Logica Universalis

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 207–223 | Cite as

Logic and Natural Selection

Article

Abstract

Is logic, feasibly, a product of natural selection? In this paper we treat this question as dependent upon the prior question of where logic is founded. After excluding other possibilities, we conclude that logic resides in our language, in the shape of inferential rules governing the logical vocabulary of the language. This means that knowledge of (the laws of) logic is inseparable from the possession of the logical constants they govern. In this sense, logic may be seen as a product of natural selection: the emergence of logic requires the development of creatures who can wield structured languages of a specific complexity, and who are capable of putting the languages to use within specific discursive practices.

Mathematics Subject Classification (2010)

03A05 

Keywords

Logic natural selection modus ponens inferentialism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Basel AG 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech RepublicPrague 1Czech Republic
  2. 2.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of Hradec KrálovéHradec KrálovéCzech Republic

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