Zusammenfassung
Die Klimaproblematik ist sehr komplex und auf der internationalen politischen Agenda immer noch relativ neu. Daher ist es nicht sinnvoll, auf den Abschluss eines globalen Abkommens zu warten. Es wäre besser, einen mehrstufigen Lösungsansatz zu verfolgen, der auf der lokalen Ebene ansetzt, Vorteile klimapolitischer Anstrengungen auf mehreren Ebenen maximiert, und ein Prozess des Experimentierens und Lernens über Klimapolitik initiiert. Die konventionelle Theorie kollektiven Handelns sagt uns, dass die effiziente Nutzung von Ressourcen nur durch zwei Maßnahmen möglich ist: Privatisierung oder Verstaatlichung. Diese Ansicht behindert Fortschritte. Um dem Klimawandel langfristig erfolgreich zu begegnen, müssen sich alltägliche Verhaltensmuster von Einzelpersonen, Familien, Firmen, Gemeinden und Regierungen auf verschiedenen Ebenen ändern – insbesondere in den entwickelten Ländern.
Abstract
Climate change is a complex problem and still relatively new on the international agenda. Waiting for effective climate policies to be established at the global level is unreasonable and wastes valuable time. It would be better to adopt a multi-scale approach starting at the local level, maximizing benefits at varying levels and encouraging experimentation and learning from diverse policies. Conventional wisdom tells us that there are only two options for dealing with resource management: either privatization or management by the state. This view is hindering progress. Successfully addressing climate change in the long run requires substantial changes at multiple levels in the day-to-day activities of individuals, families, firms, communities, and governments especially those in the more developed world.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Literatur
Agrawal, A. 2008. The role of local institutions in adaptation to climate change. Report submitted to the World Bank, Washington, DC.
Baer, P., et al. 2000. Equity and greenhouse gas responsibility. Science 289:2287.
Bala, G., et al. 2007. Combined climate and carbon-cycle effects of large-scale deforestation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (16): 6550–6555.
Botsen, W. J. W., J. M. Gowdy, und J. C. J. M. Van Den Bergh. 2008. Cumulative CO2 emissions: Shifting international responsibilities for climate debt. Climate Policy 8:569–576.
Bruner, A., R. Gullison, R. Rice, et al. 2001. Effectiveness of parks in protecting tropical biodiversity. Science 291 (5501): 125–129.
Costanza, R. 1987. Social traps and environmental policy. BioScience 37:407–412.
Daily, G. C., et al. 2009. Ecosystem services in decision making: Time to deliver. Frontier in Ecology and the Environment 7 (1): 21–28.
Dellink, R., et al. 2009. Sharing the burden of adaptation financing. Amsterdam: Institute for Environmental Studies Newsletter (January).
Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, und P. Stern. 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science 302 (5652): 1907–1912.
Dietz, T., G. T. Gardner, J. Gilligan, et al. 2009. The behavioral wedge: Household actions can rapidly reduce U.S. carbon emissions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106:18452–18456.
Finlayson, A. C. 1994. Fishing for truth: A sociological analysis of Northern cod stock assessment from 1977–1990. St. Johns: Memorial University of Newfoundland, Newfoundland Institute of Social and Economic Research.
Finlayson, A. C., B. J. McCay. 1998. Crossing the threshold of ecosystem resilience: The commercial extension of Northern cod. In Linking social and ecological systems: Management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience, Hrsg. Fikret Berkes und Carl Folke, 311–338. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fuller, M. C., S. C. Portis, und D. Kammen. 2009. Toward a low-carbon economy: Municipal financing for energy efficiency and solar power. Environment 51 (1): 22–32.
Gardner, G. T., und P. C. Stern. 2008. The short list: The most effective actions U.S. households can take to curb climate change. Environment 50:13–24.
Gibson, C., M. McKean, und E. Ostrom, Hrsg. 2000. People and forests: Communities, institutions, and governance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gibson, C., J. Williams, und E. Ostrom. 2005. Local enforcement and better forests. World Development 33 (2): 273–284.
Harris, L. 1990. Independent review of the state of the Northern Cod Stock. Prepared for the Honourable Thomas Siddon, Minister of Fisheries. Ottawa: Communication Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans.
Hayes, T., und E. Ostrom. 2005. Conserving the world’s forests: Are protected areas the only way? Indiana Law Review 38 (3): 595–617.
Kaufman, L. A. 2009. Desire to keep up with neighbors is spurring conservation. New York Times, 30. Januar.
Matthews, H. D., und K. Caldeira. 2008. Stabilizing climate requires near zero emissions. Geophysical Research Letters 35:1–5.
Michel, D. 2009. Foxes, hedgehogs, and greenhouse governance: Knowledge, uncertainty, and international policy-making in a warming world. Applied Energy 86:258–264.
Miller, C. A. 2004. Climate science and the making of a global political order. In States of knowledge: The coproduction of science and social order, Hrsg. Sheila Jasanoff, 46–66. New York: Routledge.
Mumford, G. 2007. Psychology’s ability to curb energy use. Monitor on Psychology 38 (11): 20–21.
Najam, A., S. Huq, und Y. Sokona. 2003. Climate negotiations beyond Kyoto: Developing countries concerns and interests. Climate Policy 3:221–231.
Nelson, E., et al. 2008. Efficiency of incentives to jointly increase carbon sequestration and species conservation on a landscape. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (28): 9471–9476.
Nelson, E., et al. 2009. Modeling multiple ecosystem services, biodiversity conservation, commodity production, and tradeoffs at landscape scales. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 7 (1): 4–11.
NRC (National Research Council). 2002. The drama of the commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Paul Stern, Susan Stonich, und Elke Weber, Hrsg. Washington: National Academy Press.
Oppenheimer, M., B. C. O’Neill, und M. Webster. 2008. Negative learning. Climatic Change 89:155–172.
Ostrom, E. 1992. The rudiments of a theory of the origins, survival, and performance of common-property institutions. In Making the commons work: Theory, practice, and policy, Hrsg. Daniel W. Bromley et al., 293–318. San Francisco: ICS Press.
Ostrom, E. 2001. Reformulating the commons. In Protecting the commons: A framework for resource management in the Americas, Hrsg. Joanna Burger, Elinor Ostrom, Richard Norgaard, et al. 17–41. Washington: Island.
Ostrom, E., und H. Nagendra. 2006. Insights on linking forests, trees, and people from the air, on the ground, and in the laboratory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103 (51): 19224–19231.
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, und J. Walker. 1994. Rules, games, and common-pool resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Posner, E. A., und C. Sunstein. 2008. Justice and climate change. Discussion Paper 08-04, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Project on International Climate Agreements.
Poteete, A., M. Janssen, und E. Ostrom. 2010. Working together: Collective action, the commons, and multiple methods in practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pritchett, L., und M. Woolcock. 2003. Solutions when the solution is the problem: Arraying the disarray in development. World Development 35 (3): 435–461.
Rothstein, B. 1998. Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, B. 2005. Social traps and the problem of trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sandler, T. 2004. Global collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schultz, P., et al. 2007. The Constructive, destructive, and reconstructive power of social norms. Psychological Science 18 (5): 429–434.
Stavins, R. 1997. Policy instruments for climate change: How can national governments address a global problem? University of Chicago Legal Forum, vol. 1997: Rethinking Environmental Protection for the 21st Century, 293–329.
United Nations. 1982. Final act of the third conference on the law of the seas. Montenegro Bay: United Nations.
Vandenbergh, M. P., und A. C. Steinemann. 2007. The carbon-neutral individual. New York University Law Review 82 (December): 1673–1741.
Vandenbergh, M. P., J. Barkenbus, und J. Gilligan. 2008. Individual carbon emissions: The low-hanging fruit. UCLA Law Review 55:1701–1758.
Walters, C. J. 1986. Adaptive management of renewable resources. New York: Macmillan.
Wells, M., und K. Brandon. 1992. People and parks: Linking protected area management with local communities. Washington: World Bank.
Wiener, J. B. 2007. Think globally, act globally: The limits of local climate policies. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155:1961–1979.
Wilson, J. 2002. Scientific uncertainty, complex systems, and the design of common-pool institutions. In The drama of the commons, Hrsg. National Research Council, Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, et al., 327–359. Washington: National Academy Press.
Danksagung
Dieser Artikel erschien zuerst als „A multi-scale approach to coping with climate change and other collective action problems“ in The Solutions Journal 1, 2 (2010). Ich danke Tom Dietz für Kommentare und Christina Asquith für die Bearbeitung meines Beitrags.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Übersetzung: Steffen Brunner und Christian Flachsland
An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11578-011-0127-9
About this article
Cite this article
Ostrom, E. Handeln statt Warten: Ein mehrstufiger Ansatz zur Bewältigung des Klimaproblems. Leviathan 39, 267–278 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11578-011-0114-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11578-011-0114-1