Abstract
Based on the evolutionary game approach, this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers. A tripartite evolutionary game model of “government-automaker-consumer” is established to explore the interactions under the condition of bounded rationality. The study shows that: 1) The increase of credit price and credit ratio will promote the diffusion of new energy vehicles (NEVs). 2) The cost premium of NEVs and the shrinking market will slow the spread of NEVs to some extent but will not prevent NEVs from becoming a trend in the automobile industry. However, the cost premium of fuel vehicles (FVs) will accelerate the development of the NEV industry. 3) Government subsidies can promote the development of NEV industry to some extent, but they are not always effective. The government can simultaneously implement subsidies for automakers and consumers in the early stages, and choose to implement the subsidy only for consumers in the medium term. Additionally, there is no need to implement the subsidy policy at a later stage.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Data Availability
All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article (and its supplementary information files).
References
Asadi S, Nilashi M, Samad S, Abdullah R, Mahmoud M, Alkinani MH, Yadegaridehkordi E (2021). Factors impacting consumers’ intention toward adoption of electric vehicles in Malaysia. Journal of Cleaner Production 282: 124474.
Carley S, Siddiki S, Nicholson-Crotty S (2019). Evolution of plug-in electric vehicle demand: Assessing consumer perceptions and intent to purchase over time. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 70: 94–111.
Dong F, Liu Y J (2020). Policy evolution and effect evaluation of new-energy vehicle industry in China. Resources Policy 67(C): 101655.
Habib MA, Kabir KMA, Tanimoto J (2022). Evolutionary game analysis for sustainable environment under two power generation systems. Evergreen 9(2): 326–344.
Harvey L D (2020). Rethinking electric vehicle subsidies, rediscovering energy efficiency. Energy Policy 146: 111760.
Huang TF, Hu CH, He QY, Yang DX, He T, Fu Y (2022). A coordination analysis of stakeholder interests on the new subsidy policy of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in China: From the perspective of the evolutionary game theory. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 47(58): 24493–24510.
Ji SF, Zhao D, Luo RJ (2019). Evolutionary game analysis on local governments and manufacturers’ behavioral strategies: Impact of phasing out subsidies for new energy vehicles. Energy 189: 116064.
Jin T, Jiang YL, Liu XW (2023). Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation. Applied Mathematics and Computation 440: 127677.
Khan U, Yamamoto T, Sato H (2020). Consumer preferences for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in Japan. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 87: 102542.
Li JZ, Ku Y, Liu CL, Zhou YP (2019). Dual credit policy: Promoting NEV with battery recycling in a competitive environment? Journal of Cleaner Production 243: 118456.
Li YM, Zhang Q, Liu BY, McLellan BJM, Gao Y, Tang YY (2018). Substitution effect of new-energy vehicle credit program and corporate average fuel consumption regulation for green-car subsidy. Energy 152: 223–236.
Liao D S, Tan B (2023). An evolutionary game analysis of new energy vehicles promotion considering carbon tax in post-subsidy era. Energy 264: 126156.
Liu C, Song Y, Wang W, Shi X (2023). The governance of manufacturers’ greenwashing behaviors: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of electric vehicles. Applied Energy 333: 120498.
Liu S, Li H, Mei Q (2021). Research on system dynamic of buying work safety services in small and medium-sized enterprises. Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 30(3): 339–362.
Liu Y, Dong F (2022). What are the roles of consumers, automobile production enterprises, and the government in the process of banning gasoline vehicles? Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model. Energy 238: 122004.
Lou GX, Ma HM, Fan TJ, Chan HK (2020). Impact of the dual-credit policy on improvements in fuel economy and the production of internal combustion engine vehicles. Resources Conservation and Recycling 156(C): 104712.
Nie QY, Zhang LH, Tong ZH, Klaus H (2022). Strategies for applying carbon trading to the new energy vehicle market in China: An improved evolutionary game analysis for the bus industry. Energy 259: 124904.
Santos G, Rembalski S (2021). Do electric vehicles need subsidies in the UK? Energy Policy 149: 111890.
Selten R (1980). A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology 84(1): 93–101.
Sen B, Noori M, Tatari O (2017). Will corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard help? Modeling CAFE’s impact on market share of electric vehicles. Energy Policy 109: 279–287.
Shao L, Yang J, Zhang M (2017). Subsidy scheme or price discount scheme? Mass adoption of electric vehicles under different market structures. European Journal of Operational Research 262(3): 1181–1195.
Su DJ, Gu YD, Du QX, Zhou WL, Huang YC (2020). Factors affecting user satisfaction with NEV: A field survey in Shanghai and Nanjing. Journal of Environmental Management 270: 110857.
Tanimoto J (2021). Sociophysics Approach to Epidemics. Springer, Singapore.
Wang L, Fu ZL, Guo W, Liang RY, Shao HY (2020). What influences sales market of NEV in China? Empirical study based on survey of consumers’ purchase reasons. Energy Policy 142(C): 111484.
Wang W, Li J (2023). A tripartite evolutionary game model for the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle industry development under government regulation in China. Fuel 348: 128223.
Wang Y, Mao J, Chen F, Wang DL (2022). Uncovering the dynamics and uncertainties of substituting coal power with renewable energy resources. Renewable Energy 193: 669–686.
Yang T, Xing C, Li XY (2020). Evaluation and analysis of new-energy vehicle industry policies in the context of technical innovation in China. Journal of Cleaner Production 281: 125126.
Yu F, Wang LT, Li XT (2020). The effects of government subsidies on new energy vehicle enterprises: The moderating role of intelligent transformation. Energy Policy 141(C): 111463.
Zhang H, Cai G X (2020). Subsidy strategy on new-energy vehicle based on incomplete information: A case in China. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 541(C): 123370.
Zhang X, Bai X (2017). Incentive policies from 2006 to 2016 and new energy vehicles adoption in 2010–2020 in China. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 70(4): 24–43.
Zhao D, Ji SF, Wang HP, Jiang LW (2021). How do government subsidies promote new energy vehicle diffusion in the complex network context? A three-stage evolutionary game model. Energy 230: 120899.
Zhao JH, Zeng DL, Che LP, Zhou TW, Hu JY (2020). Research on the profit change of new energy vehicle closed-loop supply chain members based on government subsidies. Environmental Technology & Innovation 19: 100937.
Zhou X, Zhao R, Cheng L, Min XF (2019a). Impact of policy incentives on electric vehicles development: A system dynamics-based evolutionary game theoretical analysis. Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy 21(5): 1039–1053.
Zhou DQ, Yu Y, Wang QW, Zha DL (2019b). Effects of a generalized dual-credit system on green technology investments and pricing decisions in a supply chain. Journal of Environmental Management 247: 269–280.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful for the referees for their very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions, which helped us correct some of the errors in this paper and improve its quality. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71702112, 72204001 and 71971049, the Social Science Planning Fund of Liaoning Province under Grant No. L19CGL008, The Economic and Social Development Project of Liaoning Province under Grant 2022lslybkt-027.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Additional information
Jinhuan Tang is an associate professor at the Economics and Management School, Shenyang Aerospace University. Her research direction is mainly low carbon supply chain management.
Qiong Wu is a graduate student at the Economics and Management School, Shenyang Aerospace University. Her research directions include new energy vehicle operation research and complex system management.
Yiming Chen is a graduate student at the Economics and Management School, Shenyang Aerospace University. Her research directions include intelligent vehicle operation management.
Yuran Jin is a professor at the College of Business Administration, University of Science and Technology Liaoning. His research direction is mainly 3D print business model.
Kun Wang is a graduate student of Economics and Management School, Shenyang Aerospace University. Her research direction is mainly new energy vehicle operation management.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Tang, J., Wu, Q., Chen, Y. et al. Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Production Decisions of Automakers in the Chinese Automobile Industry: A Tripartite Model of Government, Automakers, and Consumers. J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng. 32, 708–728 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-023-5582-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-023-5582-8