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Politische Vierteljahresschrift

, Volume 59, Issue 1, pp 63–80 | Cite as

Sind Demokratien die besseren Steuerstaaten?

Ein globaler Vergleich, 1980–2010
  • Laura Seelkopf
Abhandlung

Zusammenfassung

Die Finanzkrise hat zu Kritik an der fehlenden demokratischen Kontrolle des nationalen Steuerstaates geführt. Dieser Kritik liegt häufig die implizite Überlegung zugrunde, dass Demokratien im Vergleich zu Autokratien höhere und progressivere Steuern haben. In der Literatur ist diese Annahme zunehmend umstritten – sowohl was die Entstehung moderner Steuerstaaten in Europa angeht als auch in Bezug auf die Höhe der Steuereinnahmen in zeitgenössischen Gesellschaften. Dieser Beitrag fasst den aktuellen Stand der Literatur zum Thema zusammen und bietet eine empirische Grundlage für die analytische Reflexion demokratischer und autokratischer Steuersysteme. Die Untersuchung von 138 Ländern zeigt, dass es seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges Demokratien ceteris paribus gelingt, mehr Steuern einzunehmen. Allerdings variiert dieser Demokratiebonus über Zeit und hat keinen Einfluss auf die Progressivität des Steuersystems. Wichtiger als politische Institutionen ist die ökonomische Entwicklung. Nicht demokratischere, sondern reichere Länder sind die besseren Steuerstaaten.

Schlüsselwörter

Steuerstaat Progressivität Steuerquote Demokratie Autokratie 

Are Democracies the Better Tax States?

A Global Comparison 1980 to 2010

Abstract

In the aftershock of the financial crisis many scholars and practitioners criticized the perceived loss of democratic control of national tax states. Many of these arguments are based on the assumption that democracies ought and should pursue policies that reflect the preferences of the majority of society. Hence, more democratic countries are expected to have higher tax ratios and more progressive tax systems than their autocratic counterparts. Yet, within the literature on regime type and taxation this assumption is more and more challenged. In this article, I summarize the arguments on the effect of democratic and autocratic institutions on the size and progressivity of tax states and test the effect of regime type on tax ratios and progressive taxation for 138 countries since the 1980s. My analysis illustrates that more democratic countries have higher tax ratios since the end of the Cold War. Yet, this effect varies over time and regime type plays no role for progressive taxation in general. Economic development on the other hand matters for both progressivity and size of the tax state. Income matters mostly for the tax state, not regime type.

Keywords

Direct taxation Tax ratio Inequality Redistribution Regime type 

Notes

Danksagung

Ich danke Thomas Rixen, Sebastian Huhnholz, Daniel Mertens, Armin Schäfer sowie zwei anonymen GutachterInnen für ihre hilfreichen Kommentare und Michael Keen für die Bereitstellung der Daten zu Steuereinnahmen.

Supplementary material

11615_2018_59_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (84 kb)
Robustness Checks der Analyse

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Copyright information

© Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.BremenDeutschland
  2. 2.San Domenico di FiesoleItalien

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