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Lake, D.A. Randall W. Stone. 2011. Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy (New York: Cambridge University Press). Rev Int Organ 7, 109–113 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9126-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9126-5