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, Volume 20, Issue 2, pp 397–410 | Cite as

Cost allocation in inventory transportation systems

  • M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro
  • I. García-Jurado
  • A. Meca
  • M. A. Mosquera
Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, we deal with the cost allocation problem arising in an inventory transportation system with a single item and multiple agents that place joint orders using an EOQ policy. In our problem, the fixed-order cost of each agent is the sum of a first component (common to all agents) plus a second component which depends on the distance from the agent to the supplier. We assume that agents are located on a line route, in the sense that if any subgroup of agents places a joint order, its fixed cost is the sum of the first component plus the second component of the agent in the group at maximal distance from the supplier. For these inventory transportation systems, we introduce and characterize a rule which allows us to allocate the costs generated by the joint order. This rule has the same flavor as the Shapley value, but requires less computational effort. We show that our rule has good properties from the point of view of stability.

Keywords

Inventory transportation systems Cooperative games Core Cost allocation rule 

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)

91A12 91A80 90B05 

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Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro
    • 1
  • I. García-Jurado
    • 2
  • A. Meca
    • 3
  • M. A. Mosquera
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Faculty of EconomicsVigo UniversityVigoSpain
  2. 2.Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Computer ScienceCoruña UniversityCoruñaSpain
  3. 3.Center of Operations ResearchMiguel Hernández UniversityElcheSpain
  4. 4.Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Faculty of Business Administration and TourismVigo UniversityOurenseSpain

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