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The United States and trade disputes in the World Trade Organization: Hegemony constrained or confirmed?

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‘One of the main functions of the WTO is to tie the American Gulliver down.’

(de Jonquieres 2004, p. 19)

Abstract

Abstract and Key Results

  • Does the World Trade Organization function to reinforce American dominance (or hegemony) of the world economy? We examine this question via an analysis of trade disputes involving the United States.

  • This allows us to assess whether the US does better than other countries in this judicialised forum: and in so doing enhance the competitive prospects of their firms.

  • The results are equivocal. The United States does best in the early phases of a dispute, where political power is important. It does less well as the process develops.

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Lindeque, J., McGuire, S. The United States and trade disputes in the World Trade Organization: Hegemony constrained or confirmed?. MANAGE. INT. REV. 47, 725–744 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11575-007-0042-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11575-007-0042-0

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