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Logica Universalis

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 409–419 | Cite as

Expressivist Perspective on Logicality

  • Pavel Arazim
Article
  • 28 Downloads

Abstract

Various attempts at demarcating logic were undertaken, many of them based on specific understanding of how logical knowledge is formal and not material. MacFarlane has persuasively shown that general idea of formality of logic can be understood in various ways. I take two of the accounts of formality, namely the requirement of conservativity and the requirement of schematicity of logical vocabulary, into consideration as promising candidates to make the all too unclear notion of formality more precise and study to what degree they could be considered as either necessary or sufficient conditions for logicality of some piece of vocabulary. Finding both notion unsatisfactory, as they stand, I propose combining them and envisage a hierarchy of logicality of expressions of a given language. Such a hierarchy is complicated and not linear, yet still offers a valuable explication of both the range and pragmatic significance of logic, if we combine it with logical expressivism.

Keywords

Logical constant expressivism topic-neutrality proof-theory conservativity 

Mathematics Subject Classification

Primary 03A05 Secondary 03A10 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Logic, Institute of PhilosophyCzech Academy of SciencesPragueCzechia

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