Abstract
I take it that A. W. Moore is right when he said that ‘Wittgenstein was right: some things cannot be put into words. Moreover, some things that cannot be put into words are of the utmost philosophical importance’. There is, however, a constant threat of self-stultification whenever an attempt is made to put the ineffable into words. As Pamela Sue Anderson notes in Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion: reason, love, and epistemic locatedness, certain recent approaches to ineffability—including Moore’s approach—attempt to find a ‘third way’ of engaging with it, which displaces the traditional dichotomy between the effable and the ineffable, that is, between what can be said and what cannot be said. In this way, they seek to overcome the threat of self-stultification mentioned above. Still, one important challenge to this kind of approach, which Moore addresses, is, as he puts it, ‘to show how it is possible’ to talk about the ineffable ‘without belying its very ineffability’. His solution to the problem of the ineffable takes the notion of ‘knowing how’ to play a central role, and is formulated in accordance with his commitments to truth and objectivity. A further important challenge to the kind of approach to the ineffable Moore proposes concerns the issue of objectivity. In Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion, Anderson draws attention to our epistemic locatedness, which brings in questions concerning, for example, gender and culture. Pursuing this view, the challenge is to show ineffable insight without ignoring our epistemic locatedness and, in particular, the role of gender in the conceptualisation and imagery through which we seek to come to terms with the ineffable. My paper deals with these challenges. By engaging with Moore’s and Anderson’s discussions of the ineffable, I examine how it is possible to talk philosophically about the ineffable, without breaking a commitment to enlarged or objective thinking, and without ignoring the epistemic locatedness of thinking.
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Notes
Moore, A. W. (2001). ‘Arguing with Derrida’. In S. Glendinning (Ed.), Arguing with Derrida (p. 63). Oxford: Blackwell (also in Ratio: an International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, XIII/4, 2000, pp. 355–381); cf. Anderson, P. S. (2001), 'Gender and the Infinite', International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, 193–203; and (2012) Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion: Reason, Love and Epistemic Locatedness. Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 70, 75.
Moore, A. W. (2003). ‘Ineffability and religion’. European Journal of Philosophy, 161–76, 167; cf. Anderson, P. S. (2002). 'Ineffable Knowledge and Gender'. In P. Goodchild (Ed.), Rethinking Philosophy of Religion: Approaches from Continental Philosophy (pp. 163–164). New York: Fordham University Press.
Anderson (2012), p. 69.
Moore (2001), p. 68.
Moore A. W. (1997). Points of View, OUP Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 8 and ‘Ineffability and religion’.
Anderson (2012), p. 79.
Moore notes, for example, that Wittgenstein and Frege are ‘unsuccessfully trying to talk about that ineffable unity—of language, of reality, and of language with reality—which makes it possible to talk about anything at all’. Moore (2001), p. 63
Moore (2003), p. 166, and Anderson (2002), pp. 162–183.
Moore (2003), p. 166.
Ibid., pp. 161-4f. Moore argues against the view that there are ineffable truths and, as noted, supports the view that there is ineffable knowledge.
Moore (2001), p. 64.
Moore (2003), p. 170.
An alternative way of dealing with contradictions when trying to come to terms with the ineffable is, as Moore notes, to make play with them in the context of creative uses of language. For instance, there are numerous examples of ‘creative use of contradiction in mystical and religious writing […]. They can be found in the writings of Plato, the Psalmists, Lao Tze, Nicholas de Cusa, Kierkegaard, and countless others’. See Moore (2001), pp. 171 and 175, n. 32. Another example of a creative, ‘playful’ use of language and contradiction is Derrida’s text ‘Différance’ (2003). Anderson has discussed this in her reading of Moore on ineffable knowledge as making play with what cannot be said, but can be shown, in creative uses of language; in particular she develops these uses in Luce Irigaray and Derrida; see Anderson, ‘Ineffable Knowledge and Gender’, pp. 177–183.
Moore (2003) p. 164.
Ibid., p. 164; Moore (1997), p. 179.
Moore (2003), p. 165; Moore (1997), p. 185.
Ibid., (1997), p. 277.
Moore (2003), p. 165.
Moore (1997), p. 184.
Moore (2003), p. 164.
Moore (2003), p. 165; see also (1997), p. 183.
Ibid., pp. 164–165.
Ibid., p. 165.
Moore (1997), p. 185; my emphasis.
Moore (2003), p. 165; my emphasis.
Moore (1997), p. 185.
Moore (2003), p. 165.
Ibid., p. 164.
Moore’s formulation of the problem and his solution are explicitly stated in Moore (2001), Section 8.
Moore (2003), p. 164.
Moore (2001), p. 63.
Ibid., p. 68.
Ibid., p. 69.
Ibid., p. 69.
Ibid., p. 73. Moore elaborates this in much more detail in terms of the distinction between mentioning and using a word, but it is not necessary to discuss this here.
Ibid., p. 74.
Haynes, P. (2014). ‘Encouraging a thoughtful love of life’. Sophia, Vol. 53, 2014.
Anderson (2012), p. 75.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 72.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 84–85.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 76.
Ibid., p. 79.
Moore (1997), p. 6.
Ibid., p. 4.
Haynes, P. (2014).
Ibid.
Ibid., Rose, G. (1978). The melancholy science: an introduction to the thought of Theodor W. Adorno. Macmillan Press, p. 145.
Haynes (2014); Howie, G. (2010). Between feminism and materialism: A question of method. Macmillan, p. 9.
Moore (1997), p. 12.
It might be useful to note that, in fact, Moore draws a distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘objective’. In this paper, I am, however, only stipulatively defining my own term ‘absolutely objective’ in a way which does not conflict with Moore’s distinction.
Baiasu, R. (2012). “Space and the limits of objectivity: could there be a disembodied thinking of reality?” In R. Baiasu, G. Bird and A. W. Moore (Eds.), Contemporary Kantian metaphysics: New essays on time and space. Palgrave.
Anderson (2012), p. 79.
Moore (1997), p. 276.
Ibid., p. 277.
Anderson (2012), pp. 85–86; my emphasis.
Moore (1997), p. 277.
To avoid a misinterpretation of this sentence, it is important to note that Moore does not deny that an absolute representation and a perspectival representation can have the same content.
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., p. 6.
Anderson’s discussion of the exchange between Moore and Derrida can be seen as illustrating how this methodology works. See Anderson (2012), Chap. 4, and Moore (2001).
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I am greatly indebted to A. W. Moore and Pamela Sue Anderson for their suggestions and comments on this paper.
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Baiasu, R. Knowing How to Talk About What Cannot Be Said: Objectivity and Epistemic Locatedness. SOPHIA 53, 215–229 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-014-0419-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-014-0419-z