, Volume 50, Issue 3, pp 331–344

Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God


DOI: 10.1007/s11841-010-0213-5

Cite this article as:
Janzen, G. SOPHIA (2011) 50: 331. doi:10.1007/s11841-010-0213-5


This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.


Pascal’s wager Theoretical rationality Prudential rationality Probability assignments 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CalgaryCalgaryCanada

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