Abstract
We consider an extension of the classic division problem with claims, division problems with multiple references. We show that the theory of cooperative games is able to provide a single-valued allocation rule for this class of problems. Moreover, this rule can be related with the Talmud rule for the classic division problem, as in Aumann and Maschler (J. Econ. Theory 36, 195–213, 1985). Finally, we establish the consistency and other basic properties of the rule.
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Hinojosa, M.A., Mármol, A.M. & Sánchez, F. A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references. TOP 20, 661–678 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-010-0158-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-010-0158-4