Datenschutz und Datensicherheit - DuD

, Volume 39, Issue 11, pp 747–752 | Cite as

Cast-as-intended-Verifizierbarkeit für das Polyas-Internetwahlsystem

  • Stephan Neumann
  • Melanie Volkamer
  • Moritz Strube
  • Wolfgang Jung
  • Achim Brelle
Aufsätze
  • 96 Downloads

Zusammenfassung

Internet-Wahlsysteme müssen einer Vielzahl von Anforderungen genügen.1 Besonders drei Eigenschaften–die Übereinstimmung von Stimmabgabe und Wählerintension, die korrekte (und vertrauliche) Speicherung der Stimmabgabe und die fehlerfreie Auszählung–sollte für ein Wahlsystem nachweisbar sein. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt Ansätze zur Realisierung einer nachweisbaren Übereinstimmung von Stimmabgabe und Wählerintension (Cast-as-intended-Verifizierbarkeit) vor und zeigt, wie das verbreitete Polyas-Internetwahlsystem um diese Eigenschaft erweitert werden kann.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephan Neumann
    • 1
  • Melanie Volkamer
    • 2
  • Moritz Strube
    • 2
  • Wolfgang Jung
    • 2
  • Achim Brelle
    • 2
  1. 1.MühltalDeutschland
  2. 2.DarmstadtDeutschland

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