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Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games

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Abstract

We consider an extension of glove markets, called T-markets, characterize a family of weighted allocation rules, and define related cooperative games. For the class of T-market games we introduce a new solution concept called the type monotonic allocation scheme. It turns out that the nucleolus and the τ-value generate the same type monotonic allocation scheme with nice extra properties.

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Correspondence to Tamás Solymosi.

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Initial research for this paper was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund grant OTKA T030945. The authors thank Ruud Hendrickx for his valuable comments. Research of T. Solymosi was also supported in part by OTKA grant T046194.

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Brânzei, R., Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S. Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games. TOP 15, 78–88 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-007-0002-7

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