Abstract
“de-extinction” refers to the process of resurrecting extinct species by genetic methods. This science-fiction-sounding idea is in fact already in early processes of scientific implementation. Although this recent “revival of the dead” raises deep ethical questions, the ethics of de-extinction has barely received philosophical treatment. Rather than seeking a verdict for or against de-extinction, this paper attempts an overview and some novel analyses of the main ethical considerations. Five dimensions of the ethics of de-extinction are explored: (a) the possible contribution of de-extinction to promoting ecological values, (b) the deontological argument that we owe de-extinction to species we rendered extinct, (c) the question of “playing God” through de-extinction, (d) the utilitarian perspective, and (e) the role of aesthetic considerations in the ethics of de-extinction. A general feature arising from the paper’s discussion is that, due to de-extinction’s special character, it repeatedly tests the limits of our ethical notions.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Donlan et al. [26]. (Theoretically, such ethical responsibility could mandate de-extinction even when it has no ecological value.)
“If we’re talking about species we drove extinct, then I think we have an obligation to try to do this,” says Professor Michael Archer, head of the Lazarus Project team; see Zimmer [27].
Cf. Peter Singer’s title: “Is the Sanctity of Life Ethic Terminally Ill?”
I provide a fuller account of this topic in “Respect for Persons, Life, and Nature” [unpublished].
It is by now obvious that “species rights” is totally different from “animal rights.”
This argument in particular suggests the more general point that the moral case for de-extinction, explained here as an argument from justice, can be re-conceptualized in terms of virtue ethics. I thank a reviewer for this journal for pointing out this possibility. This of course lends further support to the case for de-extinction by showing the breadth of its possible justifications.
The advancement of knowledge may be seen as an objective value, beyond preference satisfaction.
On cloning and de-extinction see Gamborg [6].
See Meno, St. 77, Symposium, St. 201ff.
See Rachel Barney’s exquisite review: [48].
Greater Hippias, St. 296, trans. Benjamin Jowett.
In the Philebus (St. 65) we are even given a formula of sorts, where the good is a function of three elements: beauty, proportion and truth.
References
Church G, Regis E (2012) Regenesis: how synthetic biology will reinvent nature and ourselves. Basic Books, New York
Church G (2013) Forum: please reanimate. Sci Am 309(3):12
Sherkow J, Greely H (2013) What if extinction is not forever? Science 340:32–33
Sandler R (2013) The ethics of reviving long-extinct species. Conserv Biol. doi:10.1111/cobi.12198
Cottrell S et al (2014) Resuscitation and resurrection: the ethics of cloning cheetahs, mammoths, and neanderthals. Life Sci Soc Policy 10(1):3
Gamborg C (2014) What’s so special about reconstructing a mammoth? Ethics of breeding and biotechnology in re-creating extinct species. In: Oksanen M, Siipi H (eds) The ethics of animal re-creation and modification: reviving, rewilding, restoring. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp 60–76
Leopold A (1949) A sand county almanac. Oxford University Press, New York
Raup D (1991) Extinction: bad genes or bad luck? Norton, New York
Thomas JA et al (2004) Comparative losses of British butterflies, birds, and plants and the global extinction crisis. Science 303(5665):1879–1881
Pimm S, Raven P (2000) Biodiversity: extinction by numbers. Nature 403(6772):843–845
Ehrlich P, Ehrlich A (1981) Extinction: the causes and consequences of the disappearance of species. Random House, New York
Primack RB (2008) A primer of conservation biology, 4th edn. Sinauer Associates, Sunderland
Thomas CD et al (2004) Extinction risk from climate change. Nature 427:145–148
Rolston H (1985) Duties to endangered species. Bioscience 35:718–726
Katz E (1997) Nature as subject. Rowman and Littlefield, New York
Williams B (1995) Must a concern for the environment be centered on human beings? In: Making sense of humanity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Elliot R (1997) Faking nature. Routledge, London
Vogel S (2003) The nature of artifacts. Environ Ethics 25:149–168
Lo Y-S (1999) Natural and artifactual: restored nature as subject. Environ Ethics 21:247–266
Argenmeier P, Karr J (1994) Biological integrity versus biological diversity as policy directives. BioSience 44(10):690–697
Mooney H, Cleland E (2001) The evolutionary impact of invasive species. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 98(10):5446–5451
Jørgensen D (2013) Reintroduction and de-extinction. Bioscience 63(9):719–720
Editors (2013) Do not reanimate. Sci Am 308(6):12
Hunter M (1996) Fundamentals of conservation biology. Blackwell Science, Oxford
Forest F et al (2007) Preserving the evolutionary potential of floras in biodiversity hotspots. Nature 445:757–760
Donlan J et al (2005) Re-wilding North America. Nature 436:913–914
Zimmer C (April 2013) Bringing them back to life. National Geographic Magazine
Heyd D (2010) Cultural diversity and biodiversity: a tempting analogy. Crit Rev Int Soc Polit Philos 13(1):159–179
Raz J (1986) The morality of freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Feinberg J (1974) The rights of animals and unborn generations. In: Blackstone WT (ed) Philosophy and environmental crisis. University of Georgia Press, Athens
Taylor P (1986) Respect for nature. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Rescher N (1980) Unpopular essays on technological progress. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh
Dawkins R (2009) The greatest show on earth. Free Press, New York
Smith JM (1964) Group selection and kin selection. Nature 201(4924):1145–1147
O’Neill J (1992) The varieties of intrinsic value. Monist 75:119–137
Dworkin R (1993) Life’s dominion. Vintage, New York
Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Schweitzer A (1987) The philosophy of civilization. Prometheus Books, Amherst
Weber BH (2010) What is life? Defining life in the context of emergent complexity. Orig Life Evol Biosph 40:221–229
Heyd D (1992) Genethics. University of California Press, Berkeley
Singer P (1993) Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Stevens T et al (1991) Measuring the existence value of wildlife: what Do CVM estimates really show? Land Econ 67(4):390–400
Taubenberger JK et al (2012) Reconstruction of the 1918 influenza virus: unexpected rewards from the past. MBio 3.5: e00201–12
Randall A (1988) What mainstream economists have to say about the value of biodiversity. In: Wilson EO (ed) Biodiversity. National Academy Press, Washington, DC
Ehrenfeld D (2006) Transgenics and vertebrate cloning as tools for species conservation. Conserv Biol 20:723–732
Parfit D (1987) Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press, New York
World Conservation Union (1980) World conservation strategy: living resource conservation for sustainable development. IUCN-UNEP-WWF, Gland
Barney R (2010) Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the good. Class Philol 105:363–380
Rolston H (2002) From beauty to duty: aesthetics of nature and environmental ethics. In: Berleant A (ed) Environment and the arts: perspectives on environmental aesthetics. Aldershot, Hampshire, pp 127–141
Parsons G (2007) The aesthetic value of animals. Environ Ethics 29:151–169
Kant (2000) Critique of the power of judgment. Guyer P (ed). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Zangwill N (2001) Formal natural beauty. Proc Aristot Soc 101:209–224
Loftis R (2003) Three problems for the aesthetic foundations of environmental ethics. Philos Contemp World 10:41–50
I wish to thank Uri Eytan, whose interest in de-extinction prompted me to embark on the research that led to this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cohen, S. The Ethics of De-Extinction. Nanoethics 8, 165–178 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-014-0201-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-014-0201-2