, Volume 54, Issue 4, pp 411–427 | Cite as

The Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Objection

  • Jacobus Erasmus
  • Anné Hendrik Verhoef


In this article, we evaluate various responses to a noteworthy objection, namely, the infinite God objection to the kalām cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalām argument face a dilemma—either an actual infinite cannot exist or God cannot be infinite. More precisely, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinite with God knowing an actually infinite number of future events or abstract objects, such as mathematical truths. We argue, however, that the infinite God objection is based on two questionable assumptions, namely, (1) that it is possible for an omniscient being to know an actually infinite number of things and (2) that there exist an actually infinite number of abstract objects for God to know.


Kalām cosmological argument Omniscience Actual infinite Platonism 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Philosophy, Faculty of ArtsNorth-West UniversityPotchefstroomSouth Africa

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