Ressourcen und Anreize im Bildungswesen

Aufgaben und Handlungsmöglichkeiten des Staates aus Sicht der Bildungsökonomik

Zusammenfassung

Ökonomen haben viel Vertrauen in Märkte und individuelle Entscheidungen. Jeder Staatseingriff bedarf der Begründung. Das gilt auch dann, wenn dies einen für die Wohlfahrt eines Landes so wichtigen Bereich wie die Bildung betrifft. Es muss zunächst geprüft werden, ob und wo Marktversagen bei individuellen Entscheidungen über Bildungsinvestitionen vorliegt. Weiter bleibt zu diskutieren, wie der Staat geeignete Rahmenbedingungen für ein Bildungssystem setzen kann. Sollen mehr öffentliche Mittel in den Bildungssektor fließen? Oder sind vielmehr im Bildungssystem Anreize zu setzen, damit sich sowohl die Lernenden als auch die Lehrenden intensiver im Bildungsprozess engagieren? Zur Gestaltung von Anreizen gibt es in der bildungsökonomischen Literatur eine Vielzahl von Ansatzpunkten, von denen in diesem Beitrag exemplarisch (und für Deutschland möglicherweise besonders interessant) die Einführung zentraler Abschlussprüfungen und leistungsabhängiger Bezahlung von Lehrkräften diskutiert werden.

Abstract

Resources and Incentives in Education: Tasks and possibilities of state for action from the perspective of education economics. Economists have a lot of confidence in markets and individual decisions. Each policy intervention has to be justified. This holds also regarding interventions that affect individual education decisions, with education being a key determinant of a nation’s welfare. In order to justify policy interventions, one first has to identify market failure concerning individual decisions. It is also necessary to discuss how policy can set appropriate framework conditions: Should more resources be allocated to the education sector? Or should the education system rather create the right incentives for teachers and students to put more effort into the educational process? The education economics literature deals with a number of approaches that create such incentives. By way of example, we discuss two of them that might be of particular interest for education policy in Germany: central exit examinations and performance-pay for teachers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Als EU19 werden die 15 EU-Länder vor der Osterweiterung plus Polen, Ungarn, Tschechien und die Slowakei bezeichnet.

  2. 2.

    Zudem gibt es empirische Belege dafür, dass Schülerleistungen in standardisierten Tests ein guter Prädiktor für das Wirtschaftswachstum von Ländern ist (vgl. Hanushek/Wößmann 2007).

  3. 3.

    Eine detaillierte Darstellung oder gar Begründung der in den genannten Arbeiten verwendeten Identifikationsstrategien (Differenzen in Differenzen bzw. Propensity Score Matching) kann hier aus Platzgründen nicht geleistet werden. Interessierte Leser/-innen seien daher auf die Originalbeiträge verwiesen.

  4. 4.

    School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions of Employment 2001: Revised Guidance, DfES/0696/2001. http://www. teachernet.gov.uk/_doc/4013/pay_guidance.doc.

  5. 5.

    http://fhh.hamburg.de/stadt/Aktuell/behoerden/bildung-sport/service/lehrer-arbeitszeit-modell/ lehrerarbeitszeit.html.

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Correspondence to PD Dr. Hendrik Jürges.

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Jürges, H., Schneider, K. Ressourcen und Anreize im Bildungswesen. ZfE 11, 234–252 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11618-008-0024-4

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Schlüsselwörter

  • leistungsabhängige Bezahlung
  • Staatseingriff
  • zentrale Abschlussprüfungen

Keywords

  • central exit examinations
  • performance-based pay
  • policy intervention