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Assuming that the Defendant Is Not Guilty: The Presumption of Innocence in the German System of Criminal Justice

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Abstract

The presumption of innocence is not a presumption but an assumption or legal fiction. It requires agents of the state to treat a suspect or defendant in the criminal process as if he were in fact innocent. The presumption of innocence has a limited field of application. It applies only to agents of the state, and only during the criminal process. The presumption of innocence as such does not determine the amount of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty. In spite of these limits, the presumption of innocence protects suspects and defendants from specific dangers inherent in the criminal process. German procedure law is used to show these areas.

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Notes

  1. Article 14 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966 reads: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

  2. See Gesetz über die Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, II Bundesgesetzblatt p. 685 (1952).

  3. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 26 March 1987, 74 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (hereinafter: BVerfGE) 358 at 370.

  4. id. at 371.

  5. Cf. § 1593 German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code): a child born within 300 days after the death of the mother’s husband is presumed to be the child of the deceased husband.

  6. For a detailed and critical analysis of the relationship between the German law on pretrial detention and the presumption of innocence, see Paeffgen in Wolter (2010), § 112 marginal notes 21 et seq., § 112a marginal notes 4 et seq.

  7. See, e.g., Esser in Löwe/Rosenberg (2012), Art. 6 EMRK marginal note 445: “The presumption of innocence protects (the defendant) against a conviction without full proof of his guilt and ties that proof to the conduct of an orderly, fair proceeding…” (my translation).

  8. See, e.g., the EU Commission’s Green Paper on the presumption of innocence of 26 April 2006 (KOM (2006) 174 final), dealing with various aspects of evidence law, the privilege against self-incrimination, trials in absentia, etc.

  9. Under § 344 German Penal Code, it is a felony to knowingly initiate a criminal prosecution of a innocent person.

  10. For example, fair trial rights exist in appeals proceedings, where arguably the presumption of innocence as such no longer applies.

  11. For the German discussion on the basis and scope of the privilege against self-incrimination see Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 8 Oct. 1974, 38 BVerfGE 105 at 114–115; Rogall (2010), vor § 133 marginal notes 130 et seq., Rzepka (2000), 387 et seq.; see also Verrel (2001).

  12. European Court of Human Rights, Barberà et al. v. Spain, application no. 10590/83, Judgment of 6 Dec. 1988, § 77.

  13. The presumption of innocence would be violated by such a declaration of guilt even if the judge made it against his true conviction, for example, in order to gain favour with the media.

  14. See Esser in Erb et al. (2012), Art. 6 EMRK marginal notes 456 et seq.; Paeffgen in Wolter (2012), Art. 6 EMRK marginal notes 197 et seq. For an opposing view, see Marxen (1980), 365 and 2013, 99 at 109.

  15. This is different with respect to press officers of courts or prosecutor’s offices; see V.1. below.

  16. The German Presserat (Press council), a voluntary organisation of the media, has published a Press Code (Pressekodex), the latest version of which went into force in 2007. According to Article 8 of the Press Code, the press shall respect any person’s private and intimate sphere. According to Rule 8.1, the press shall, as a rule, not publish any verbal or pictorial information about crimes and court trials that would permit the identification of offenders or victims. Rule 8.4 provides an exception with respect to homicide suspects against whom an arrest warrant has been issued. Violations of the Press Code are not punishable offences; they can be sanctioned by public reprimand of the offending press organ.

  17. On the connection between the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof in criminal cases see McCormick on Evidence, 2006, p. 573.

  18. German law does, of course, recognize procedural rights of individuals and, based on those rights, sets limits to the court’s authority in taking evidence. For example, a suspect’s or a witness’s statement that has been brought about by undue pressure or physical force may not be used as evidence (§ 136a sec. 3 German Code of Criminal Procedure [CCP]); and the fact that a suspect remained silent when questioned by the police or by a judge may not be used as evidence of his guilt; see Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Judgment of 26 Oct. 1965, 20 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen (hereinafter: BGHSt) 281 at 283 (the fact that the suspect remained silent when questioned by the police must not be used as evidence against the credibility of his later statement made before a judge).

  19. See § 244 s. 2 CCP.

  20. § 261 CCP.

  21. See § 267 Code of Criminal Procedure.

  22. For example, if the court has heard witnesses A, B and C, and A and B claimed that they saw the defendant commit the offence while C testified that the defendant was not even present at the scene of the crime, the trial judges are free to acquit the defendant but will have to explain, in the written judgment, why they disbelieve the testimony of A and B. The Federal Court of Justice has established detailed requirements for the written reasons of a judgment; for an overview, see Stuckenberg in Erb et al. (2013), § 267 marginal notes 35 et seq.

  23. See Article 6 (2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”).

  24. For a similar argument see Stuckenberg (1998), 522–530.

  25. It is not clear whether a verdict of guilty rendered at the trial court level indeed marks the “end” of the presumption of innocence. According to a majority of German writers, the presumption of innocence “ends” only when a conviction becomes final, that is, after appeals have been waived or exhausted; see Meyer 1989 at 71. The Federal Constitutional Court has nevertheless permitted a trial court to make an official statement that the defendant is “guilty” even before the judgment has been rendered but after all evidence had been taken and the court had persuaded itself of the defendant’s guilt; see Judgment of 26 March 1987, 74 BVerfGE 358 at 372–373; judgment of 29 May 1990, 82 BVerfGE 106 at 116.

  26. The European Court of Human Rights has found that such a shifting of the burden of proof does not violate Article 6 (2) of the European Convention of Human Rights; G. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application no. 37334/08, Decision of 30 August 2011, § 26.

  27. Salabiaku v. France, ECtHR, Application no. 10519/83, Judgment of 7 Oct. 1988.

  28. id. at § 28.

  29. id. at § 30.

  30. See id. at § 28: “… the national legislature would be free to strip the trial court of any genuine power of assessment and deprive the presumption of innocence of its substance, if the words "according to law" were construed exclusively with reference to domestic law. Such a situation could not be reconciled with the object and purpose of Article 6, which, by protecting the right to a fair trial and in particular the right to be presumed innocent, is intended to enshrine the fundamental principle of the rule of law (…). Article 6 para. 2 does not therefore regard presumptions of fact or of law provided for in the criminal law with indifference. It requires States to confine them within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence.”

  31. In Hansen v. Denmark, ECtHR, Application no. 28971/95, Decision of 16 March 2000, the ECtHR declared that “the Contracting States may, under certain conditions, penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether it results from criminal intent or from negligence”.

  32. G. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application no. 37334/08, Decision of 30 August 2011, § 27.

  33. Two examples from German law: § 264 Penal Code defines the offense of making a false declaration in an application for EU subsidies or of wrongly appropriating such subsidies, thus dispensing with the need to prove a causal relationship between the defendant’s fraudulent conduct and financial harm to another, as normally has to be proved for the crime of fraud (§ 263 Penal Code). Under § 231 Penal Code, it is a serious crime to take part in a physical altercation between more than two persons if any person is killed or seriously wounded in that altercation; no proof is needed as to which participant caused the death or injury.

  34. See Allenet de Ribemont v. France, ECtHR, Application no. 15175/89, Judgment of 10 Feb. 1995, §§ 37, 41; A.L. v. Germany, ECtHR, Application no. 72758/01, Judgment of 28 April 2005, § 31.

  35. In private criminal suits, the court has discretion to dismiss the complaint when the alleged offence is insignificant; § 383 sec. 2 Code of Criminal Procedure.

  36. § 471 sec. 3 Code of Criminal Procedure.

  37. Judgment of 26 March 1987, 74 BVerfGE 358 at 374–375 (1987). See also Minelli v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Application no. 8660/79, Judgment of 25 March 1983, § 38. In the somewhat similar case A.L. v. Germany, ECtHR, Application no. 72758/01, Judgment of 28 April 2005, § 38, the ECtHR did not find a violation of the presumption of innocence: The complainant had been charged with fraud and spent four weeks in pretrial detention. The fraud case was eventually dismissed by the trial court according to § 153a sec. 2 Code of Criminal Procedure which authorizes the trial court to dismiss cases of lesser seriousness. The complainant then filed for monetary compensation for the time he had spent in pretrial detention. According to the statute providing for compensation in such cases, the award of compensation lies in the discretion of the court where the defendant had not been acquitted but had his case dismissed on discretionary grounds (§ 3 Gesetz über die Entschädigung für Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen of 8 March 1971, I Bundesgesetzblatt 1971, 157). The court denied the complainant’s claim for compensation explaining that an award of a compensation would not be equitable under the circumstances of the case. The presiding judge of the court also sent a letter to the complainant’s lawyer in which he stated that it was “highly likely” that the complainant would have been convicted if the trial court had completed the trial, and that therefore it was correct to deny compensation. The ECtHR regarded this as a close case but eventually found no violation of the presumption of innocence, relying mostly on the fact that the “highly likely” statement had not been part of the official court order but had been made only in the judge’s letter to complainant’s counsel.

  38. § 153a Code of Criminal Procedure.

  39. Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 22 November 1994, 40 BGHSt 371.

  40. Böhmer v. Germany, ECtHR, Application no. 37568/97, Judgment of 3 Oct. 2002, § 67. For reviews of this decision, see Neubacher (2004) and Seher (2006).

  41. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 9 Dec. 2004, 2005 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 817.

  42. For that reason, German law provides that pretrial detainees must be kept separate from convicted prisoners, and that they are not obliged to work during detention. See, e.g., §§ 3 and 11 (1) Gesetz zur Regelung des Vollzuges der Untersuchungshaft in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Law on the Regulation of the Enforcement of Pre-Trial Detention in Northrhine-Westphalia) of 27 Oct. 2009, 2009 Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt Nordrhein-Westfalen p. 540.

  43. See on this case Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 10 June1963, 16 BVerfGE 194.

  44. Cf. Frister (1988, 84–85).

  45. These grounds for pre-trial detention are regulated in § 112 sec. 2 German Code of Criminal Procedure.

  46. For about half of all pre-trial detainees in Germany, detention before trial is the only time they ever spend in custody. Most of these defendants are convicted but are sentenced to fines or probation. See the discussion in Dünkel and Morgenstern (2013, 85–86).

  47. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 15 Dec. 1965, 19 BVerfGE 342 at 350.

  48. The crimes of being a member of a terrorist gang (§ 129a sec. 1 and 2 Penal Code) and mayhem (§ 226 sec. 1 Penal Code) are punishable by 1–10 years imprisonment.

  49. The list of § 112a Code of Criminal Procedure includes drug offences, sexual offences, arson, and aggravated theft.

  50. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 15 Dec. 1965, 19 BVerfG 342 at 349-350; Judgment of 30 May 1973, 35 BVerfGE 185.

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Weigend, T. Assuming that the Defendant Is Not Guilty: The Presumption of Innocence in the German System of Criminal Justice. Criminal Law, Philosophy 8, 285–299 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9271-4

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