Abstract
In this paper we analyse how whistle-blowing affects fraudulent behaviour of managers while the company instigates imperfect internal audit to detect the fraud. To do so, we employ in a first step a non-cooperative inspection game to analyse fraudulent behaviour of a manager controlled by an internal auditor. In a second step we introduce exogenous whistle-blowing of a manager’s employee to aid the auditor to reveal the fraud. In a third step, the two-person inspection game is extended to a three-person approach with endogenous whistle-blowing. Our novel results are that the intensity of internal audit is always lower with whistle-blowing than without and that whistle-blowing renders the manager to act less fraudulently than compared to the basic inspection game if and only if she is unaware of the whistle-blower’s expected pay-off and the efficacy of internal audit is sufficiently low.
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Notes
Note that this assumption does not connote that the employee’s identity is or becomes known to the board. That is, given a truthful report by the internal auditor to the board, the auditor only confirms that her successful identification of fraudulent behaviour was possible only due to some kind of ’company-internal help’.
As before, we assume that anonymity of the employee is guaranteed with the internal auditor being the one to transfer the reward from the board to the whistle-blower.
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The authors would like to thank H.-U. Küpper for handling the manuscript during the submission process as well as three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
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Appendices
Appendix
Comparative static analysis of (31) and (32)
Differentiating (31) with respect to the according parameters while taking account of (1), (2) and (28) provides
Let \(M \equiv \left( (1 - p_d) \cdot p_r \cdot (R^+ + R^-) + p_d \cdot (1 - z) \cdot R^+ \right) ^2\). Differentiating (32) with respect to the relevant parameters subject to (16) leads to
2.1 Proof of proposition 1
To prove proposition 1 (i), exploit (1), (17) and (31) and simplify to obtain
which is true by (2).
Proposition 1 (ii) is proven by comparing (18) and (32) subject to (16). This leads to
where due to the general assumption of \(z \in (0,1)\), we have \(\frac{(1 - z) \cdot R^+}{R^+ + R^-} \in (0,1)\). The opposite case of \(p_f^* < \tilde{p}_f^*\), consequently, holds if \(p_r > \frac{(1 - z) \cdot R^+}{R^+ + R^-}\).
Discussion of strategy tuples from Fig. 1 in the three-person inspection game with endogenous whistle-blowing
As each player aims at maximising its own pay-off according to Nash and since we intend to solve the optimisation problem in accordance with an inspection game approach, it is necessary to figure out, if there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in the first place. We successively verify whether or not one of the strategy tuples defined in Fig. 1 results in the highest pay-off for each player subject to the quantities given in Table 2. In particular, we investigate for each player’s possible strategy if she has an incentive to change her strategy taking as given the choices of the other players. Recall, that \(v^g \equiv v + b_b\).
1.1 Strategy tuple \({{s}}_{{1}} =\) (fraud/high level/hide):
-
The manager prefers no fraud as in \(s_5\) to fraud as in \(s_1\), since \({\mathcal {A}}^M < {\mathcal {C}}^M\) by (13).
-
The auditor prefers high level as in \(s_1\) to low level as in \(s_3\), since \({\mathcal {A}}^A > {\mathcal {B}}^A\) by (15).
\(\Rightarrow s_1\) cannot be a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies irrespective of the strategy choice of the employee.
1.2 Strategy tuple \({{s}}_{{2}} =\) (fraud/high level/disclose):
-
There is no alternative for the manager. He, therefore, chooses fraud as in \(s_2\).
-
The auditor prefers high level as in \(s_2\) to low level as in \(s_4\), i.e. \(s_2 \succ s_4\), and vice versa if
$$\begin{aligned} s_2 \begin{Bmatrix} \succ \\ \prec \end{Bmatrix} s_4 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad {\mathcal {A}}^A_d \begin{Bmatrix}> \\< \end{Bmatrix} {\mathcal {B}}^A_d \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad z \begin{Bmatrix} < \\ > \end{Bmatrix} 1 - \frac{K}{R^+}, \end{aligned}$$(54)where, due to (15), the bound on z from (54) is less than one.
-
The employee prefers disclose as in \(s_2\) to hide as in \(s_1\), i.e. \(s_2 \succ s_1\), and vice versa, if
$$\begin{aligned} s_2 \begin{Bmatrix} \succ \\ \prec \end{Bmatrix} s_1 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad {\mathcal {A}}^E_d \begin{Bmatrix}> \\< \end{Bmatrix} {\mathcal {A}}^E \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (1 - \mu ) \cdot b_b + \mu \cdot b_\mu \begin{Bmatrix} > \\ < \end{Bmatrix} \mu \cdot (v + c_\mu ) + (1 - p_r) \cdot m + c_s \end{aligned}$$(55)and we conclude
Lemma 1
Suppose that the manager, auditor and employee simultaneously choose one from their respective two strategies. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium in the pure strategies (fraud/high level/disclose) if and only if
Given (30), (fraud/high level/disclose) is not a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if either
or
or both.
1.3 Strategy tuple \({{s}}_{{3}} =\) (fraud/low level/hide):
-
The manager prefers fraud as in \(s_3\) to no fraud as in \(s_6\), since \({\mathcal {B}}^M > {\mathcal {D}}^M\) by (14).
-
The auditor prefers high level as in \(s_1\) to low level as in \(s_2\), since \({\mathcal {A}}^A > {\mathcal {B}}^A\) by (15).
\(\Rightarrow s_3\) cannot be a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies irrespective of the strategy choice of the employee.
1.4 Strategy tuple \({{s}}_{{4}} =\) (fraud/low level/disclose):
-
There is no alternative for the manager. He, therefore, chooses fraud as in \(s_4\).
-
The considerations of the auditor read along the line of the strategy tuple \(s_2\), see (54).
-
The employee prefers disclose as in \(s_4\) to hide as in \(s_3\), i.e. \(s_4 \succ s_3\), and vice versa, if
$$\begin{aligned} s_4 \begin{Bmatrix} \succ \\ \prec \end{Bmatrix} s_3 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad {\mathcal {B}}^E_d \begin{Bmatrix}> \\< \end{Bmatrix} {\mathcal {B}}^E \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (1 - \mu ) \cdot b_b + \mu \cdot b_\mu \begin{Bmatrix} > \\ < \end{Bmatrix} \mu \cdot (v + c_\mu ) + m + c_s \end{aligned}$$(57)and we conclude
Lemma 2
Suppose that the manager, auditor and employee simultaneously choose one from their respective two strategies. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium in the pure strategies (fraud/low level/disclose) if and only if
(fraud/low level/disclose) is not a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if either
or
or both.
1.5 Strategy tuple \({s}_{{5}} =\) (no fraud/high level/hide):
-
The manager prefers no fraud as in \(s_5\) to fraud as in \(s_1\), since \({\mathcal {A}}^M < {\mathcal {C}}^M\) by (13).
-
The auditor prefers low level as in \(s_6\) to high level as in \(s_5\), since \({\mathcal {C}}^A < {\mathcal {D}}^A\) by (16).
-
The employee has no alternative and chooses hide as in \(s_5\).
\(\Rightarrow s_5\) cannot be a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
1.6 Strategy tuple \({{s}}_{{6}} =\) (no fraud/low level/hide):
-
The manager prefers fraud as in \(s_3\) to no fraud as in \(s_6\), since \({\mathcal {B}}^M > {\mathcal {D}}^M\) by (14).
-
The auditor prefers low level as in \(s_6\) to high level as in \(s_5\), since \({\mathcal {C}}^A < {\mathcal {D}}^A\) by (16).
-
The employee has no alternative and chooses hide as in \(s_6\).
\(\Rightarrow s_6\) cannot be a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Discussion of Nash equilibrium probabilities in the three-person inspection game with endogenous whistle-blowing
Recall \(v^g \equiv v + b_b\). Notice from (48) that \(\hat{p}_h^* \in (0,1)\) requires the probable appropriation of the board \(b_b\) and the possible national protection of the whistle-blower \(b_\mu\) to be such that
according to which \(s_4\) will not arise as a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, see Lemma 2. In order to avoid that \(s_2\) may represent the Nash equilibrium, see Lemma 1, we consider (56) to hold in terms of \(z > 1 - \frac{K}{R^+}\).
To check for \(\hat{p}_d^*\) from (49) to attain a value between zero and one, be aware that its denominator is negative, see
The numerator, thus, must be negative as well so that \(\hat{p}_d^* > 0\). To guarantee this, recall that the manager’s costs in case of her fraud being revealed (\(\Delta\)) are assumed to exceed her long-term reputation loss if there is only the internal audit and it does not reveal the fraud (\(\rho ^-\)), see (1). A sufficient condition for a negative numerator is, then, given if \(\Delta\) is not too high in terms of
For \(\hat{p}_d^* < 1\) to hold, we find that Z from (40) must be positive, i.e.
Since the left-hand side is negative while the right-hand side is positive, \(Z > 0\) applies and \(\hat{p}_d^* \in (0,1)\) follows from (60).
Closer inspection of (50) shows that the numerator of \(\hat{p}_f^*\) is negative because of (16) and \(Z > 0\). Hence, in order for \(\hat{p}_f^* > 0\) to hold, the denominator must be negative as well. Since we generally have
it turns out that a sufficient condition for a negative denominator in (50) is
Moreover, \(\hat{p}_f^* < 1\) requires that
As the lower bound on \(X/Z\) from (63) is less negative than that in (62), we obtain \(\hat{p}_f^* \in (0,1)\) subject to (63), which is equivalent to
Notice that \(\underline{\Delta}\) from (64) is smaller than \(\bar{\Delta }\) from (60) as the third addend of the former is negative. It is, however, unclear whether or not \(\underline{\Delta}\) is in line with (1) via \(\underline{\Delta} > \rho ^-\). A feasible domain for \(\Delta\) subject to (1) is, therefore, given by \(\Delta\,\in\,\left (\max\{\rho ^-, \underline{\Delta}\}, \bar{\Delta }\right)\).
Comparative static analysis of (48), (49) and (50)
Recall \(v^g \equiv v + b_b\) and \(b_\mu ^n \equiv b_\mu - c_\mu\). Differentiating (48) with respect to the relevant parameters while taking account of (58) gives
Differentiating (49) with respect to the relevant parameters subject to (1), (2), (14), (58), \(X\) from (38) with \(X < 0\), see (60), \(Y\) from (39) with \(Y < 0\), see (59), leads to
Let \(W \equiv \left( (1 - z) \cdot R^+ - K\right) \cdot X - (R^+ + R^-) \cdot Z\) with \(W < 0\) because of (62). Differentiating (50) with respect to the relevant parameters while exploiting (1), (2), (15), (16), \(z > 1 - \frac{K}{R^+}\) from (56), (58), \(X\) from (38) with \(X < 0\), see (60), \(Z\) from (40) with \(Z > 0\), see (61), yields
Proof of proposition 2
To prove proposition 2 (i), compare (17) and (48). Taking account of (1) and (58) results in
which is true by (60).
We prove proposition 2 (ii) by comparing (18) and (50) conditional upon (15), the assumption of \(z > 1 - \frac{K}{R^+}\) from (56), \(X < 0\) from (60) and (62). We obtain
which is true.
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Siggelkow, B.F., Trockel, J. & Dieterle, O. An inspection game of internal audit and the influence of whistle-blowing. J Bus Econ 88, 883–914 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-018-0893-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-018-0893-9