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Time/History, Self-disclosure and Anticipation: Pannenberg, Heidegger and the Question of Metaphysics

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Abstract

This essay examines Wolfhart Pannenberg’s defense of metaphysics’ foundational importance for philosophy and theology. Among all the modern philosophers whose claims Pannenberg challenges, Martin Heidegger’s discourse against Western metaphysics receives the major portion of criticism. The first thing one concludes from this criticism is an affirmation of a wide intellectual gap that separates Pannenberg’s thought from Heidegger’s, as if each stands at the very opposite corner of the other’s school of thought. The questions this essay tackles are: is this seemingly irreconcilable difference between Pannenberg and Heidegger fully justifiable? What if there is a reading of Panneberg’s and Heidegger’s view of metaphysics that can reveal deeper similarities between the two thinkers than the first reading of Pannenberg’s criticism of Heidegger allows us to see? It then answers these questions by showing that both thinkers actually share a common emphasis on the concepts of ‘time/history’, ‘self-disclosure’ and ‘anticipation’, and their reliance on these notions reveals that Heidegger’s and Pannenberg’s approaches to the phenomenon of understanding and to metaphysical ontology are not fully contradictory but rather hold noticeable hermeneutical similarities.

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Notes

  1. W. Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, Philip Clayton (trans.), (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), pp. 9-10 ff.

  2. See: John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 71-72.

  3. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pp. 73-74.

  4. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, p. 5.

  5. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, Albert Hofstadter (trans.), (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), p. 23, and Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pp. 87-92.

  6. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, p. 76.

  7. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pp. 82-83.

  8. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, p. 84.

  9. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pp. 85ff.

  10. Robert J. Dostal, “Time and Phenomenology on Husserl and Heidegger”, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Charles E. Guignon (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 141-169, p. 154.

  11. Dostal, “Time and Phenomenology on Husserl and Heidegger”, p. 157.

  12. Dostal, “Time and Phenomenology on Husserl and Heidegger”, p. 155.

  13. Dostal, “Time and Phenomenology on Husserl and Heidegger”, p. 158. Dostal is correct in asking “is [Heidegger’s] analysis of the temporality of being merely an extension [my italics] of the account of time…or are there important differences in the two accounts?” (p. 157), the question, that is, that can be raised, as Dostal says, to challenge Husserl’s phenomenology as well (pp. 143-150).

  14. James R. Mensch, Knowing and Being: A Postmodern Reversal, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 84.

  15. Heidegger, Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.), (London: SCM Press, 1962), II.5, p. 426.

  16. Heidegger, Being and Time, II.5, p. 426.

  17. Heidegger, Being and Time, II.5, pp. 430-431ff.

  18. Heidegger, Being and Time, II.5, p. 434. What is anticipated by Dasein, according to Heidegger, is death. By the anticipation of death, Dasein “understands itself unambiguously in terms of its own most distinctive possibility”. Death works conveniently in Heidegger’s Dasein since he is speaking abut self-disclosure in its relation to human life. This, however, is not the same as saying that for Heidegger Dasein is merely the existent individual human being. Man’s existence-in-the-world is an exemplary arena for understanding, not a final definition of being-there.

  19. Heidegger, Being and Time, II.5, p. 449.

  20. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, in The Piety of Thinking, James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (trans.), (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 6,7.

  21. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 7.

  22. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 9.

  23. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 9.

  24. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 10.

  25. Derrida argues that contrary to the reading of the post-war (French) philosophy of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, Heidegger’s Being and Time is not an anthropologistic deviation from phenomenology. Rather, his destruction of classical metaphysics includes a destruction of the anthropocentric interpretation of metaphysics: Derrida, “The Ends of Man”, in Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass (trans.), (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982), p. 118 (pp. 111-119). In footnote number 10 on the same page, Derrida sites a quotation from Heidegger’s paper “Letter on ‘Humanism’” to prove this view: Heidegger, Basic Writings: from Being and Tine (1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964), David F. Krell (ed.), (London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 193-242. Derrida, nonetheless, believes that Heidegger’s language of being is the reason behind the misreading of his Being and Time’s real intention (pp. 126-129).

  26. See: John D. Caputo, “Heidegger and Theology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, pp. 270-288, p. 282; and Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 6.

  27. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 13.

  28. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 13.

  29. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 14.

  30. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 17.

  31. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 21.

  32. Caputo, “Heidegger and Theology”, p. 283.

  33. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, (London: Sheed and Ward, 1979), p. 4.

  34. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 8. Pannenberg even believes that “the varieties of solutions [to this challenge] reflect the deep-seated difficulties in the problem itself”.

  35. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 9ff.

  36. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 16.

  37. For a detailed discussion and proof that this Hegelian or process-philosophy conviction is not characteristic of Pannenberg’s theological ontology, read Najeeb G. Awad, “Futural Ousia or Eschatological Disclosure: A Systematic Analysis of Pannenberg’s Trinitarian Theology” in Kerygma Und Dogma, 54 (1), 2008, pp. 37-52, and Najeeb G. Awad, “Revelation, History and Idealism: Re-examining the Conceptual Roots of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Theology,” in Theological Review, 26(1), pp. 91-110.

  38. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p.18.

  39. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p.131.This involvement designates for Pannenberg “a content of revelation that is continually revising itself”.

  40. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 132.

  41. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, pp. 133-135.

  42. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 134.

  43. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 135. “An understanding that puts revelation into contrast to, or even conflict with, natural knowledge is in danger of distorting the historical revelation into a Gnostic knowledge of secrets”.

  44. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 137.

  45. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 150.

  46. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 150.

  47. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 153.

  48. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, Basic Questions in Theology, (London: SCM Press, 1973), Vol.3, pp. 116-143, p. 120.

  49. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, p. 121. The philosophical assumption even becomes the object of theological reflection, according to Pannenberg.

  50. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, p. 123. Pannenberg has here in mind the traditional trend of Protestant theology: “The Traditional concentration of Protestant theology upon the ethical question of Sin and forgiveness has forced into the background not only the problem of the understanding of the world, but often too the social nature of the reality of human existence” [p. 123 (pp. 118ff)].

  51. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, p. 125.

  52. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, p. 131. Such an attention to the intimacy of being and time is detected in Pannenberg’s speech about the historical reality of Jesus and its relation to the way this reality was interpreted through time in: Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, Basic Questions in Theology, (London: SCM Press, 1970), vol.1, pp. 137-181. “While it is necessary to distinguish between the individuality of a historical figure and the ‘history of influences’…stemming from him, they nevertheless belong together. They do so in a way that not only must the ‘history of (his) influence’ be understood from the side of the historical figure that constitutes its point of origin, but also, conversely, in a way that this figure cannot be comprehended in his individuality unless it is understood as the starting point of this history of influence” (pp. 153-154).

  53. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, p. 139.

  54. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, p. 142.

  55. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, pp. 6-7.

  56. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, pp. 128-129.

  57. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 15.

  58. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, p. 129.

  59. Pannenberg, “Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism”, p.130, and Metaphysics and the Idea of God, pp. 3-21.

  60. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, p. 139. “The meaning we call the historical one is inherent in the object itself. It follows from this that the facticity of the content must somehow remain the measure of the multiplicity of its interpretations, although interpretation of it must go beyond bare facticity and therefore can appear in a manifold form”.

  61. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, p.140. This is the meaning of Pannenberg’s following claim “the universal significance of the history of Jesus [i.e. the form] as the revelation of the all-determining reality of God [i.e. the content] cannot be adequately tested solely in relation to the individual’s experience of conscience” (p. 142).

  62. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, pp. 144ff. See also Heidegger, The basic Problems of Phenomenology, Albert Hofstadter (trans.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, and Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Michael Heim (trans.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

  63. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, p. 151. It is excluded, according to Pannenberg, by virtue of the fact that their unity is demonstrated and given through the unity of the historical object or subject they both are interpreting (p. 152).

  64. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, pp. 162ff.

  65. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, p. 163.

  66. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, pp. 163-164.

  67. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, p. 166.

  68. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, pp. 166-167. “The wholeness of the individual’s existence would not come into view from the standpoint of death, but only from the standpoint of a determination transcending the finitude of individual human being”. See also the argument in: Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, pp. 69-90.

  69. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutics”, pp. 167-169.

  70. Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, p. 6. Pannenberg is quite right in believing that theology as well, if not more than all, should take metaphysics so seriously, for, as he says, “a theological doctrine of God that lacks metaphysics as its discussion partner falls into either a kerygmatic subjectivism or a thoroughgoing demythologization–and frequently into both at the same time”. Such a warning is very important for the various theological trends of postmodernity that tries to undermine metaphysics.

  71. Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, p. 12 (pp. 11-13 ff).

  72. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, p. 9.

  73. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology”, pp. 10ff.

  74. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Martin Heidegger and Marburg Theology”, in Philosophical Hermeneutics, David E. Ling (trans. & ed), (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 198-212, p. 207.

  75. Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pp. 13ff.

  76. L.P. Hemming, “Nihilism: Heidegger and the Grounds of Redemption”, in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, John Milbank; Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (eds.), (London and New York: Rutledge, 2003), pp. 91-108, p. 97.

  77. Hemming, “Nihilism: Heidegger and the Grounds of Redemption”, p. 97.

  78. H.L. Dreyfus, “Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics”, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, pp. 289-316, pp. 292-293.

  79. Dreyfus, “Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics”, pp. 313-319.

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  1. Lecturer in Systematic and Intercultural Theology, EL Missionseminar, Hermannsburg/Göttingen University, Seminar Hermannsburg Mission, Missionsstr 3-5, 29320, Hermannsburg, Germany

    Najeeb G. Awad

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Correspondence to Najeeb G. Awad.

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I am deeply grateful to Prof. Wolfhart Pannenberg for reading the first draft of this essay and commenting on it when I send it to him on 10 December, 2005 (before he unfortunately entered the hospital and intensive care). Prof. Pannenberg generously wrote to me commenting on it with the following message: Thank you for your letter of December 10 and for your manuscript comparing my own thought to that of Heidegger. On reading through your manuscript I found many very pertinent observations and comparisons. The early Heidegger felt very close to the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey on history and hermeneutics as it is contained in volume 7 of Dilthey’s collective works. My own view on history and hermeneutics is also influenced by this position of Dilthey, and this fact may explain certain parallels with some ideas of Heidegger. Heidegger contributed in “Sein und Zeit” a solution to the main problem of Dilthey’s view, the relativism resulting from the observation that the meaning of history is not accessible before the end of history, neither in the case of individual life history nor in the case of history at large. In the case of individual history Heidegger introduces the notion of anticipation of the end of the life of Dasein functioning as a key to the whole of Dasein and of its meaning. This is the one idea of Heidegger’s that I appropriated to my own thought and transferred to history at large in the light of Jewish apocalyptic expectation and of the event of Jesus’ resurrection. This is the point of closest contact between Heidegger and my own thought. Regarding his critique of metaphysics and his reading of the history of philosophy I remained rather critical. I consider Heidegger’s reading of the early philosophers to be rather arbitrary at many points as compared to the philological interpretation of those texts. In this respect, I was deeply influenced by the book of W. Jaeger on the theology of the Early Greek Thinkers. It shows that the true concept of God was the basic issue in the beginnings of philosophy. The concept of being entered only later, with Parmenides and became determinative for “metaphysics” especially in the Aristotelian tradition, which Heidegger learned from his early days in his Roman Catholic training. Because of this different perspective on the history of philosophy, I came to question the basic importance of the concept of being in the task of metaphysics. This also has obvious consequences for the way of conceiving the relationship between theology and philosophy. Thank you again for your letter and manuscript. With kind regards and all my best wishes for your future work I am

Sincerely yours

Wolfhart Pannenberg

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Awad, N.G. Time/History, Self-disclosure and Anticipation: Pannenberg, Heidegger and the Question of Metaphysics. SOPHIA 50, 113–133 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0209-1

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