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On engineering game theory with its application in power systems

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Abstract

Due to its capability of solving decision-making problems involving multiple entities and objectives, as well as complex action sequences, game theory has been a basic mathematical tool of economists, politicians, and sociologists for decades. It helps them understand how strategic interactions impact rational decisions of individual players in competitive and uncertain environment, if each player aims to get the best payoff. This situation is ubiquitous in engineering practices. This paper streamlines the foundations of engineering game theory, which uses concepts, theories and methodologies to guide the resolution of engineering design, operation, and control problems in a more canonical and systematic way. An overview of its application in smart grid technologies and power systems related topics is presented, and intriguing research directions are also envisioned.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering and Applied Electronics Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China

    Shengwei Mei, Wei Wei & Feng Liu

  2. State Key Laboratory of Control and Simulation of Power Systems and Generation Equipments, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China

    Shengwei Mei, Wei Wei & Feng Liu

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  1. Shengwei Mei
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  2. Wei Wei
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  3. Feng Liu
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Correspondence to Wei Wei.

Additional information

This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 51621065).

Shengwei MEI is currently a Professor with Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. His research interests include power system complexity and control, game theory and its application in power systems.

Wei WEI is currently an Assistant Professor with Tsinghua University. His research interests include applied optimization, energy economics, and interdependent energy networks.

Feng LIU is an Associate Professor with Tsinghua University. His research interests include power system distributed control and optimization.

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Mei, S., Wei, W. & Liu, F. On engineering game theory with its application in power systems. Control Theory Technol. 15, 1–12 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11768-017-6186-y

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