Staatskapazität und Verwaltungsreformen in hybriden und autoritären Regimen – am Beispiel der Steuerverwaltung in postsowjetischen Ländern

  • Rafael Mrowczynski
  • Sabine Kropp
  • Katharina Bluhm
Literaturbericht
  • 2 Downloads

Zusammenfassung

Autoritäre Regime unternehmen zahlreiche Anstrengungen, um ihre Verwaltungen zu professionalisieren und Staatskapazitäten zu erweitern. Der Bericht verknüpft zentrale Annahmen und Befunde der Forschung zu autoritären und hybriden Regimen mit Ergebnissen der politikwissenschaftlichen Verwaltungsforschung zu postsowjetischen Staaten. Als Beispiel dienen Reformen von Steuerverwaltungen, da diese eine essenzielle Voraussetzung für die Erweiterung von Staatskapazität darstellen. Anhand der Fälle Russland, Ukraine und Kasachstan wird unter Rückgriff auf Annahmen der Autoritarismusforschung gezeigt, dass stabile, hegemoniale autoritäre Regime offenbar erfolgreicher sind, wenn es gilt, effizienzorientierte Verwaltungsreformen durchzuführen. Während solche Regime ihre (Steuer‑)Verwaltung professionalisieren und bürgerorientierter gestalten, kann diese gleichzeitig für selektive repressive Maßnahmen gegenüber politischen Gegnern eingesetzt werden. Hybride bzw. stärker kompetitive autoritäre Regime, die von häufigen Machtwechseln geprägt sind, scheinen demgegenüber effizienzorientierte Verwaltungsreformen eher zu unterlassen.

Schlüsselwörter

Autoritarismus Verwaltungsreformen Steuerverwaltung Staatskapazität Postsowjetische Staaten 

State Capacity and Administrative Reforms in Hybrid and Authoritarian Regimes—with a Focus on Tax Administrations in Post-Soviet Countries

Abstract

In order to enlarge state capacity, authoritarian regimes have undertaken considerable efforts to (re-)construct and modernize their administrations. Combining various research strands, this literature review links basic findings of research on authoritarian and hybrid regimes to those on administrative reforms in post-soviet countries. As tax administrations are essential for increasing state capacity, a particular focus is laid on these reforms. Drawing on the cases of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazachstan, the article reveals that stable, hegemonic authoritarian regimes seem to succeed better in increasing administrative efficiency and capability. While professionalizing their civil services, however, tax administrations can still be used to repress opponents. Hybrid regimes which are shaped by frequent government turnovers, by contrast, seem to avoid longsome efficiency-oriented reforms of their administrations.

Keywords

Authoritarianism Administrative reforms Tax administration State capacity Post-Soviet countries 

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Copyright information

© Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rafael Mrowczynski
    • 1
  • Sabine Kropp
    • 1
  • Katharina Bluhm
    • 1
  1. 1.BerlinDeutschland

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