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Nussbaum on Sexual Instrumentalization

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Abstract

In “The Wrongness of Rape”, Gardner and Shute argued that the English offence of rape primarily targets the wrong of objectification. They tie objectification closely to instrumentalization—to the “conversion of subjects into instruments or tools”. In doing so, they explicitly purport to follow Nussbaum’s understanding of what is morally problematic about objectification. In this paper, I want to explore more closely just what Nussbaum understands by instrumentalization, focusing in particular upon the meaning and role of mutuality in her analysis. Doing so gives us insight into why sexual touching in three broad contexts may not be considered instances of instrumentalization: spontaneous sexual touching in a romantic context; non-spontaneous sexual touching in the context of intimate relationships; and prostitution. The last point may be most controversial given Gardner and Shute’s own stated view that prostitution involves instrumentalization. Even when we look to sexual touching in intimate relationships, however, Nussbaum seems to introduce ideas of implied consent that appear nowhere in Gardner and Shute’s paper.

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Notes

  1. John Gardner and Stephen Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape” in Jeremy Horder, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series (Oxford 2000). The paper has been reproduced in John Gardner, Offences and Defences: Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford 2007). See also Carolyn M. Shafer and Marilyn Frye, “Rape and Respect” in Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English, eds., Feminism and Philosophy (Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1977).

  2. Gardner and Shute, ibid. at 204.

  3. Ibid. at 204.

  4. Ibid. at 204–205.

  5. Ibid. at 257, 265.

  6. Ibid. at 209–212.

  7. Martha Nussbaum, "Objectification" (1995) 24 Phil. & Public Affairs 249 at 274, referring to Cass R. Sunstein, Review of Nadine Strossen, Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for Women’s Rights (New York: Scribner 1995), The New Republic, 9 January 1995.

  8. DH Lawrence, The Rainbow (Penguin, __).

  9. Nussbaum, supra note 7 at _.

  10. Ibid. at 265.

  11. John Stanton-Ife, “Horrific Crimes” in Duff et al., eds., The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford 2010).

  12. Ibid. at 154.

  13. Gardner and Shute, supra note 1 at 206–9.

  14. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge, 2000) at 119–22; Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Harvard, 2006) at 73.

  15. Women and Human Development, ibid. at 87.

  16. See Richard Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law” (1985) 1193 at 1199; Donald A Dripps, “Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent” (1992) 92 Columbia L Rev 1780 at 1789. See also Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089 at 1100–1101, 1125–1127, and the discussion in Margaret Jane Radin, “Market-Inalienability” (1987) 100 Harv L Rev 1849 at 1879-81; Gardner and Shute, supra note 1 at 199–203. For a benign example, Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (Picador, 2011 [1986]) at 47 (speaking of proprioception, a term which itself evokes notions of ‘property’, as the experience of “owning” one’s body).

  17. Gardner and Shute, ibid. at 201–202.

  18. Ibid. at 204.

  19. Ibid. at 203.

  20. Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (Free Press, 1986) at 251.

  21. This point helps to explain Nussbaum’s rejection of the Kantian view that sexual touching is inherently instrumentalizing because it necessarily involves reducing one’s partner to a body to be used for one’s own pleasure. Consider the analysis by Barbara Herman, “Could It Be Worth Thinking About Kant on Sex and Marriage?” in Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt, eds., A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (Boulder: Westview 1993); Nussbaum, supra note _ at 266–267; Simon Blackburn, Lust (Oxford 2004) at 94–95.

  22. Scruton, supra note 20 at 18.

  23. Martha C. Nussbaum, Philosophical Investigations: Reviews 1986–2011 (Oxford, 2012) at ch. 2.

  24. Blackburn, supra note 21 at 88–9. See also Thomas Nagel, “Sexual Perversion” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge 1979) at 50.

  25. Blackburn, ibid. at 61.

  26. See Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge 1999).

  27. Scruton, supra note 20 at 64.

  28. Ibid. at 65.

  29. Ibid. at 67, 70.

  30. Ibid. at 92.

  31. On the relationship between autonomy, self-governance, and “permeability” or “violability”, see Sarah Buss, “Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction, and the Basis of Moral Constraints” (2005) 115 Ethics 195 at 195–196.

  32. See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, supra note 26.

  33. See Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton 2004). See also Nussbaum, ibid.; Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (___); Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton 2010) at 38–40.

  34. Scruton, supra note 20 at 251.

  35. Nussbaum, supra note 7 at 277–278.

  36. Ibid. at 276–267.

  37. Scruton, supra note 20 at 25.

  38. Ibid. at 30.

  39. Nussbaum, supra note 7 at 275.

  40. Ibid. at 275n.

  41. Ibid. at 275.

  42. See Blackburn, supra note 21 at 108–9.

  43. See Gardner and Shute, supra note 1 at 206–7.

  44. Martha Nussbaum, “‘Whether from Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for Bodily Services” in Sex and Social Justice (Oxford, 1999) at 281–2.

  45. Gardner and Shute, supra note 1 at 207, n25.

  46. It is in this sense that the work of Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin has particular resonance. They are right to argue that a culture of objectification can taint sexual relationships between men and women. See Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words (Harvard, 1993). See also the reasoning in R. v Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452. MacKinnon contributed to the submissions by LEAF, which influenced the Court. MacKinnon and Dworkin qualifiedly endorsed the ruling: Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, eds., In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings (Harvard 1997) at 4n.

  47. Nussbaum, supra note 7 at 265.

  48. See the submissions of the accused in R v J.A., 2011 SCC 28 at para. 58.

  49. See R. v Cey (1989), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Sask. C.A.); R v LeClerc (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 563 (Ont. C.A.). See also the discussion in Hamish Stewart, “Parents, Children, and the Law of Assault” (2009) 32 Dal. L. J. 1. But see R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, where the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that implied consent applies to sexual touching.

  50. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon, 1986) at ch. 12; Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, supra note 26.

  51. On loyalty, see Raz, ibid.; Scruton, supra note 20 at 241–242.

  52. See Scruton, ibid. at 248.

  53. Ibid. at 247.

  54. See RA Duff, Answering for Crime (Hart, 2007) at 247–9.

  55. See Evan Fox-Decent, “The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 259; Evan Fox-Decent, “Is the Rule of Law Really Indifferent to Human Rights?” (2008) 27 Law & Phil. 533.

  56. Lorianna de Giorgio, “Is bad bedside manner a conscious decision on the doctor’s part?” Toronto Star (12 May 2012), online: <http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1176448--is-bad-bedside-manner-a-conscious-decision-on-the-doctor-s-part>.

  57. Consider the discussion by Annalise Acorn, “Responsibility, Self-Respect and the Ethics of Self-pathologization” in Francois Tanguay-Renaud and James Stribopolous, eds., Rethinking Criminal Law Theory (Hart 2012), in which she distinguishes between old and new approaches to psychiatry.

  58. See Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226; Strother v 3464920 Canada Inc., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 177.

  59. See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (2011) at r. 2.03.

  60. See David Sussman, “What’s Wrong with Torture?” (2005) 33 Phil. & Public Affairs 1 at 26–28.

  61. Gardner and Shute, supra note 1 at 206–209.

  62. On the relationship between the legal significance of consent and the liberal respect for individual autonomy, see Heidi Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent” (1996) 2 Legal Theory 121.

  63. Gardner and Shute, supra note 1 at 206.

  64. Ibid. at 207 [emphasis added].

  65. See Nussbaum, supra note 44.

  66. Ibid. at 281–2.

  67. See Nussbaum, supra note 7 at 286–287.

  68. Ibid. at 286–288.

  69. Erica Jong, Fear of Flying (New American Library, 1973).

  70. Ibid. at _.

  71. See Gardner and Shute, supra note 1 at 208-9.

  72. See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, supra note _. See also Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Princeton, _).

  73. Nussbaum, supra note 7 at 287.

  74. Nussbaum, supra note _ at _.

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  1. College of Law, University of Saskatchewan, 15 Campus Dr, Saskatoon, SK, S7N5A6, Canada

    Michael Plaxton

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Plaxton, M. Nussbaum on Sexual Instrumentalization. Criminal Law, Philosophy 10, 1–16 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9290-1

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