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A Stackelberg differential game for defence and economy

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Abstract

We considered counterterror measures and the economic growth Stackelberg differential game. The equilibrium of this game was acquired by using the Maximal Principle. We also characterized the optimal strategy for the government and terrorist organization and compared it with Nash equilibrium published previously.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by NSFC (11401046).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Basic Science, Changchun University of Technology, Changchun, 130012, People’s Republic of China

    Jun Wang

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  1. Jun Wang
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Correspondence to Jun Wang.

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Wang, J. A Stackelberg differential game for defence and economy. Optim Lett 12, 375–386 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-017-1197-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-017-1197-7

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