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The Review of International Organizations

, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp 145–177 | Cite as

Trade flows and trade disputes

  • Chad P. BownEmail author
  • Kara M. Reynolds
Article

Abstract

This paper introduces a new data set and establishes a set of basic facts and patterns regarding the ‘trade’ that countries fight about under WTO dispute settlement. It characterizes the scope of products, as well as the levels of and changes to the trade values, market shares, volumes, and prices for those goods that eventually become subject to WTO litigation. The first result is striking heterogeneity in the level of market access at stake across disputes: e.g., 14% of cases over disputed import products feature bilateral trade that is less than $1 million per year, and another 15% feature bilateral trade that is more than $1 billion per year. Nevertheless, some strong patterns emerge from a more detailed examination of the data. Both high- and low-income complainants tend to suffer important losses in foreign market access in the products that ultimately become subject to dispute. Furthermore, while the respondent’s imposition of an allegedly WTO-inconsistent policy is associated with reductions, on average, to trade values, volumes and exporter-received prices, there is some evidence of differences in the size of these changes across both the different types of policies under dispute and the potential exporter country litigants. Finally, these different types of policies under dispute can have dissimilar trade effects for the complainant relative to other (non-complainant) exporters of the disputed product, and this is likely to affect the litigation allegiance of third countries.

Keywords

Dispute settlement WTO Trade agreements 

Supplementary material

11558_2014_9208_MOESM1_ESM.zip (7.3 mb)
ESM 1 (ZIP 7524 kb)

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Development Research Group, Trade and International Integration (DECTI)The World BankWashingtonUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsAmerican UniversityWashingtonUSA
  3. 3.Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)LondonUK

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