Sophia

, Volume 55, Issue 3, pp 437–449 | Cite as

Euthyphro and Moral Realism: A Reply to Harrison

Article

Abstract

Gerald Harrison identifies two Euthyphro-related concerns for divine command theories and makes the case that to the extent that these concerns make trouble for divine command theories they also make trouble for non-naturalistic moral realism and naturalistic moral realism (call this the parity thesis). He also offers responses to the two concerns on behalf of divine command theorists. I show here that the parity thesis does not hold for the most commonly discussed version of divine command theory. I further argue that his responses to the two concerns fail. Finally, I draw on some of Harrison’s ideas to identify an advantage that non-naturalistic moral realism has over divine command theories and naturalistic moral realism.

Keywords

Euthyphro Divine command Moral realism Harrison 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyDePauw UniversityGreencastleUSA

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