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Welfare reform, 1834: Did the New Poor Law in England produce significant economic gains?

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Abstract

The English Old Poor Law, which before 1834 provided welfare to the elderly, children, the improvident, and the unfortunate, was a bête noire of the new discipline of Political Economy. Smith, Bentham, Malthus, and Ricardo all claimed it created significant social costs and increased rather than reduced poverty. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, drafted by Political Economists, cuts payments sharply. Because local rules on eligibility and provision varied greatly before the 1834 reform, we can estimate the social costs of the extensive welfare provision of the Old Poor Law. Surprisingly there is no evidence of any of the alleged social costs that prompted the harsh treatment of the poor after 1834. Political economy, it seems, was born in sin.

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Fig. 1

Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1835)

Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1834b)

Fig. 4

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Notes

  1. Ricardo (1919, 83, 86).

  2. 11% of the population were in receipt of some kind of relief in 1803, and 9% in each of the years 1813–1815. Payments per head of population reported for 1825–1834 were similar to 1803–1804, 1813–1815 (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1803-4, 1818, 1830-1, 1835). Total payments as a share of GDP were, however, only around 2% 1783–1834 (Lindert 1998).

  3. Smith (1904), Bentham (2001), Malthus (1970), Ricardo (1919, 82–86).

  4. Blaug (1963, 151).

  5. On Sweden, see for example, Lindbeck (1997).

  6. Over the course of the nineteenth century, increasing proportions of relief recipients were in workhouses. The workhouse itself was not abolished in England until 1929.

  7. In 1842, the cost per workhouse relief recipient was 63 percent greater than for outdoor recipients (Statistical Society 1843, 256).

  8. The vestry was the parish council. Up until 1834 local magistrates, with jurisdiction over groups of parishes, adjudicated if the parish denied relief to an applicant and set the level of relief that had to be offered (see, for example, Song 1998). Thus in the parish of Ardleigh, in Essex, in 1795 the overseer’s account book notes “Relieved John Lilly on complaint by order, 5 s.” (Essex Record Office, Overseers Accounts, D/P 263/12/1).

  9. Essex Record Office, Overseers Accounts, D/P 263/12/7-8, Census Returns 1821, D/P 263/28/1.

  10. Boyer (1990) considers the main loser from these transfers to be smallholders who did not hire labor, or house owners. But the tithe collectors, who could get as much as 20% of the rental income in a parish, would also typically not hire labor locally.

  11. Boyer’s primary empirical support for his theory is data on a cross section of parishes in 1832–1833. He shows that parishes with higher poor law payments were those with more seasonal labor demands. High-payment parishes were also those with a larger proportion of ratepayers who were farmers (Boyer 1990).

  12. The fraction of the land employed in arable cultivation comes from the tithe surveys carried out in parishes mainly in the years 1837–1845. Only for 35 percent of parishes do we have this fraction directly. For the rest, we estimate it as the average of the county the parish was in (there were 42 counties).

  13. Boberg-Fazlic and Sharp (2017) also find that once region controls are included, indicators of arable potential by county (Table 2, p. 67) do not show a significant link with Old Poor Law payments 1787 or 1815. They find proximity to London is associated with higher payments, but that is captured by our south east indicator variable in Table 1.

  14. Where child allowance was allowed just for “large families” without a specific rule it was often stated or implied that this was an infrequent occurrence.

  15. King (2000).

  16. King (2000) makes the argument that there were regional differences in attitudes to welfare that created these different expenditures. Boberg-Fazlic and Sharp (2018) argue that the lower welfare payments in Northern England can be linked to more rapid social mobility rates in the North, which reduced public support for welfare payments.

  17. The logic of the commissioners argument has been criticized. See, for example, McCloskey (1973).

  18. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1834a, 146).

  19. Besley and Coates (1992) set out a micro-theoretic conditions which would underpin this approach.

  20. We include the 1824–1828 data to show that the relationship between the payments in 1829–1833 and 1838–1841 cannot be just the result of larger random components in the higher paying parishes in 1829–1833. If so the curve relating 1824–1828 payments to 1829–1833 would show a similar regression to the mean.

  21. Addition of other variables such as indicator variables for local effects, for urban versus rural parishes, and for the poor law union the parish belonged to can raise the R2 to 0.64. But this implies that these other elements explain only a very small share of the variance.

  22. Again looking at the change from 1829–1830 to 1831–1833 under the Old Poor Law the same variables explain only 2% of the variance across time periods in poor payments per acre.

  23. To be a valid instrument, the level of poor payments per head before the reform also must have no direct effect on the change in rent. We demonstrate in Table 1 above that these payments were largely determined by local tastes for welfare, which we expect are unconnected directly with subsequent changes in the rental values of farmland.

  24. Clark (1998, 88).

  25. Quoted in Boyer (1989, 94).

  26. Huzel (1980, 369–375).

  27. Boyer (1989, 105) controls in his estimations for such things as the income of laborers, and the availability of housing and other income sources.

  28. We excluded parishes where less than 50% of males were employed in agriculture in 1831, and where the population in 1831 was less than 50 people.

  29. Clark (2002).

References

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  • Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1818) Returns relative to the expense and maintenance of the poor in England, vol XIX

  • Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1830–1831) Money expended for the relief of the poor, 1825–9, vol XI, p 217

  • Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1833) 1831 census: abstracts of the answers and returns, vols XXXVI–XXXVIII

  • Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1834a) Report of the poor law commission, vol XXVII

  • Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1834b) Report of the poor law commission, Appendix B. 1. Part II, vol XXXI

  • Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1835) Money expended for the maintenance of the poor, 1830–4, vol XLVII, pp 185–400

  • Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1844) Poor rates, vol XL

  • Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1845) Annual value of real property of each parish of each county of England and wales assessed to the property and income tax, 1842–3, vol XXXVIII

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Correspondence to Gregory Clark.

Data Appendix

Data Appendix

Because of the intense public debate about reforming the poor law, the English collected a great deal of information about poor payments, population and occupations by parish in the years 1825–1842.

For the tests outlined above, we measure farmland rents in 1842 from the tax valuations for this year of all farmland in a parish (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1845). For properties let within 7 years of the assessment (i.e., 1835–1842), the rental value was the contracted value. For properties on longer leases, it was the assessed market value. Thus the parish land rents measured in 1842 all stem from the post-reform period. We added any tithe payments (also recorded in this source) to the rents, so that the 1842 measure is for all rental claims on farmland in the parish. Only parishes with more than two-thirds of the property value coming from land in 1842 were included so that we are dealing mainly with rural parishes.

To get the rent per acre in 1842, we divide by the land area of the parish. Since not all of this parish area was farmland, it introduces an error in this measurement, which fortunately is on the left-hand side of our estimation of Eq. (4). In some rural parishes, a large part of the land was not used for agriculture, being too hilly. For rural parishes, the fraction of the area that was actually farmland will correlate with the population density. So we include population density as a control for this measurement error when estimating Eq. (4). In Table 3, the estimated coefficient on population density is positive, which is what we would expect from the nature of the measurement error.

There is no parish-level data available on land rents before the 1834 reform. To get rental values in the years before the reform, we use data collected by Clark on newly formed rents (and tithes) on individual plots within parishes in the years 1820–1834.Footnote 29 From these, we estimate parish rental values per acre before the reform by adjusting for plot sizes. Rents per acre tended to be much higher on smaller plots. We adjust land rents to the average plot size that would be expected for a parish of that character (based on population density, location, and type of agriculture). In 1820–1834, overall farm rents stayed constant (Clark, 2002) but in estimating pre-reform parish rents we included year dummies to control for such year effects. From 5739 plot rentals, we estimate 2207 rural average parish land rents per acre.

Though the data come from very different sources, the parish rent per acre for 1820–1833 estimated in this way is strongly linked to rents per acre in 1842. Thus

$$Rent_{20 - 34} = \, \mathop {1.011}\limits_{{\left( {.047} \right)}} + \mathop {0.560rent_{42} }\limits_{{\left( {.031} \right)}}$$

Note that the intercept is greater than 0, and the coefficient on the 1842 rent less than 1. This implies, as we indicate above, significant errors in the later measures of rent per acre at the parish level.

Data are available from the Parliamentary Papers on poor rate collections in each of the years 1824–1833, and 1838–1841 (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1830-1, 1835, 1844). We average these into poor rate collections in 1824–1828, 1829–1833, and 1838–1841, and so calculate poor rate payments per head, and poor rate payments per acre based on the 1831 and 1841 population totals. We calculate poor payments charged on farmland by multiplying these parish totals by the share of the parish property value in 1842 that was land. We calculate poor payments per acre by dividing the totals for the parish by the measured land area of the parish. This would introduce a measurement error which would bias the estimate of b toward 0, except that we are effectively normalizing on the left-hand side of Eq. (4) with the same imperfect measure of farmland area.

We measure the fraction of land which was common property in 1842 using parish-level data on common land from Tate and Turner (1978). The fraction of common on the plots earlier is estimated as discussed in Clark (2002).

The 1831 census supplies information for each parish on the population, the number of resident farmers hiring labor, the number of resident farmers not hiring labor, and the numbers of agricultural laborers (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1833). We can thus identify rural parishes where most employment in 1831 was in agriculture. We kept in the sample only parishes where agriculture was the listed occupation for at least 50% of adult males in 1831.

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Clark, G., Page, M.E. Welfare reform, 1834: Did the New Poor Law in England produce significant economic gains?. Cliometrica 13, 221–244 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-018-0174-4

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