Abstract
The drivers of public support for international organizations (IOs) are multifaceted and contested. Focusing on the US, we argue that citizens weigh elite cues about the financial burden associated with funding IOs and the influence over IOs that such funding yields. Moreover, we identify political ideology as a powerful moderator – theorizing that conservatives should respond more positively to cues about US influence and more negatively to cues about financial costs than liberals. We find support for the core theory, but also counterintuitively find that the negative effect of the cost treatment manifests primarily amongst liberals as opposed to conservatives. A second, pre-registered experiment reveals that conservatives support increasing funding to IOs to secure US influence, and may even support increasing taxes to do so, especially when cued by a co-partisan. By contrast, liberals who learn that funding provides influence prefer to cut funding to IOs, even when cued by a co-partisan.
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Data Availability
The dataset generated by the survey research analyzed for the current study are available in the Dataverse repository and the Review of International Organizations’ webpage.
Notes
As quoted in (Milner & Dustin, 2012, 3).
Morse (2014).
Data from the Chicago Council’s Worldviews 2002 Report and Global Views poll from 2008 suggest these figures are broadly consistent with past decades.
Andersen et al. (2006).
Clark and Dolan (2021).
For related work on how ideology and elite rhetoric shape public attitudes toward the international order, see Lee and Prather (2020).
Shendruk, Amandam, Laura Hillard, and Diana Roy. “Funding the United Nations.” Council on Foreign Relations. June 8, 2020. http://on.cfr.org/3odpzxs.
Browne, Ryan. “Trump Administration to Cut its Financial Contribution to NATO.” CNN. November 28, 2019. https://cnn.it/3cuIKx4. Also see “Brazil’s President Says NGO Funding will be Tightly Controlled.” Reuters. January 7, 2019. https://reut.rs/2T2tvnk on Brazilian President Bolsonaro, who has made similar statements.
Drezner (2008).
This is consistent with the findings of Kiratli (2020), who argues that people may be particuarly dissatisfied when there is a gap between economic expectations and the perceived utility of IOs, which is especially pronounced for voters in countries that contribute more to IOs.
Our samples are are broadly representative based on education, income, gender, and age, as shown in Table A5.
Hurst et al. (2017).
Cassata, Donna. “Seeking Showdown With Clinton, Gingrich Gets One With GOP.” CNN. March 18, 1998. https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/03/18/cq/foreign.policy.html
Webb, Whitney. “Leaked WikiLeaks Doc Reveals US Military Use of IMF, World Bank.” Mint News. February 7, 2019. https://bit.ly/3aMvna5
Mutz and Kim (2017).
Brutger and Rathbun (2021).
Milner and Dustin (2012). While Milner and Tingley argue that publics prefer bilateral solutions to multilateral ones when they desire control, powerful states may possess comparable influence over IOs in some cases while yielding other benefits, such as a veil of legitimacy.
For example, Rathbun et al. (2016).
Dellmuth and Scholte (2018).
Rathbun (2007).
Brutger (2021).
Rathbun (2007).
Brutger and Kertzer (2018).
Rathbun (2007).
Rathbun (2007).
Jost (2017).
Casler and Groves (2021).
We use social values theory to predict heterogenous effects across ideology (and partisanship), since ideology and partisanship are some of the most salient dimensions guiding the formation of political coalitions and the policy making process. While we could have attempted to directly measure core values, we follow recent scholarship, such as Brutger (2021) and Casler and Groves (2021), by focusing on the politically salient dimensions that are likely to be more meaningful to political audiences. For example, policy advisors and politicians seeking to build a domestic coalition are likely to ask whether liberals, moderates, and/or conservatives will support a policy, or in the American context whether Democrats and/or Republicans will support a policy. However, it is quite unlikely that political actors will consider whether individuals who are high or low in specific values, such as self-transcendence values, are likely to support or oppose a policy.
As these examples suggest, the US is the largest contributor to organizations with various institutional design features. This logic then is not specific to any one voting scheme or governance framework.
See e.g. Trump on NATO and the WHO — Browne, Ryan. “Trump Administration to Cut its Financial Contribution to NATO.” CNN. November 28, 2019. https://cnn.it/3cuIKx4
Cassata, Donna. “Seeking Showdown With Clinton, Gingrich Gets One With GOP.” CNN. March 18, 1998. https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/03/18/cq/foreign.policy.html
Ibid.
The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of California, Berkeley, under protocol 2019-07-12427.
E.g., Clark and Dolan (2021).
Smith, R. Jeffrey. “Republicans Seek to Curb UN Funding.” Washington Post. January 23, 1995. https://wapo.st/3jrktdH; “Trump Calls for World Bank to Stop Loaning to China.” Reuters. December 6, 2019. https://reut.rs/3iR3T7b
See Guisinger and Saunders (2017) on elite cues and international issues.
For examples of publications in leading political science journals using Dynata (SSI) studies, see e.g. Brutger and Kertzer (2018), Brutger and Strezhnev (2022), and Bush and Prather (2020). We discuss ethics and human subjects principles in detail in Appendix §8. The Appendix is available on the Review of International Organizations’ webpage.
See Appendix Table A1.
See Appendix Table A5.
See Brutger et al. (2022), which shows that salient cue-givers can generate larger treatment effects.
We specifically make use of IO mandates from their founding documents and websites.
As shown below, the influence treatments specify the formal rules that give control through the ability to veto, which allow the US to exert significant influence. This means that the treatment potentially combines public concerns about control and influence in IOs, which is representative of how the issues are frequently discussed by the media and elites, and is appropriate given the close connection between control and influence. For more on state influence and control in IOs, see Novosad and Werker (2014) and Stone (2011).
News coverage similarly juxtaposes discussions of US influence with cost considerations – see e.g. Harris, Gardiner. “Trump Administration Withdraws US From U.N. Human Rights Council.” New York Times. June 19, 2018. https://nyti.ms/3e7vK15; Armus, Teo. “Trump Threatens to Permanently Cut WHO Funding.” May 19, 2020. Washington Post. https://wapo.st/2Y3R9CC.
See Brutger et al. (2022), which finds that longer treatment text reduces the size of average treatment effects.
We randomized whether respondents who received this treatment received the influence or cost condition first.
These results also hold when we include socio-demographic covariates (Appendix Table A7).
The measure of ideology and a discussion of its use is provided in Appendix §2.4
In the subset analysis, each respondent is coded as liberal if they selected “slightly liberal,” “liberal,” or “extremely liberal” with conservatives coded in the corresponding manner.
With respondents’ stronger priors toward the UN, we also recognize that conservatives have become muchmore negative toward the UN, especially since the 9/11 attacks (Pushter, 2016).
We randomized the order of the main dependent variable and the potential mediators, as recommended.
Dellmuth and Scholte (2018).
Brutger and Rathbun (2021).
Brutger and Rathbun (2021).
Dellmuth and Scholte (2018).
Once again, we re-scale the seven-point conservatism variable to a 0-1 scale for ease of interpretation.
Notably, the average fairness, legitimacy, and trust values are much higher for liberals than conservatives. Specifically, liberals average 3.64, 3.45, and 3.91 out of five for fairness, trust, and legitimacy respectively, while conservatives average 3.10, 2.91, and 3.23.
Had we directly measured whether individuals place a higher value on equality versus equity, we would have likely found a larger negative effect of the influence treatment on those who prioritize equality. This means that the potential bias of proxying for core values with ideology may lead to our estimates being relatively conservative, since ideology is not as precise a measure of the underlying value.
Jost (2017).
Our sample is balanced on key observables, as is shown in Appendix Figure A8. To enhance data quality we implemented a series of respondent screening questions and procedures, which we detail in the Appendix Section 6.1, along with a discussion of some of the strengths and limitations of the sample. Descriptive statistics for the sample can be found in Appendix Table A9. Comparisons to Census benchmarks can be found in Table A5.
Cassata, Donna. “Seeking Showdown With Clinton, Gingrich Gets One With GOP.” CNN. March 18, 1998. https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/03/18/cq/foreign.policy.html
House Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1982: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 97th Congress, First Session.
Hennigan, W.J. “We Reject Globalism: President Trump Took American First to the United Nations.” Time. September 25, 2018. https://bit.ly/3Bo85UO
Schlipphak et al. (2022)
Brutger (2021).
See e.g., Zaller (1992).
See e.g., Hiscox (2006).
See e.g. Cassata, Donna. “Seeking Showdown With Clinton, Gingrich Gets One With GOP.” CNN. March 18, 1998. https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/03/18/cq/foreign.policy.html and the 2018 US budgetary documents at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2018-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2018-BUD.pdf.
Since the survey provided information about funding departments (Defense, Education, Transportation, etc.) we felt that the most similar comparison was to include funding for the State Department and related foreign policy allocations, as opposed to the specific line-item for the IO funding.
See Ibid p. 50.
We tuned the models to ensure that exclusivity and semantic coherence were high. For democrats, we run the model with six topics. For republicans, we run it with five topics.
Guisinger and Saunders (2017).
Dellmuth et al. (2021).
See Brutger et al. (2022).
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Acknowledgements
We thank Don Casler, Lisa Dellmuth, Lindsay Dolan, Noel Johnston, Julia Morse, Tyler Pratt, Jonas Tallberg, Felicity Vabulas, and Noah Zucker for helpful comments on previous drafts. We also thank participants at the 2020 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and 2021 Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association and Political Economy of International Organization conference for constructive feedback. All remaining errors are our own.
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Brutger, R., Clark, R. At what cost? Power, payments, and public support of international organizations. Rev Int Organ 18, 431–465 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-022-09479-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-022-09479-9