Daniel Finke, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch and George Tsebelis. 2012. Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
Power, Steven Lukes (1974) teaches us, has three dimensions. The first dimension, based on Dahl’s (1957) pluralist view of power, becomes apparent in open conflicts such as decision-making situations when one actor is capable of making other actors do something that they would not otherwise do. In International Relations and EU studies, this perspective is most closely associated with studies of intergovernmental bargaining in a decentralized environment (Moravcsik 1998).
Considering non-decisions as likewise important, the second dimension adds procedures to the picture. Institutional rules “mobilize bias” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, drawing on Schattschneider) in that they confine the scope of decision-making by preventing certain decisions from being taken on issues over which there is a conflict of interest. This view is particularly prominent in studies of legislative bargaining, which in the context of the EU, analyze, for example, how different agenda-setting rules affect the...
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