Abstract
Current IMF reform proposals are preoccupied with changing governance structures by reallocating Executive Board chairs and quota shares and with expanding and altering the Fund’s surveillance role, but not enough attention has been paid to whether organizational change at the staff level is also needed. IMF staff have intellectual dominance and discretion in the design of loan conditionality, writing of surveillance reports, and provision of technical and policy advice. There are also clear internal and external criticisms of how the Fund’s organizational culture—that is perceived to be hierarchical, technical/economistic, bureaucratic, and homogeneous/conforming—negatively affects the Fund’s policy output and relationship with borrowing members. This article suggests altering ’how things are done’ at the IMF by making changes to recruitment and organizational structure.
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Notes
Survey results were based “on a 5-point scale where ‘5’ means ‘describes completely’ and ‘1’ means ‘does not describe at all’. After careful review of the IEO report it appears that the survey results corresponded to those who reported ‘5’ or ‘describes completely’. However, the IEO did not respond to email requests for verifying this inference.
Based on personal interviews with former senior Fund officials conducted in Washington, DC on May 3 and 5, 2006.
Based on personal interviews with former senior Fund officials conducted in Washington, DC on May 3 and 5, 2006.
Based on personal interviews with former senior Fund officials conducted in Washington, DC on May 3 and 5, 2006.
That said, IMF staff have similarly complained that government cabinet-shuffles and changes in government can also be frustrating. As noted in a personal interview with a former staff member, ‘musical chairs’ can work both ways.
Based on personal comparisons made between Executive Director statements (acquired from former EDs) and Fund Secretary’s documentation of Executive Board minutes (later acquired through the Archives). It should be noted that this is in no way to suggest a doctoring of ED statements, but a toning down of criticism where words chosen, perhaps even subconsciously, are less passionate, expressive, and confrontational.
A former senior staff member in a personal interview dated May 5, 2006 provided this idea.
While the Fund can proclaim it achieves ‘passport diversity’ in that staff have varied national backgrounds, it fails to hire staff with varied economic training. In both 1999 and 2000 (latest information released through the Fund archives), for example, none of the 37 and 48 incoming EP staff obtained their final degrees outside of Europe and North America (IMF, 2000: 9; IMF, 2001: 10).
Based on personal interviews with former senior Fund officials conducted in Toronto in February, 2004.
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Momani, B. IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals. Rev Int Org 2, 39–57 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-006-9002-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-006-9002-x