, Volume 46, Issue 3, pp 295–304 | Cite as

More than One Flaw: Reply to Millican

  • Graham OppyEmail author


Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004) claims to have detected ‘the one fatal flaw in Anselm’s ontological argument.’ I argue that there is more than one important flaw in the position defended in Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004). First, Millican’s reconstruction of Anselm’s argument does serious violence to the original text. Second, Millican’s generalised objection fails to diagnose any flaw in a vast range of ontological arguments. Third, there are independent reasons for thinking that Millican’s generalised objection is unpersuasive.


Ontological argument Anselm Proslogion Non-existent objects 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Philosophy and BioethicsMonash UniversityClaytonAustralia

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