending that if the attributes were necessary existents in themselves, they would be continuous (bāqiya). Continuation (al-baqā’) is a meaning (maʿna); and it would imply that the existence of a meaning would subsist in another meaning. In response [to this objection], it is explained that each attribute continues by a mode of continuance, which is that very attribute itself.²⁰

Al-Taftāzānī’s choice to reference al-Ḍarīr is not random. He seeks to cite a prominent Māturīdī scholar who firmly upholds the notion that both God and His attributes are eternal. Al-Ḍarīr’s influence was particularly pronounced in the thirteenth century, especially in the Transoxiana region (Mā warāʼ al-nahr). Having studied under Shams al-A‘immah ʿAbd al-Sattār al-Kardarī²¹ (d. 642/1244) and Sadr al-Sharīʿa al-Akbar²² (635/1275), he was regarded as the leading scholar of his time.²³ Moreover, al-Ḍarīr had a significant impact on his students, notably including Abu al-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310), who authored works such as al-ʿUmda (The Pillar of Creed) and Kitāb al-Iʿtimād fi al-iʿtiqād. In alignment with his master’s teachings, Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī expressed the same ideas, employing the very words quoted by al-Taftāzānī in his Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid. He writes in his al-Iʿtimād:

The creator of the universe is eternal. Since there is no middle ground between eternal and originated, if He were not eternal, He would be originated. For, the eternal is what has no beginning to its existence, and originated is what has a beginning. And there is no middle ground between affirmation and negation. If He were originated, He would need an originator. For, He would be a possible existent and possible non-existent (jāiz al-ʿadam)… This is due to the fact that the eternal is Necessary Existent per se.²⁴

It is worth noting that Al-Ḍarīr²⁵ and Abu al-Barakāt al-Nasafī were not the only scholars committed to this idea. Several prominent Ashʿarī scholars such as Sharaf al-Dīn Ibn al-Tilmisānī (d. 1246),²⁶ Abū ʿAbdillah b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 1490),²⁷ Abū ʿAbd Allah Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī al-Mallālī al-Tilmisānī (1492?),²⁸ Muhammad al-Dasūqī (d. 1815)²⁹ also embraced this principle. Furthermore, it seems that there were multiple figures in nineteenth-century Russia who found the idea of the necessity of the attributes compelling. ʿAbd al-Nasīr al-Qursāwī (d. 1812) and Shihāb al-Dīn al-Marjānī (d. 1899), for example, determinedly maintained that the necessity of the attributes by themselves is an essential part of creed.³⁰

This idea is attributed to al-Rāzī as well. In his ḥashiyah on Zayn al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Jurjānī’s Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyalkūtī writes:

According to him [al-Rāzī], the eternal can only be the Necessary Existent by Himself, and this is in accordance with the earlier theologians’ principle that eternal and necessary are synonyms, i.e., co-extensive terms.³¹

Most of the early mutakallimūn believed that an eternal being has no beginning to its existence, and the core principle they deduced from this understanding is that an eternal thing cannot be caused. This accords with their rejection of essential origination and their principle that the idea of origination is limited to the temporal one. Therefore, this principle can be attributed to any early mutakallim who argues that the eternal cannot have a cause (al-qadīmu lā yuʿallalu) and also to any later mutakallim who approves that principle and still rejects the idea of essential origination.³² This approach also highlights the tension between two opposing positions: one that affirms the eternality of the attributes and hence their necessity by themselves, and the other that avoids making explicit statements and resorts to equivocal assertions.

Al-Taftāzānī, by citing al-Ḍarīr’s position, intends to draw attention to the complexity of the subject and highlight that it was not merely a matter of confusion among the Muʿtazilīs, but also among the Māturīdīs and certain Ashʿarīs. His aim is to demonstrate that the issue was intricate and engendered divergent viewpoints across different theological schools. Subsequently, he proceeds to explicate the weaknesses inherent in their lines of reasoning.:

This is an extremely difficult notion [to defend]. [First of all,] the assertion of multiplicity of the Necessary Existent by itself is inconsistent with the principle of tawḥīd. And the proclamation that the divine attributes are possible is inconsistent with their statement that every possible being is originated. If they assert that the attributes are eternal in time, meaning that non-existence never preceded them, this is consistent with their idea of [the attributes] being essentially originated, in the sense that they need the essence (dhāt) of the Necessary Existent. [But then], this position corresponds to the perspective of the Philosophers, who categorized both eternity and origination into essential (dhātī) and temporal (zamānī) aspects. In this view, there is a denial of many foundations of the faith, and further verification (taḥqīq) of this matter will come later.³³

After stating the explanation provided to solve the problem, He identifies two key reasons for his disapproval. Firstly, the dictum that God and His attributes are together necessary per se is a direct violation of the principle of tawḥīd: The only necessary being by Himself is God. Secondly, it is not coherent with their principle affirming that every possible being is originated. By limiting the options to either being necessary by itself or possible by itself, the only logical conclusion would be that the attributes are contingent to maintain the principle of tawḥīd. However, if they are contingent, they cannot be eternal since, according to Māturīdī theology, every possible being is inherently originated. Consequently, the attributes must fall into one of two categories: either they are essentially originated or temporally originated. If the Māturīdīs (and of course the Ashʿarīs) submit to the idea that the divine attributes are temporally originated, this is a deviation from the path of Sunnī tradition. Conversely, affirming the idea that the divine attributes are essentially originated and temporally eternal would implicitly validate the Philosophers’ theory of emanation. Hence, both alternatives are flawed and unsatisfactory, serving as the primary impetus for al-Taftāzānī to seek a resolution to this impasse.

In his attempt to establish a credible solution, al-Taftāzānī begins by cautioning his readers about a strategic error made by both earlier and later mutakallimūn. He points out that these theologians inadvertently articulated a statement that Muʿtazilīs skillfully used to deny the existence of the divine attributes:

The Muʿtazilīs argued that accepting the notion of eternally existent attributes different from the essence of Allah, would undermine the oneness of Allah. [Further], it follows that something other than Allah is eternal and that there are numerous eternal beings. Indeed, [it leads to admitting that] there are numerous necessary existent beings, as it is implied in the statements of the earlier theologians (al-mutaqaddimūn), and explicitly stated by the later theologians (al-muta’akhkhirūn) who [claimed] that the Necessary Existent by Himself is Allah and His attributes. [The Muʿtazilīs further contended that] the Christians have been deemed infidels for admitting three eternal beings, so what is to be said of those who admit to eight or more?³⁴

They either implied the multiplicity of eternal beings as seen in the statements of earlier mutakallimūn when they said “eternal and necessary are synonyms”³⁵ or they explicitly affirmed that the Necessarily Existent by Himself is Allah and His attributes, as evident in the statements of later mutakallimūn. Therefore, the primary step to avoid any accusation of violating the principle of tawḥīd and to pull the rug out from under the Muʿtazilīs’ rhetorical claims is to refrain from the statements giving voice to the multiplicity of eternal beings or necessary existents. To bolster his argument, al-Taftāzānī appeals to the case of Christianity:

Although the Christians do not explicitly state that there are distinctly different eternal beings, this is the position they are required to commit to (lazimahum)… Some may deny the dependence of the plurality or the multiplicity on the dissimilarity (al-taghāyur) in the sense of detachment, employing the evident fact that the series of numbers from one, two, three and so on are both multiples and plurals, yet some of them are part of the others and [it is very well known that] the part is not dissimilar (lā yughāyiru) to the whole. It is also inconceivable that there be a dispute among the ahl al-Sunnah on the question of the multiplicity and plurality of the divine attributes whether they are [considered] distinctly separate or not.³⁶

After critiquing the theological error of Christian theology for admitting the multiplicity of eternals, al-Taftāzānī proceeds to illustrate that this fallacy is not necessarily based on the principle of dissimilarity of the eternals. In other words, making the same mistakes does not necessitate acknowledging dissimilarity among those eternals. Consequently, advocating a principle of multiplicity of eternals in the context of divine attributes, whether these eternals are considered dissimilar to God or not, is equally daring and may lead to unintended consequences. This unmistakable fact becomes apparent through numerical examples. Consider a series of numbers where each number is derived by adding one to the previous number, resulting in each number being a part of the following number in the series. For instance, the number five is attained by adding one to four, and thus, four is an essential part of five.³⁷ Although these numbers are not dissimilar entities, there is an evident multiplicity and plurality in the case of two consecutive numbers. Therefore, dissimilarity cannot be posited as a necessary condition or even a concomitant of the multiplicity or the plurality. Consequently, the claim that the eternality and self-necessity of the divine attributes, not being dissimilar to God’s essence (dhāt), do not contravene the principle of tawḥīd holds no merit.

To resolve the impasse resulting from earlier solutions, al-Taftāzānī advances a daring proposition, suggesting a middle ground between being necessary per se and possible per se. He introduces the formula “necessary by its cause, possible in itself” as a potential resolution to the issue:

Therefore, it is more reasonable to maintain that the impossibility lies in the multiplicity of eternal essences, rather than in the plurality of an essence and its attributes. Instead of making a bold claim that the attributes are necessary existents by themselves, a more suitable approach is to affirm that they are necessary existents, not due to something else, but by that which is neither themselves nor distinct from themselves; namely, the Essence of Allah, Exalted. When one asserts that the necessary existent in His essence is Allah and His attributes, it signifies that these attributes are necessary existents within the essence of the Necessary Existent. Nevertheless, in themselves, they are possible existents.³⁸

By clearly delineating the distinction between necessary existents and possible existents, the predicament of either admitting the multiplicity of eternal essences or accepting that the divine attributes are not eternal but temporal remains unresolved. Both of these stances conflict with the traditional Sunnī creed. Therefore, positing that the divine attributes are possible in themselves and necessary by the essence of God serves two purposes: first, it avoids the notion of multiple necessary essences, as there is no necessary essence other than God Himself. Second, it establishes that the divine attributes are necessary by God’s essence, and by the same token, they are eternal in God’s essence.

Despite its potential advantages, the approach of positing an eternal being that is necessary by its cause and possible in itself gives rise to two significant challenges. Firstly, this notion was originally introduced by the Falāsifa and played a central role in their cosmological and ontological theories, most notably in Ibn Sina’s philosophical system. This concept aligns with the theory of emanation, which was a contentious topic between the Falāsifa and the mutakallimūn. Therefore, proposing such an ontological status may evoke controversy surrounding the theory of emanation.

Secondly, this position directly contradicts kalām’s cosmological theories, which assert that every possible being is temporal and originated. These complexities are acknowledged by al-Taftāzānī, who seeks to reassure readers that his position is appropriate while distinctly separating it from the philosophical perspective:

There is no irrationality in the eternity of the possible if it subsists in the essence of the Eternal, is necessary by Him, and is not separated (munfaṣil) from Him. It should be emphasized that not every eternal entity is a god; hence, the existence of eternals does not necessitate the existence of multiple gods. Rather, it is more accurate to assert that Allah is eternal, and His attributes are ascribed to Him. The term “eternals” should not be used, lest the estimative faculty (al-wahm) go so far as to think that each of the eternals subsists in itself and that divine attributes are predicated of it.³⁹

In this context, al-Taftāzānī proposes that for an attribute to be acknowledged as eternal, it must subsist within God and not be separated or detached from Him. This condition allows him to differentiate his approach from the theory of emanation, where celestial bodies and intellects, while also necessary by the Necessary Existent, are considered separate and independent entities,⁴⁰ lacking the ontological status of attributes. These entities do not subsist in the essence of the Eternal but are rather sustained by His essence. Particularly in the case of intellects, their degree of self-subsistence further disqualifies them from being classified as eternals in the kalām perspective. Al-Taftāzānī thus rejects the notion that eternal and necessary are synonymous to ensure that the principle of tawḥīd is not violated.⁴¹

In finding a more competent solution regarding the ontological status of the divine attributes, al-Taftāzānī acknowledges the insufficiency or partial flaws of existing solutions. Particularly, he finds the assertions that “the Necessary Existent by Himself is Allah and His attributes” and that eternal and necessary are synonymous to be problematic. Therefore, he proposes a novel approach that strikes a middle ground between necessary by Himself and possible in itself, suggesting that the attributes are necessary by God and possible in themselves. To differentiate his position from the philosophical perspective, he introduces the condition that eternals, including attributes, must subsist within the essence of the Eternal, be necessary by Him, and not be separated (munfaṣil) from Him. By doing so, he steers clear of adopting the implications associated with the theory of emanation.

Furthermore, Al-Taftāzānī voices a degree of discontent with the classical Ashʿarī formulation that posits “The attributes are not His essence itself, nor are they anything extraneous to His essence.” While he does not outright reject this notion of dissimilarity, he does introduce a more nuanced perspective and seeks to scrutinize the formulation through a slightly philosophical lens. In doing so, he explores alternative interpretations and opens up the possibility for further discussion and examination of the concept of dissimilarity.

However, two major issues remain unaddressed in al-Taftāzānī’s formulation. First, his description of attributes as “eternal contingents” raises queries regarding the specific nature of their eternality. Attributes can be either essentially eternal (qadīm al-dhātī) or temporally eternal (qadīm al-zamānī), yet al-Taftāzānī does not delve into a comprehensive examination of this aspect. Secondly, whether an eternal contingent is the effect of an agent by choice (al-fāʿil al-mukhtār) or is the effect of an essentially necessitating cause (mūjib bi al-dhāt) remains unexplored.

These unresolved issues point to the complexity and intricacy of the topic at hand, and they invite subsequent scholars and commentators to delve deeper into the nuances of al-Taftāzānī’s formulation to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the ontological status of the divine attributes.

Super-Commentary Tradition

The realm of Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid encompasses a multitude of super-commentaries. Nonetheless, among this array, certain super-commentaries have garnered noteworthy influence, capturing greater attention, frequent replication, and widespread scholarly scrutiny. In the following discussion, our focus shall center on the super-commentaries of Mūsā al-Khayālī (d. 875/1470) and Ramazan (Efendi) b. Muḥammad al-Ḥanafī al-Māturīdī (d. 1025/1616?). Despite the distinctiveness in their styles, both of these commentaries have successfully reached a vast readership and received profound scholarly examination.

Aḥmad b. Mūsā al-Khayālī’s Super-Commentary

One of the most prominent super-commentaries is Khayāli’s work, which has been widely studied and served as a focal point for subsequent glosses. It attained a central position in Ottoman madrasas at the advanced level, becoming one of the main texts for the study of kalām.⁴² According to the Kawākib al-Sabaʿ, as many as four hundred glosses were written on it.⁴³ Khayālī composed this commentary early in his career, likely during his tenure as a mudarris at the Madrasa of Şehābeddin Paşa.⁴⁴ Although many ideas developed by Māturīdīs and Ashʿarīs resonate throughout the entire book, only some of the prominent works like Ījī’s al-Mawāqif⁴⁵ and Sayyid Sharīf’s commentary Sharḥ al-Mawāqif,⁴⁶Sharḥ al-Tajrīd by Isfahānī,⁴⁷ Abū al-Muīʿn al-Nasafī’s Tabṣirat al-adilla⁴⁸ and al-Taftāzānī’s Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid⁴⁹ are mentioned by name.

Khayālī initiates the discussion of the divine attributes with a succinct introduction on establishing their existence. He proposes that a careful observation of the exquisite and precise fashion in which the universe is originated (ḥudūth) leads to the judgment that these attributes must be ascribed to the Necessary Being:

Comprehending the Necessary One in a manner that He is the originator of everything in this exquisite fashion and articulate style necessitates the a-priori judgment that these attributes must be predicated to Him.⁵⁰

In this context, Khayālī not only contends that the actuality of the attributes can be deduced from the origination of the universe but also goes a step further by asserting that ascribing attributes to Allah is a priori once we contemplate the perfect design evident in the creation of the universe. However, the inclusion of the design argument and the claim of a priori judgment might raise questions, as it is a controversial statement. One might wonder if deducing the existence of certain attributes from the origination of the universe is sufficient to explain the task of the efficient cause?

Khayālī addresses this by highlighting two essential points. First, the origination alone may provide grounds to argue for the existence of an efficient cause. However, he emphasizes that when combined with the element of the perfect manner in which the universe is created, multiple arguments in support of the attributes’ ascription can be formulated. This indicates the significance of considering not just the occurrence of origination but also the exceptional quality of the creation itself.⁵¹ Second, even if we can deduce the existence of an agent with certain attributes, skepticism may arise regarding whether this agent is truly God or merely a mediator through which the universe is created. Anticipating such objections, Khayālī incorporates the notion of exquisite fashion and precise style, which later came to be known as the design argument:

The objection positing the possibility of the universe originating through the mediation (al-wasaṭ) of an of the agent by choice (al-fāʿil al-mukhtār), which in turn emanates from the essentially necessitating cause (mūjib bi al-dhāt) and this necessitation, abstracted from intentionality, does not indicate to knowledge or any other attribute, is deemed unsuitable. The reason behind this lies in the assertion that a mediating agent must be a component of the universe and therefore, must be originated. Thus, it cannot necessarily emanate from the eternal one. Additionally, it becomes evident that such a claim may only be entertained when one refrains from confining the discourse to the mere recounting of origination. This is because the articulate state plays a pivotal role in establishing the a-priority of the judgment.⁵²

Once the proposition that the efficient cause responsible for the existence of the universe necessarily possesses certain attributes is firmly established on an a-priori basis, any objection concerning the involvement of a mediator agent loses its ground. Consequently, the inclusion of the universe’s perfect order within the argument of origination becomes pertinent to Khayālī’s reconstruction, regardless of the outcome’s ultimate success. Moreover, as will be expounded upon in subsequent discussions, this assertion holds significant importance in addressing the inseparability of the divine essence and His attributes.

Upon presenting arguments in favor of the existence of divine attributes, Khayālī proceeds to critique the stance of al-Imam Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Ḍarīr and his adherents, who assert that both God and the divine attributes possess inherent necessity. In doing so, Khayālī contends that their analysis of the notions of necessity, eternality, and origination (ḥudūth) lacks coherence and logical consistency:

[They say that] “By originated (muḥdath), we refer only to that which relies on the creative act (ījād) of something else.” This implies that the existence of the eternal attributes does not hinge on the creative act of any external entity. However, this perspective reflects a clear lack of understanding. If they argue that our discourse concerns the essentially Eternal One and that the attributes, in contrast, are not essentially eternal, then their contention that the attributes are necessary becomes invalid.⁵³

Khayālī’s primary intention is to highlight that had it been the case that the divine attributes are necessary, the divine attributes would not need God to exist. According to the perspective of Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Ḍarīr and his followers an eternal being is also a Necessary Being by Himself. This notion is evident in their line of reasoning, where they argue that if the attributes were not necessary by themselves then they would be possible beings. Subsequently, they would need a determining principle (mukhaṣṣiṣ) which diminishes them to being originated (muḥdath). Indeed, the understanding presented by Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Ḍarīr and his followers leads to a logical contradiction. If the attributes are not originated, their existence would not necessitate a cause, including God. In an attempt to address this inconsistency, they may argue that what they are referring to by “eternal” is the essentially eternal and the attributes are not essentially eternal, and they still need Good to exist. Consequently, they encounter another predicament because they can no longer assert that the attributes are necessary by themselves, given that they are now considered to be temporally originated.⁵⁴

Khayālī, in alignment with al-Taftāzānī, aims to expose the misconception of those who advocate for the idea that the divine attributes are necessary by themselves. Nonetheless, rather than relying on the principle of tawḥīd, he tries to demonstrate that their argument is fundamentally incoherent. Unlike al-Taftāzānī, Khayālī does not shy away from employing the distinction between essentially eternal and temporally eternal, despite his belief that neither option can fully resolve their inherent self-contradiction. These two introductions collectively contribute to the “philosophizing” aspect of the ongoing discussion.

To fortify the Sunnī perspective on the divine attributes and their connection with the divine essence, Khayālī delves into an examination of the concept of “dissimilarity” (taghāyur):

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (He [al-Nasafī] referred to the answer saying “They [the attributes] are neither Him nor are they anything other than Him”.) Al-Taftāzānī did not say “he answered”. This should be attributed to the fact that a comprehensive response necessitates negating dissimilarity not only between the divine essence and attributes but also among the attributes themselves. The author, however, limited his discourse to addressing the first aspect. Nevertheless, he alluded to the principle that multiplicity (taʿaddud) is a corollary principle (farʿ) of dissimilarity.⁵⁵

In his attempt to elucidate the negation of the concept of dissimilarity, Khayālī employs a fundamental principle known as the corollary principle (farʿ). Essentially, this principle asserts that if something is considered the corollary (farʿ) of another, the establishment of the first (aṣl) is a prerequisite for claiming the existence of the second. To illustrate, if one contends that a person never existed but built seven bridges, such a claim would be invalid. This is because being an active cause necessitates existence, making existence a prerequisite for being an active agent. Consequently, being an active agent is the corollary principle of existence in this case. Similarly, the concept of multiplicity cannot be established without first establishing the dissimilarity between two or more entities. In response to the claims made by the Muʿtazilīs, Khayālī endeavors to refute the notion of multiplicity of eternals by negating dissimilarity.

Khayālī offers a comprehensive analysis of the concept of dissimilarity, recognizing its critical role in negating the notion of multiplicity, which holds significance in Sunnī theory concerning the divine attributes. His inquiry commences with the definition of dissimilarity itself. Is it to be regarded as something negative (salbī)? Should it be understood in relation to something else? What constitutes the fundamental prerequisite for the concept of dissimilarity? To answer these questions, Khayālī presents two significant aspects of dissimilarity to the reader:

As per the conventional practice and lexicon, it is plausible to say “There is none other than Zayd in the house.”, despite the fact that he has his hand and his power [in the house with him]. In response to this statement, it is argued that in this context, the term “other” (ghāyr) refers to another individual of the same kind. Otherwise, Zayd and his clothes would be considered dissimilar from each other.⁵⁶

In this example, Khayālī presents the first condition of dissimilarity: for two entities to be regarded as dissimilar (mutaghāyir), they must belong to the same species. As God has no species, He and His attributes are not dissimilar from each other. However, it is essential not to conflate dissimilarity with sheer distinction (tabāyun). In the case of sheer distinction, two entities cannot be attributed to each other, nor can they be associated in any way. Consequently, Sunnī mutakallimūn refrain from appealing to the notion of distinction but instead employ the notion of dissimilarity, which grants them the necessary flexibility to attribute certain qualities while negating others.⁵⁷

The second condition of dissimilarity, as postulated by Khayālī, revolves around detachment:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (They can be detached from each other.) They [dissimilar beings] can be detached from each other in terms of space or existence.⁵⁸

So, according to Khayālī’s analysis, if two things are detachable from each other in terms of space or existence, then they are principally dissimilar beings. However, as al-Taftāzānī objected, this argument can be invalidated through the relation between God and the universe. Since the universe can never be detached from God, as no cause can be detached from its effect, they should not be considered dissimilar. Yet, it is universally accepted by theists that God and the universe are dissimilar. In response to this objection, Khayālī re-affirms that the definition proposed for the dissimilarity remains valid and should be applied accurately:

You know that what is intended with detachment (infikāk) encompasses (yaʿummu) the detachment in terms of space or existence. So, no refutation that is based on the example of the universe and God is valid. This is because of the fact that God can be detached from the universe in terms of existence and the universe can be detached from God in terms of spatial occupation (taḥayyuz).⁵⁹

Clearly, Khayālī finds the argument that God and the universe are dissimilar yet not detachable to be very objectionable. He argues that although they cannot be detached from each other in the sense of the chain of cause and effect, there are other ways in which they can be detached. First, in terms of existence, the universe and God are separable whether the universe is considered essentially originated or temporally originated. Secondly, God and the universe are separated from each other in terms of space, as God is not subject to spatial occupation.

Now, provided that if two things are detachable from each other, then they are principally dissimilar beings, one might ponder that if the attributes are detachable from the divine essence theoretically, even if two are eternally associated.⁶⁰ In other words, God’s attributes have been with Him and subsisted in Him eternally and they can never be detached from Him in extra-mental existence. However, in mental existence, one can abstract God from His attributes, and in doing so, perceive them as distinct concepts or entities. This is actually how one comprehends that they are two different concepts or things. Thus, al-Taftāzānī argues that it is possible to suppose that the divine essence and attributes are detachable from each other hypothetically.⁶¹ This is due to the fact that one can comprehend the existence of God without considering His attributes or realizing He has attributes. Furthermore, since al-Taftāzānī is the refuter (māniʿ), his responsibility is to raise the possibility of detachment between the divine essence and attributes. He is not obliged to present a complete and sufficient argument to prove that this detachment is indeed the case. Merely pointing out the possibility aligns with his position as a refuter, and he does not need to provide further evidence beyond that.⁶²

Khayālī endeavors to counter this claim by asserting that the presence of a hindrance (māniʿ) renders the mere possibility insufficient to assume that the divine attributes can be detached from God’s essence.⁶³ He argues that the hindrance in this context is the divine essence itself. Since God’s attributes are concomitant with His essence, they can never be contemplated or hypothetically supposed to be detached from Him. To suggest otherwise would undermine the necessary relation between the concomitant and the necessitating agent (malzūm), leading to an absurdity:

[Therefore] His [al-Taftāzānī’s] argument can be refuted on the basis that they [al-mashāyikh] clearly stated that the matter under consideration pertains to the essential attributes, or more accurately, the eternal attributes. The divine essence does not exist without the attributes. [When they said this,] they intended to convey that the possibility of detachment of one [the divine essence] from the other [the attribute] without any hindrance (māniʿ) principally. Therefore, the possibility [of detachment of the attributes from the essence] in itself is not enough.⁶⁴

Moreover, as it is mentioned earlier, Khayālī sees ascription of the divine attributes to God in the extra-mental world as an a priori fact. A contemplative observation of the universe reveals that its design and order necessitate a Creator possessing attributes of perfection. From this perspective, it can be argued in defense of Khayālī that while theoretical considerations of God’s essence may not inherently lead to the notion of attributes, in the practical, extra-mental world, it becomes challenging to argue for a divine essence abstracted from any attribute, particularly within a theistic framework.

Can al-Taftāzānī’s new formulation be developed or worked through to create a better argument? Unlike some Ashʿarīs like al-Dasūqī or Ibn Tilmisānī, Khayālī does not reject the idea. However, he has a concern:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (Therefore, it is better to say that the impossible is the plurality of eternal essences but not the plurality of the essence and attributes… It means that these [attributes] are necessary existents in the essence of the Necessary Existent.) One can also answer the question saying that the eternal is the everlasting (al-azaliyyu), self-subsisting one. Even if it is accepted that [multiplicity of eternals is impossible], the [actual] impossibility is multiplicity of essentially eternal entities, rather than the absolute [multiplicity]. [However], it is well known that this [formulation] is not compatible with mutakallimūn’s cosmology. [Al-Taftāzānī said] (But in themselves, they [the attributes] are possible.) As already mentioned above, this idea contradicts the prevailing notion among them, asserting that every possible being is originated, which implies that it is preceded by non-existence.⁶⁵

Although Khayālī does not endorse the idea of the possibility of the attributes in themselves with great enthusiasm, he refrains from outrightly dismissing the idea on the grounds of reducing the divine attributes to mere possibilities. His primary concern lies in the incongruence between the proposed solution and other aspects of kalām cosmology.

Khayālī’s commitment to the formulation that “The attributes are not God’s essence itself, nor are they anything extraneous to His essence”, drives him to reiterate the principle by refining the details of the concept of “dissimilarity”. He also attempts to refute al-Taftāzānī’s claims about the inadequacy of the formulation. This becomes evident through his commentaries on al-Taftāzānī’s objections and his attempts to poke holes in the formulation. Moreover, Khayālī seems recept to the formulation of “The attributes are necessary existents in the essence of the Necessary Existent and possible in themselves”. Nevertheless, he remains concerned about its lack of compatibility with certain fundamental elements of Ashʿarī cosmology.

Ramazan Efendi’s Super-Commentary

The available information on Ramazan Efendi is currently limited, leading to frequent confusion with Ramazan (Ramaḍān) Efendi el-Bihishtī. In various catalog records, Ramazan Efendi is referred to by his full name as either “Ramazan Efendi b. Muhammed el-Makhfī al-Ḥanafī” or “Ramazan Efendi b. Muhammed al-Ḥanafī al-Karahisārī,” both of which pertain to the same individual. This nomenclature aligns chronologically with the era before the passing of Siyālkūtī, who has made references to Ramazan Efendi.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, the complete name of Ramazan Efendi is not found within the mentioned books.⁶⁷ If the catalog records are accurate, it indicates that al-Karahisārī al-Makhfī was a Khalwatī shaykh residing in Istanbul and establishing a branch of Khalwatī ṭarīqa known as the Ramazaniyya.⁶⁸

According to Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, there have been false attributions of a super-commentary on al-Taftāzānī’s work to “al-Makhfī al-Ḥanafī”, which he claims actually belongs to Ramazan Efendi al-Bihishtī.⁶⁹ However, this claim is erroneous, as the said work cannot be attributed to al-Bihishtī (d. 1571). The reason being that al-Bihishtī did not compose a super-commentary on al-Taftāzānī’s book; instead, he authored a gloss on al-Khayāli. Furthermore, it is essential to note that Ramazan Efendi is consistently identified as Ramazan b. Muḥammad, whereas Ramazan Efendi al-Bihishtī’s full name is Ramazan b. Abd al-Muḥsin al-Vizevī. This distinction clarifies the misattribution and provides a more accurate understanding of the authors and their respective works.

Ramazan Efendi’s work has numerous copies dating back to the seventeenth century. However, it is noteworthy that the work experienced a remarkable surge in popularity during the reign of Sultan ʿAbd al- Ḥamīd II (1876–1909). Between the years 1876 and 1890, the work was published multiple times, indicating a sudden and significant increase in interest surrounding it in that particular period.

In his discussion of the divine attributes, Ramazan Efendi begins by addressing the stance of al-Imam Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Ḍarīr and other earlier theologians on this matter. Unlike Khayālī and al-Taftāzānī, Ramazan Efendi does not consider their position to be entirely illegitimate. Hence, he takes a sympathetic approach and offers a formulation that is understanding and supportive of their opinions:

[They said that] (If he [the eternal one] were not necessary per se, then he would be possible non-existents (jāiz al-ʿadam) in itself.) This due to the fact that there is no middle position between them, i.e., there cannot exist a third realtà (ʾamr) between them that it is neither eternal nor originated. The opposition between the eternal and the originated is essentially the opposition between negation and affirmation. For, the eternal is the existent whose existence has no beginning and the originated is the existent whose existence has a beginning. The former represents a negation where there is a denial of a nexus between subject and predicate in a judgment (al-nisba al-ḥukmiyya), whereas the latter is an affirmation of the nexus. No intermediate state exists between negation and affirmation as it would lead to the simultaneous negation of two contradictories or their simultaneous affirmation—both of which are logically impossible.⁷⁰

Here Ramazan Efendi endeavors to demonstrate that the position of the early theologians is at least coherent, indirectly countering to Khayālī’s claim that their reasoning is inconsistent. However, despite this coherence, a challenge remains to be addressed. Should their argument be deemed plausible, it would lead to the inference that the divine attributes are necessary by themselves, thereby directly contravening the principle of tawḥīd. Yet, Ramazan Efendi posits that there exists an alternative interpretation for this conclusion, one that may offer a different perspective or understanding of the matter:

The statement “The necessary by itself is God and his attributes” as formulated by some scholars signifies that they [the attributes] are necessary by the essence of the necessary existent, i.e., they are dependent on the essence of God by the way of necessity rather than intention and choice.⁷¹

Clearly, Ramazan Efendi appears to be striving to reconcile the position of earlier theologians, seeking a middle ground where they can be deemed both coherent and not in violation of the principle of tawḥīd. However, this proposed solution may face challenges in terms of its persuasiveness, as the earlier theologians themselves never explicitly articulated such an idea or anything that could be interpreted in this manner. On the contrary, these theologians widely upheld the principle that God possesses the will (irādā) and acts in accordance with His will, which they defended against the Falāsifa.⁷² Consequently, this particular solution put forth by Ramazan Efendi attracted criticism in later super-commentaries. Scholars and commentators raised concerns about the adequacy of this interpretation, given that it seems to diverge from the explicit positions of the earlier theologians and may not align seamlessly with their established beliefs regarding God’s will and actions. As a result, the proposed middle ground viewed with skepticism and received scholarly scrutiny for its departure from the traditional theological doctrines of the earlier scholars.⁷³

After pointing out that the divine attributes can subsist in God eternally, Ramazan Efendi proceeds to explore the implications of this conclusion. He delves into the question that arises naturally from this idea: If the attributes exist in God eternally, regardless of whether they are necessary or not, their existence persists continuously. This persistence leads to the concept of “endurance” (baqā’) which raises further inquiries. Firstly, Ramazan Efendi grapples with the nature of this endurance or baqā’. He questions whether it can be considered an accident. If it is indeed an accident, then the challenge lies in justifying its continued existence in God. On the other hand, if it is not an accident, he should seek to categorize it appropriately within the theological framework. To resolve this complex problem, Ramazan Efendi initiates his explanation by discussing the concept of continuity (baqā’) as understood by the mutakallimūn. By examining their perspectives on this notion, he aims to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive understanding of how to approach the idea of endurance in relation to the divine attributes and God:

For, endurance also is classified as an accident. This categorization stems from the fact that an accident is an additional meaning to the essence (dhāt). So is endurance, i.e., it is an additional meaning to the existence. For, endurance is the continuousness (istimrār) of the existence. Since continuousness of something is distinct from the entity itself, it becomes evident that endurance and existence are [two] different things.⁷⁴

If endurance is an accident, then it should not persist for two consecutive moments according to the mutakallimūn. Despite the existence of three pieces of evidence in kalām books,⁷⁵ al-Taftāzānī specifically cites the one that he deems most suitable and relevant:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (This), i.e., the argument for the impossibility of the continuity of accidents (is grounded in the principle that continuousness of something is an additional meaning to its existence.) The commentator [al-Taftāzānī] presents two arguments for the impossibility of the continuity of accidents. Among these arguments, he particularly favors the first one, which states that the accident cannot be self-sustaining. The second one which maintains that it is impossible for it to continue to exist is spurious (muzayyaf). His statement that (because the subsistence of an accident in something means that its spatial occupation (taḥayyuz) is dependent on that particular thing’s spatial occupation) is the justification for the impossibility. His dictum that (this is based on…) is a pointer to the fact that it is spurious.⁷⁶

The majority of early mutakallimūn and later mutakallimūn put forth arguments indicating that an accident or a meaning cannot sustain another accident. They typically cite two main reasons in support of this position. The first argument contends that for an accident to subsist (qiyām) in something, it must depend on the spatial occupation of that particular thing. If an accident were to subsist in another accident, it would imply that one accident provides spatial occupation to another, which, according to the mutakallimūn, is only possible for substances—the entities that possess their own spatial occupation. The second argument asserts that if an accident or a meaning were to sustain another accident, the initial accident would either exist in no location, in another accident, or in a substance. The first possibility is evidently false. The second option would necessitate an infinite chain of accidents subsisting in each other consecutively. The only reasonable option appears to be the third one, i.e., both accidents would subsist in a substance. However, this conclusion contradicts the initial assumption and the premises set forth in the beginning of the argument.⁷⁷

As a result, these arguments led the early Ashʿarīs and most of the later Ashʿarīs, to reject the notion of one accident sustaining another, emphasizing the unique role of substances in providing spatial occupation to accidents. Thus, according to the early Ashʿarīs and most of the later Ashʿarīs, endurance is an accident and cannot exist for two consecutive moments. he only manner in which it can persist is by being continuously created through God’s free will. Moreover, it cannot subsist in another meaning, regardless of whether that meaning is an accident or not. The issue that arises from this understanding is how to justify the endurance of the divine attributes. If endurance is an accident and requires constant creation by God’s will to persist, does the same apply to the divine attributes? If not, then what is the alternative explanation for their endurance? Ramazan Efendi offers another approach to the problem:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (The truth is that the endurance is the continuity of the existence and the absence of its essence’s cessation.) i.e. the existence, not an additional meaning to the existence. (Its reality) the endurance (is the existence in the manner of its relation to the second moment) the existence with regard to the first moment is the beginning and the existence with regard to the second moment is the endurance. Therefore, the existence with regard to the second moment is the endurance itself, not that the endurance is an addition to the existence.⁷⁸

Based on the accounts cited so far, the Ashʿarī argument for the impossibility of the endurance of the accidents can be summarized as follows:

• I. (The first premise) Endurance is an additional meaning (maʿnā) to the existence of something. So, if a meaning or an accident could sustain another accident, then a meaning would sustain another meaning, the endurance in this case.

• II. (The second premise) Subsisting in a thing means to be dependent in the spatial occupation. Thus, to sustain an accident or a meaning would require that the sustaining accident itself possesses its own spatial occupation.

• III. Since both of these premises entail multiple impossibilities in the early Ashʿarī cosmology, they concluded that it is impossible for an accident to subsist in another accident. It is also impossible for an accident to sustain another accident.

Ramazan Efendi’s approach involves refuting both premises by proposing that endurance is simply the existence of something in consecutive moments. He argues that endurance is not an independently existing meaning in the external world, which undermines the basis of both premises. If endurance is not an actual entity or a separate meaning, there is no actual being to consider as a meaning or an accident that could be added to or dependent on another accident. By making this distinction, Ramazan Efendi removes the perceived impossibilities that were derived from the previous premises. He contends that admitting that an accident or a meaning can endure for two consecutive moments does not lead to any contradictions or logical inconsistencies. Thus, his alternative understanding allows for a different perspective on the nature of endurance and its implications for the endurance of accidents, including the divine attributes.

He not only refutes the idea that an accident cannot endure by rejecting the premises in the way of manʿ (refuting), but he also employs the same line of argument to make a counter-indication (naqḍ) proving what the opponent would typically reject. Ramazan Efendi’s reasoning underscores the interconnectedness and interdependence between substances, accidents, and their endurance. He argues that both accidents and substances appear to be constantly existent and stable, which implies that there is no valid reason to differentiate between them concerning their endurance. Indeed, Ramazan Efendi’s argument raises further implications. If the accidents are continuously being created, it logically follows that one can reasonably argue that the bodies, which contain those accidents, are also being constantly created. This observation challenges the premise that accidents are being created every consecutive moment independently. On the other hand, if bodies are constantly being created, it implies that the endurance of accidents is not an additional accident or separate entity added to substances or bodies. In this case, it cannot be an additional accident for the accidents themselves.⁷⁹ Thus, Ramazan Efendi’s argument leads to a crucial dilemma for the mutakallimūn. They are left with two options:

• I. Admitting that endurance is not an accident: If they accept this position, it would entail a revision of their previous understanding that endurance is an accident. This would require reevaluating their categorization of endurance and its relation to substances and accidents.

• II. Accepting that bodies are constantly being created: If they opt for this stance, they would be faced with the implication that bodies are undergoing continuous acts of creation every consecutive moment. However, this proposition contradicts their established belief and vehement refusal that bodies undergo such constant creation⁸⁰

Where does the knowledge that endurance is not an accident leave us? The understanding that endurance is not an accident leads to a significant shift in perspective. Ramazan Efendi utilizes this insight to explain how God’s attributes subsist in Him in a manner that does not violate God’s unity and transcendence:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (The subsisting) that is to be conjugated with his statement “endurance is continuity of the existence” (is designation of the attribute to the attributed) it is attachment of one thing to another in a way that it requires that one [to be] attribute and the other [to be] the attributed. Then, in this sense, it is possible for a meaning to subsist another meaning. (As it is [the case] in God’s attributes.) i.e., God’s attributes subsist in His essence, are designated to Him, endure (thābit) in Him. [It is] not in the sense that their spatial occupation is reliant on Him, for, it is impossible for God to have a spatial occupation.⁸¹

Contrary to the viewpoint of the early Ashʿarī mutakallimūn, Ramazan Efendi argues that the subsistence of something in another does not necessarily imply or entail a relation of spatial occupation. This is because of the fact that the subsistence (qiyām) in itself is something more general than the need for the spatial occupation (taḥayyuz). The application of this principle becomes evident when considering God’s attributes. As his attributes subsist in Him, they do not necessitate any form of spatial occupation at all. Therefore, the concept of subsistence needs to be understood in a more comprehensive manner, encompassing meanings that subsist in other meanings. In this regard, Ramazan Efendi employs al-Taftāzānī’s text to expand the definition of subsistence, encompassing meanings that do not have an existence in the external world. As a result, he successfully establishes a framework that supports the notion that the divine attributes can indeed sustain the meaning of endurance.

In summary, Ramazan Efendi argues that endurance is nothing more than the continuity of existence and has no actual being in the extra-mental world. Thus, it can be added to another meaning. Therefore, admitting that the divine attributes can endure entails no impossibility. Furthermore, since subsisting in something does not entail dependence on that particular thing for spatial occupation, but rather being designated to that particular thing in the manner of being attributed to it, the divine attributes can and should sustain endurance. By the same token, the divine attributes can subsist in God without requiring any kind of spatial occupation. Remarkably, Ramazan Efendi does not shy away from discussing God’s attributes in a more cosmological context, the context of accidents and substances. This is a further development in adoption of philosophical approaches into discussion of the divine attributes marking a significant departure from earlier text-based approaches or frameworks shaped by discussion of the divine names.

Once he has established that the divine attributes subsist and endure in God without posing any insuperable difficulty, Ramazan Efendi sets out to deal with the Karrāmiyya’s claim that⁸² God’s attributes are originated:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (In opposition to the viewpoint of the Karrāmiyya which posits that God has attributes that are originated, [God’s attributes are eternal]… They [the Sunnī mutakallimūn] justified it with different arguments. One of them is [to claim that] God’s attributes are the attributes of perfection. To be disassociated or detached (khuluww) from them equals the deficiency… [Karrāmiyya’s response to this argument is] the idea that being detached of the act is a deficiency only for the Essentially Eternally One, is an unsubstantiated idea. Furthermore, the origination (ḥudūth) does not entail the being detached [of the act]. For, it is possible [for the origination] to succeed ad infinitum. It is not impossible for the Necessary One to be affected by His own action. Especially considering the fact that Ahl al-Sunnah believes that His essence has given existence (awjada) to His attributes.⁸³

It is noteworthy that Ramazan Efendi refrains from offering counter-evidence or directly engaging in a discussion with the Karrāmiyya, indicating a certain level of acknowledgment of the potential merit in their argument. His approach, characterized by a modest commentary, suggests that he recognizes some value in the points presented by the Karrāmiyya. The final sentence cited above could shed light on the rationale behind this perspective. By aligning with the belief of Ahl al-Sunnah that God’s essence imparts existence to His attributes, Ramazan Efendi’s appreciation of the Karrāmiyya’s viewpoint becomes more comprehensible. The proposition positing that “God’s essence has given existence (awjada) to His attributes” holds some measure of acceptability within the ahl al-Sunnah theological framework. Once this premise is acknowledged, it paves the way for the Karrāmiyya school of thought to present their argument. According to their perspective, if we concede that God being affected by His own actions does not imply any deficiency for Him, then it becomes conceivable that a divine attribute can be originated in a manner that triggers an infinite regress of originations. Consequently, a divine attribute can be considered as having originated while also extending infinitely backward. The ultimate result of this infinite regression of originated divine attributes would still be God Himself. For example, He would know Himself. Since being affected from His essence is not impossible for God, it does not entail any absurdity.

Of particular significance in this context is their use of the dictum “God’s essence has given existence (awjada) to His attributes”, which aligns favorably with their position. This alignment potentially strengthens the inclination towards adopting al-Taftāzānī’s proposed solution. Al-Taftāzānī’s approach is noteworthy for its omission of explicit reliance on the notion of divine will, thereby precluding any contention that God is influenced by His own actions. Additionally, his novel framework avoids the requirement for God to function as a free willing agent, which, in turn, eliminates the necessity for temporal origination. This facet enhances the value of al-Taftāzānī’s solution, especially in response to the contentions posited by the Karrāmiyya.

After establishing the unproblematic subsistence and enduring nature of the divine attributes within God, Ramazan Efendi proceeds to address the matter of the multiplicity of these attributes. Diverging from Khayālī’s approach, he recognizes the necessity of confronting the concerns articulated by al-Taftāzānī. Delving into al-Taftāzānī’s objections in a comprehensive manner, Ramazan Efendi concedes the existence of a significant issue with the “neither Him, nor anything other than Him” formulation. The Ashʿarī scholars of the early period devised a conceptual framework in response to concerns about contravening the principle of tawḥīd. Their primary objective was to address the perplexity stemming from the notion of a fictitious plurality within the eternal realm, wherein one constituent is identified as God while the others are designated as divine attributes. To resolve this issue, they posited the notion of dissimilarity based on the concept of detachability as a prerequisite for genuine multiplicity. By asserting that the divine attributes are inseparable from God, subsisting solely in Him and not detachable from Him, they aimed to preclude any confusion. Thus, it can be deduced that the existence of dissimilar beings is non-existent, leading to the inference that genuine multiplicity does not actually exist. Consequently, the coexistence of multiple eternal beings is untenable.

Thus, there is no actual dissimilar beings, a fact which leads to the conclusion that there is no real multiplicity. If there is no real multiplicity, there cannot be multiple eternal beings. Therefore, the apparent multiplicity inherent in the divine essence and attributes does not contravene the principle of tawḥīd. However, upon closer examination, this proposition proves inadequate. In several instances, even in the absence of dissimilarity, multiplicity persists, thereby indicating that dissimilarity cannot be posited as an essential condition for multiplicity.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the ahl al-Sunnah firmly uphold the notion of the multiplicity of the divine attributes, irrespective of the presence of dissimilarity. Consequently, when a reevaluation of the formulation becomes unavoidable, the novel proposition put forth by al-Taftāzānī emerges as a significant breakthrough:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (Therefore, it is more appropriate to say) in response to Muʿtazila that (what is impossible is the multiplicity of eternal essences, not the essence and the attributes) this is due to the fact that multiplicity of essences is a violation of the principle of tawḥīd. Despite the fact that it is certainly the case, he said “therefore, it is more appropriate”, but not “therefore, the appropriate answer is…”. For, the upshot of the earlier explanation is ultimately alike. [However], this way of elucidation is a better one, due to its clarity. To expound further, considering that the author’s assertion remains susceptible to refutation by a proponent [from the Muʿtazilī school], a more suitable approach would be for adherents of ahl al-Sunna to counter with the statement, “what is impossible is the multiplicity of eternal essences” etc. Such [a response] gains an advantage over the author’s initial stance, as it remains impervious to the aforementioned potential refutation.⁸⁵

Within Ramazan Efendi’s super-commentary, two salient aspects deserve attention. Firstly, he posits that al-Taftāzānī’s commentary aligns with al-Nasafī’s original text, contending that both scholars concur on the issue at hand and present a unified response to Muʿtazilī refutation. Consequently, he contends that the upshot of both arguments remains identical. Al-Taftāzānī merely accentuates the same principle with greater firmness and refinement. Nevertheless, given the enhanced clarity and facilitation of comprehension in al-Taftāzānī’s formulation, it attains greater esteem. Secondly, Ramazan Efendi puts forth the notion that al-Taftāzānī’s formulation entirely conforms to the fundamental tenets upheld by ahl al-Sunna. Thus, he asserts that this novel maxim represents a more sophisticated retort from the perspective of ahl al-Sunna. However, the degree to which this formulation aligns with the principles of kalām cosmology necessitates further examination. Certain concomitants of this maxim, previously met with fervent rejection by early mutakallimūn, demand consideration. Despite being aware of these potential objections, Ramazan Efendi remains committed to expanding the formula’s philosophical dimensions to their fullest expression:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (But rather [one must say] that they) the attributes (are necessary, not by something else, but by that which is not themselves nor other than themselves; I mean by the essence of Allah exalted. This) i.e., the motto that they are necessary, not by something else, but by that which is not themselves nor other than themselves (is what they mean when they say that the Necessary Existent by Himself is Allah and his attributes. It means that these [attributes] are necessary by the essence of the Necessary Existent. But in themselves, they) those attributes (are possible.) For, they are needy for their existence.⁸⁶

Having concurred with al-Taftāzānī regarding the compatibility of divine multiplicity arising from the eternal nature of the divine essence and attributes with the principle of tawḥīd, Ramazan Efendi expounds further on the notion that the divine attributes derive their necessity from the very essence of God. Nonetheless, when considered in isolation, these attributes retain a state of possibility, as their existence relies on God.

This particular standpoint gives rise to several inquiries of philosophical significance: Are these attributes akin to the intellects in Avicennian metaphysics, representing effects of God’s eternal act? Should the divine attributes be deemed possible, are they still eternal? If indeed they are eternal, what is the means through which their possibility and eternality harmoniously coexist? Ramazan Efendi does not shy away from addressing these questions:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] (There is no irrationality in the eternity of what is deemed possible, as long as it subsists in the essence of the Eternal) The expression “there is no irrationality” employed by the author appears to be a rebuttal aimed at preempting an anticipated objection. This objection posits that “If the author’s explanation (jawāb) is subject to refutation, the commentator’s response, despite being built upon the different premises, would inevitably face a similar fate and thus remains on par with the author’s initial answer, both sharing [the common outcome of] being refuted. The commentator addressed the objection by asserting that “There is no irrationality in the eternity of the possible if it subsists in the essence of the Eternal”. However, if it [the possible being] subsisted in the essence of an incipient [being] or subsisted in the essence of the Eternal but was detachable from Him, then the eternality of this possible being would be impossible. The abridged account of this refutation is to say “The possibility of these attributes and their necessity by the Necessary Existent is an [obvious] contradiction with their principle of ‘every possible being is originated.’ For, if the attributes were necessary by the essence of the Necessary Existent, then they would have been eternals and eternality is in contradiction with the origination.” And the concise response [to this refutation] is that we do not concur with the notion that the eternality of these possible attributes is a violation of the principle that dictates “every possible being is originated”. [The principle in question is applicable] when it subsists in something other than The Eternal. When it subsists in The Eternal, however, the possible being is eternal. An objection stating that “Asserting that basis for being needy of a cause to exist for the [divine] attributes is possibility rather than origination” is to deviate from the universal rational principle, [without a valid justification], that asserts “every possible being is an incipient [being] and cause (ʿilla) of being needy (iḥtiyaj) for its existence is origination due to its possibility (li thubūt al-imkān)” might be raised. [However, this] objection is improper. For, we say that the universality of the [second] principle is unacceptable. Thus, there is no deviation. This is because of the fact that the cause of the origination is the emanation by choice (al-ikhtiyār), not the sole possibility. Their claim that “The basis of the need for a cause is origination” is not true at all. For, the origination is posterior to the invention (ījād) which, in turn, is posterior to the need. On the contrary, [the basis of the need for a cause] lies in the possibility. The equivalence between the two sides of the possible being necessitates the need for a propounder in preferring one side over the other.⁸⁷

Within this extensive commentary, Ramazan Efendi introduces several principles that constitute a significant development in kalām ontology. In his efforts to promote al-Taftāzānī’s formulation, he goes a step further by committing to a more philosophical solution. His first move entails refuting the notion that al-Taftāzānī’s formulation as in a contradiction with mutakallimūn’s principle of “every possible being is originated”. He claims that this principle only applies to beings which do not subsist in God. As the divine attributes subsist in God, they fall under an exception to this principle.

Nonetheless, this proposed solution gives rise to two notable challenges. Firstly, it prompts the inquiry into the rationale behind introducing an exception to the universally accepted principle among the mutakallimūn when considering the divine attributes. Secondly, it calls for an investigation into the fundamental basis for the need of a cause in relation to possible beings.

In response to the first question, Ramazan Efendi adopts a straightforward approach by outrightly denying the universality of the principle. According to his perspective, there exists no compelling reason to concede to the claim of universality. In essence, he objects to the foundational premises of the principle, employing the method of manʿ (refutation) to challenge its validity: His objection stems from the absence of sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim of universality put forth by the opponent. Nevertheless, recognizing that a solitary refutation of the interlocutor’s refutation does not suffice to establish his case, Ramazan Efendi acknowledges the necessity of offering additional evidence to support his claim that God’s attributes can simultaneously possess both eternal and possible aspects. Consequently, he endeavors to justify his stance by emphasizing the pivotal point that solely the divine attributes subsist in God. Since nothing else can subsist in God, he argues that the eternality of these attributes can be posited without entirely discarding the principle that maintains “every possible being is originated”. In this manner, he seeks to harmonize the coexistence of divine attributes as both eternal and possible without disregarding the broader principle.

Addressing the second question, Ramazan Efendi’s viewpoint diverges from the perspective of the Falāsifa. He contends that the basis of the need for a cause is not solely possibility but emanation through the will of God. However, a critical inquiry arises: how can a cause be an agent acting by choice while simultaneously emanation entails this agency? While Ramazan Efendi himself does not provide an extensive elaboration on this matter, historical attempts have been made to reconcile these two distinct conceptual frameworks. In his Mawāqif, Ījī highlights that there exist different opinions concerning the causal dependency of the eternal entity on both the agent by necessity and agent by choice and Jurjānī expounds on this theme, offering further insights into the matter:

[Ījī said] (Refutation of both of them are discovered in their statements) i.e. impossibility of dependency of eternal on the agent by choice and possibility of its dependency on the agent by necessity (mūjib). (As for its dependency on the agent by choice, Āmidī affirmed it and said: precedence of the causation over the intention) in the issue of existence of the effect (is like precedence of the causation over the necessity. As it) i.e. necessary causation (is an essential priority not the temporal one, it is like that here) in the way that intentional causation (al-ījād al-qaṣdī) is synchronal with the existence of effect, but also [intentional invention] being essentially prior to it. (There is no difference between them) i.e. two kind of causation (with regard to priority and necessity of non-existence) then, it becomes possible for universe to be eternally necessary by the Necessary Existence, although He is agent by choice. They exist synchronically, even though they differ essentially with regard to their priority and posterity.⁸⁸

The proposed formula serves the purpose of alleviating the tension between the universes eternality and the notion of God as the agent acting by choice (al-fāʿil al-mukhtār). By acknowledging the synchronicity of causation with intentionality, Āmidī provides valuable insights into the compatibility of God’s role as both an emanating agent and an agent acting by choice. In this context, it is postulated that God’s will to create precedes the universe solely in an essential manner, devoid of any temporal implications. Consequently, while the universe emanates from God, He also eternally wills its existence. God caused universe not “after a while”, i.e., not posterior to His existence, but rather, it is a result of His deliberate choice and in accordance with His will (irāda). This formula, if accepted, enables the notion that the universe can possess eternal attributes while simultaneously being caused by God through His volition. As a result, this perspective bestows coherence upon the argument that the universe eternally emanates from God through His deliberate choice.

On the other hand, contrarily to the assertions put forth by the mutakallimūn, the basis of the need cannot be solely attributed to origination. This is due to the fact that origination is only conceivable subsequent to the creation of the originated being and does not precede the act of creation. Since a non-existent cannot cause or necessitate anything, it cannot be the basis of the need. Moreover, a non-existent entity lacks the capacity to cause or necessitate anything, making it unsuitable as the basis of the need. Therefore, the need must stem from a different aspect.

This approach bears resemblance to Ibn Sina’s critique of the mutakallimūn concerning their theory of origination. His criticism primarily revolves around four distinct points.⁸⁹ Among these points, one holds greater significance and directly pertains to the matter under discussion:

The Basis (ʿIllah) Of Need for The Necessary (al-Wājib) is Possibility, Not Origination You should know that when considering the effect of an active agent, which provides existence to something that previously did not exist, there are [solely] two states involved: a past state of non-existence and a current state of existence. The active agent does not possess any influence on the state of non-existence; rather, its impact (ta’thīr) takes place solely in the bestowal of existence upon the effect (maf ʿūl). Consequently, the very essence of the effect lies in its existence coming from something other than itself.⁹⁰

As evident from the chapter’s title, this passage establishes the foundation for a highly influential analysis of origination (ḥudūth) based on a straightforward proposition: a cause cannot exert any influence on something that exists in a state of sheer non-existence. Non-existence, by its very nature, does not necessitate any cause, and thus, it is not a suitable basis for requiring a cause.

Another Avicennian criticism directed towards ḥudūth (origination) pertains to the inadequacy of temporal origination in elucidating the enduring nature of an incipient entity. Ibn Sīnā argues that even if one were to accept the concept of temporal origination, it does not inherently entail the existence of a cause, nor does it sufficiently account for the continued persistence of the effect in its state of existence.:

It is impossible for the incipient [being], after its origination, to be continuous by itself, whereby it transforms from an originated [state] to a [state of] necessary existence, persisting in its being and existence without any cause… We know that its [the incipient’s] persistence (thabāt) is not by itself. It cannot possibly become necessary by the origination which is neither necessary by itself, nor existent by itself.⁹¹

Having established that origination does not necessitate the existence of an incipient being, Ibn Sīnā proceeds to emphasize that even if we were to accept the actuality of temporal origination, it still does not guarantee the persistence of the incipient. Far from that, it deters the relation between cause and effect. For, if granted, the active agent can only grant existence to the effect, not ensure its continuation. Upon its origination, the incipient being becomes independent of its cause for its continued existence. In other words, the effect is contingent upon the cause solely for its initial emergence, not for its sustained presence, given that the necessity of the causal connection arises from the state of non-existence preceding the moment of origination. Consequently, upon evading non-existence, the causal relation between the effect and its cause is rationally severed.

Upon careful examination of these two interrelated criticisms, one arrives at a judicious inference, indicating that the temporal origination theory fails to substantiate the necessity for a cause and is also inadequate in explaining the sustenance of the contingent being. Notably, a common thread unifying these critiques is the notion of “need” (iḥtiyaj). In both instances, the indispensability of the possible being to its cause becomes evident as an essential aspect.

Considering these two criticisms together, the reasonable conclusion is that the temporal origination theory neither helps to establish the need for a cause, nor does it help to explain the sustenance of the contingent being. These two points have something in common: the idea of need (iḥtiyaj). In both cases, the need of possible being to its cause is necessary. In contrast, the temporal origination theory weakens the notion of dependency between the possible being and its cause. A striking parallel emerges when comparing Ramazan Efendi’s stance to Ibn Sīnā’s criticisms. Both argue that origination cannot be the ground for the requirement of a cause for existence, given that origination transpires only after existence has manifested. Furthermore, they contend that origination, occurring subsequent to existence, cannot possibly engender the necessity for a cause. Consequently, they reach a shared conclusion, akin to Ibn Sīnā’s, that the underlying basis for the need of a cause lies in imkān rather than ḥudūth.

Following the examination of the eternality of the attributes, Ramazan Efendi proceeds to expound on the concept of necessity, dedicating various arguments to it as well:

[Al-Taftāzānī said] [The attributes are] (necessary by Him, undetectable from His essence) Hence, His essence necessitates His attributes, even though He is [still] agent by choice with regard to His acts. However, an objection is raised based on the premise that if necessity is considered an attribute of perfection, as posited by the philosopher, then His actions would also be deemed necessary for Him. If it is asserted as an attribute of defect, as argued by the mutakallimūn, then the attribution of necessity to Him concerning the attributes becomes problematic. However, if one posits [the maxim that] necessity is a perfection concerning His attributes and a defect concerning His actions, additional evidence [supporting this stance] must be presented [for its validation]. An argument is put forth that “If God does not necessitate His attributes, it would entail the ignorance and inability. Therefore, unlike the actions, necessitating the attributes is certainly a perfection. The perfection lies in possessing unrestricted free will concerning it [action].” However, this [line of reasoning] requires careful reevaluation since it relies primarily on rhetorical persuasion rather than presenting certainty (yaqīn). Especially, [the statement that] the necessity is perfection at all levels.⁹²

In accordance with the perspective of al-Taftāzānī, Ramazan Efendi commences by elucidating the concept of the necessity of divine attributes. Like al-Taftāzānī, Ramazan Efendi defines the divine attributes as emanating from God, thus rendering them necessary by His essence. This notion bears a striking resemblance to Avicennian intellects, which Avicenna characterizes as emanating from God and being necessary by Him. Yet, despite the similarities in considering the necessity of divine attributes and Avicennian intellects, a substantial difference persists between these two ontological frameworks. Al-Taftāzānī’s formulation proposes that these attributes always subsist in God and are not detached from Him, whereas Avicennian intellects are detached from God and do not subsist in Him. This crucial distinction highlights the contrasting perspectives on the ontological relationship between the attributes and the divine in the respective theories.

However, this formulation raises two significant concerns that demand attention. Firstly, the proposition that the attributes are necessary by divine essence leads to a crucial question: either the principle of necessity must be affirmed universally across all aspects, or a clear differentiation must be established between the necessity of the attributes and the necessity of actions. If the former is accepted, it would imply that God lacks free will and is solely the essentially necessitating cause (mūjib bi al-dhāt). Yet, this is a direct violation of the Ahl al-Sunnah’s stance about the divine attributes. The second proposition, which posits a differentiation between the divine attributes and other aspects, appears to align harmoniously with the doctrinal principles upheld by Ahl al-Sunnah. However, a notable concern arises: How can this differentiation be adequately substantiated and intellectually validated? One potential resolution to this issue is to assert that the principle of the necessity of divine attributes serves to safeguard God, the Exalted, from being ascribed with attributes of ignorance and incapability. Without the necessity of these attributes by God’s essence, they would be deemed possible in every respect, and consequently, subject to origination. Indeed, the concept of originated attributes, which suggests that certain attributes of God cease to exist for a period in eternity and also necessitates that originated beings are sustained in God, stands in direct contradiction to the principles upheld by Ahl al-Sunnah concerning the divine attributes, such as the will and the might. From this perspective, it can be inferred that the necessity of the attributes is a concomitant of the eternality of these attributes. Nevertheless, Ramazan Efendi considers this argument to be rhetorical without giving any detail about possible grounds for his disapproval.

Conclusion

Following al-Rāzī’s somewhat ambiguous formulation, which posits that the divine attributes are possible in themselves and necessary by God’s essence (dhāt), a significant advancement in understanding the divine attributes emerged. However, it is noteworthy that this groundbreaking insight was largely overlooked in Sunnī kalām for a substantial period spanning approximately two centuries.

Al-Taftāzānī revived the discussion through his commentary on al-ʿAqāid al-Nasafiyya marking a significant turning point when this approach received substantial scholarly attention. In his attempt to establish a credible solution, al-Taftāzānī first explains how both earlier and later mutakallimūn made a strategic mistake in their writings by adopting an approach implicating multiplicity of eternals and necessary beings. He expresses dissatisfaction with the conventional Ashʿarī interpretation that suggests, “The attributes are not His essence itself, nor are they anything extraneous to His essence.” Therefore, he critiques this formulation through the concept of dissimilarity on multiple occasions. Without denying it entirely, he manages to steer away from the classical formulation slightly and introduces a touch of philosophical perspective into his approach.

In contrast to al-Rāzī, al-Taftāzānī holds the view that the divine attributes are actual. However, he straightforwardly suggests that these attributes are possible in themselves and necessary by the divine essence. By establishing a middle ground between necessary per se and possible per se, al-Taftāzānī seeks to avoid a sharp distinction between Necessary Existent and possible existents. This approach helps him steer clear of the dilemma of either acknowledging multiple eternal essences or considering the divine attributes as non-eternal and temporal. Therefore, al-Taftāzānī’s argument that the divine attributes are possible in their essence and necessary by the essence of God serves two important purposes: Firstly, it allows him to avoid the idea of multiple necessary beings, upholding the principle of tawḥīd. Secondly, it enables him to maintain the belief in the eternality of the divine attributes, ensuring they are not considered as temporary or subject to change.

Al-Taftāzānī takes a further step to differentiate his approach from the purely philosophical perspective: In addition to his assertion that the divine attributes are possible in themselves and necessary by God’s essence, he emphasizes that these attributes must subsist in the Eternal, and they cannot be separated (munfaṣil) from Him. This condition helps him steer away from embracing the theory of emanation and its concomitants. By striking this balance, al-Taftāzānī aims to reconcile these theological concepts and present a coherent understanding of the divine attributes. Thus, his approach combines classical considerations of Ahl al-Sunnah with logical reasoning to present a more coherent and orthodox understanding of the relationship between God and His attributes.

This innovation by al-Taftāzānī’s sparked a substantial scholarly interest in the Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid tradition. The author of one of the most influential super-commentaries on Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid, Khayālī remains firmly dedicated to the principle that “The attributes are not God’s essence itself, nor are they anything extraneous to His essence.” Therefore, he attempts to reaffirm this principle by carefully refining the nuances of the concept of “dissimilarity”, aiming to provide a robust defense against al-Taftāzānī’s criticisms. Given that his only concern lies in the inconsistency of the formulation with certain aspects of Ashʿarī cosmology, it is reasonable to suggest that Khayālī also accepts the formulation of “The attributes are necessary existents by the essence (dhāt) of the Necessary Existent and possible in themselves”.

Ramazan Efendi advanced the development of a more philosophically inclined version of al-Taftāzānī’s formulation. He endeavored to amend the principle posited by the mutakallimūn, namely, “every possible being is originated”, through the act of refuting its universal applicability. Instead, Ramazan Efendi asserted that this principle exclusively applies to beings that do not subsist in God. Since no other thing may subsist in God, it becomes conceivable to posit the eternality of divine attributes without entirely discarding the principle that every possible being is originated. Additionally, in contrast to the assertions made by the mutakallimūn, Ramazan Efendi argues that the rationale behind the necessity for a cause does not solely rest upon the notion of origination. Indeed, Ramazan Efendi’s argument further elucidates the issue by highlighting that the concept of origination is contingent upon the actual creation of the originated being. As such, it does not exist prior to the act of creation. Furthermore, since a non-existent entity lacks the capacity to cause or necessitate anything, it is not tenable as the fundamental basis for the notion of need or causality. This approach bears a notable resemblance to Ibn Sīnā’s criticism of the mutakallimūn concerning their theory of origination. Like Ibn Sīnā, Ramazan Efendi contends that origination cannot serve as the foundational basis for the need of a cause, both before and after the existence of a possible being.

Ramazan Efendi, influenced by al-Taftāzānī’s insights, puts forth the argument that the divine attributes, having emanated from God, are consequently necessary by His essence. This line of reasoning bears a striking resemblance to Avicennian cosmology, wherein intellects are also conceived to be necessary emanations from God and, by extension, necessary by Him. This conceptual convergence between Ramazan Efendi’s viewpoint and Avicennian cosmology further enriches the discourse on the nature of emanation and the ontological status of divine attributes and intellects. Yet, Ramazan Efendi alludes to a significant distinction existing between the two ontological frameworks. His proposal suggests that the divine attributes maintain perpetual subsistence in God and remain inseparable from Him. In contrast, Avicennian intellects are considered detached from God and do not subsist in Him. This essential difference in the nature of subsistence and detachment characterizes the varying perspectives embraced by the two schools of thought concerning the relationship between divine attributes and intellects.

Although the ideas that emerged within the Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid tradition faced criticism from certain Ashʿarī scholars such as al-Sanūsī and al-Dasūqī, it is important to note that these concepts found wide acceptance among many scholars within the subsequent tradition. This broad acceptance suggests that it is viable to construct an argument for the principle of tawḥīd using philosophical language and frameworks while maintaining coherence with the later Sunnī tradition. This underscores the potential for fruitful engagement and synthesis between philosophical reasoning and theological tenets, paving the way for a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the principle of tawḥīd which not only remains congruent with the Sunnī scholarly tradition but also exhibits great potential in addressing contemporary intellectual challenges.