Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft

, Volume 80, Issue 10, pp 1007–1026 | Cite as

Fluktuation von Vorständen und personelle Verflechtungen in DAX-Unternehmen

  • Benjamin Balsmeier
  • Alexander Dilger
  • Jörg Lingens
Forschung

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Beitrag werden Hazardraten für die Vorstandsmitglieder in DAX-Unternehmen geschätzt und analysiert. Neben zahlreichen Kontrollvariablen wird insbesondere der Einfluss personeller Verflechtungen im DAX auf Ebene der Vorstände und Aufsichtsräte untersucht. In der Regel erhöhen die personellen Verflechtungen die Fluktuation der Vorstandsmitglieder, so dass sie nicht zur Verschanzung in Unternehmen dienen können, sondern auf eine bessere und wirksamere Corporate Governance hindeuten. Weitere Aufsichtsratsmandate von Arbeitnehmervertretern im Aufsichtsrat haben dagegen keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Hazardrate von Vorstandsmitgliedern.

Schlüsselwörter

Corporate Governance Cox-Modell Hazardrate Verflechtung Verschanzung 

Fluctuation of executives and personnel interdependencies in DAX-companies

Abstract

In this article we estimate and analyse hazard rates of executives in DAX-companies. We examine the effects of cross-company personnel interdependencies at the level of executives committees as well as supervisory boards and also use several covariates. Generally, personnel interdependencies raise the fluctuation of executives, such that they cannot be used for entrenchment but indicate improved and more effective corporate governance. However, additional mandates of employee representatives in the supervisory board have no significant effect on the hazard rate of executives.

Keywords

Corporate governance Cox-Model Entrenchment Hazard rate Interdependence 

JEL-Classifikation

M20 J63 C41 

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Copyright information

© Gabler Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Benjamin Balsmeier
    • 1
  • Alexander Dilger
    • 2
  • Jörg Lingens
    • 3
  1. 1.Monopolkommission und Centrum für Management an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität MünsterBonnDeutschland
  2. 2.Institut für Ökonomische Bildung und Centrum für ManagementWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität MünsterMünsterDeutschland
  3. 3.Lehrstuhl für VolkswirtschaftstheorieWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität MünsterMünsterDeutschland

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