, Volume 56, Issue 3, pp 519–522 | Cite as

Response to John Makeham on Xiong Shili

  • Frank JacksonEmail author

This is not a response in the traditional sense. I am in no position to critically assess John Makeham’s reading of Xiong or his claims concerning the hybrid quality of Chinese philosophy (Makeham, 2017). My remit is to indicate how philosophers working inside the analytical tradition might respond to Xiong’s doctrines (as understood and reported in Makeham’s very helpful essay—I emphasize that this proviso governs all discussion of Xiong in what follows). Of course, the term ‘analytical tradition’ is a far from happy one—there is plenty of analysis, argument, etc. in the authors Makeham discusses—but it is a useful tag and I trust readers will know what I have in mind.

The short answer is that these philosophers will say that Xiong’s position is like the kind of idealism to be found in George Berkeley.1A perennial question is the relationship between how the world presents itself to us and how it is in itself, the relationship between our perceptual experiences and the world around...


Representationalism Idealism Berkeley 


  1. Makeham, J. (2017). Xiong Shili on why reality cannot be sought independent of phenomena. Sophia. doi: 10.1007/s11841-017-0587-8

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of PhilosophyAustralian National UniversityActonAustralia

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