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Kombinatorische Auktionen in der betrieblichen BeschaffungEine Analyse grundlegender Entwurfsprobleme – An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions

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WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK

Zusammenfassung

Traditionelle Auktionsverfahren sind auf reine Preisverhandlungen mit einfachen, standardisierten Gütern beschränkt. Kombinatorische Auktionen ermöglichen die Abgabe von Bündelgeboten und dadurch die effiziente Durchführung von Verhandlungen über mehrere Güter. Der Einsatz in der betrieblichen Beschaffung ist durch eine Reihe von Besonderheiten gekennzeichnet:

  • Die Auswahl der Gewinner führt zu Optimierungsproblemen, bei denen in der Beschaffung zahlreiche betriebswirtschaftlich motivierte Nebenbedingungen beachtet werden müssen.

  • Iterative Verfahren sind aus mehreren Gründen die am weitesten verbreiteten Auktionsformate in der Beschaffung.

  • Die unterschiedlichen Güter, die in der betrieblichen Praxis beschafft werden, erfordern eine Vielfalt von Gebotstypen zur Berücksichtigung qualitativer Attribute oder von Mengenrabatten, die bisher noch wenig untersucht wurden.

In diesem Beitrag sollen grundlegende Entwurfsprobleme Kombinatorischer Auktionen charakterisiert und Besonderheiten bei Anwendungen in der betrieblichen Beschaffung diskutiert werden.

Dieser Beitrag, ausgewählt für die Kategorie „Beste Beiträge von 1959 bis 2008“, wurde zuerst in WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK 47(2)2005:126–134 veröffentlicht. Rechtschreibung und Zitierweise wurden an den aktuellen Stand angepasst.

Abstract

Traditional auction mechanisms support price negotiations on a single item. The Internet allows for the exchange of much more complex offers in real-time. This is one of the reasons for much research on multidimensional auction mechanisms allowing negotiations on multiple items, multiple units, or multiple attributes of an item, as they can be regularly found in procurement. Combinatorial auctions, for example, enable suppliers to submit bids on bundles of items. A number of laboratory experiments has shown high allocative efficiency in markets with economies of scope. For suppliers it is easier to express cost savings due to bundling (e. g., decreased transportation or production costs). This can lead to significant savings in total cost of the procurement manager. Procurement negotiations exhibit a number of particularities:

  • It is often necessary to consider qualitative attributes or volume discounts in bundle bids. These complex bid types have not been sufficiently analyzed.

  • The winner determination problem requires the consideration of a number of additional business constraints, such as limits on the spend on a particular supplier or the number of suppliers.

  • Iterative combinatorial auctions have a number of advantages in practical applications, but they also lead to new problems in the determination of ask prices.

In this paper, we will discuss fundamental problems in the design of combinatorial auctions and the particularities of procurement applications.

Reprint of an article from WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK 47(2)2005:126–134.

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  1. Fakultät für Informatik (I18), Lehrstuhl für Internetbasierte Geschäftssysteme, TU München, Boltzmannstr. 3, 85748, Garching/München, Deutschland

    Martin Bichler,  Alexander Pikovsky &  Thomas Setzer

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  1. Martin Bichler
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  2. Alexander Pikovsky
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  3. Thomas Setzer
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Correspondence to Martin Bichler.

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This article is also available in English via http://www.springerlink.com and http://www.bise-journal.org: Bichler M, Pikovsky A, Setzer T (2008) An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions. Bus Inf Syst Eng. doi: 10.1007/s12599-008-0014-3.

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Bichler, M., Pikovsky, A. & Setzer, T. Kombinatorische Auktionen in der betrieblichen BeschaffungEine Analyse grundlegender Entwurfsprobleme – An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions. Wirtsch. Inform. 51, 130–138 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11576-008-0119-9

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