Performative contradiction and the regrounding for philosophical paradigms

Abstract

As a unique method of philosophical argument, performative contradiction attracted general attention after the change in direction of pragmatics in the twentieth century. Hintikka used this method to conduct an in-depth analysis of Descartes’ proposition “I think, therefore I am,” providing a proof which is a model in the philosophical history; Apel absorbed performative contradiction into his own framework of a priori pragmatics; and Habermas introduced it into the theory of formal pragmatics and rendered it an effective weapon of debate. Wittgenstein, who had fallen into the trap of performative contradiction in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, later managed to extract himself from it and indeed used the methodology of performative contradiction to cure the ills of philosophy, making it a general philosophical method. Through analysis of its connotations and classic examples of its use we can see that it is crucial in refuting extreme relativism and skepticism, and hence provides methodological support for a new foundation for philosophical paradigms.

摘要

践言冲突作为一种独特的哲学论辩方法, 在20 世纪语用学转向之后受到普遍关注。 欣提卡以践言冲突方法深入分析了笛卡尔 “我思故我在” 这一命题, 使其论证成为哲学史研究中的典范; 阿佩尔将其纳入自己的先验语用学框架, 哈贝马斯则将其引入形式语用学理论, 使之成为相当有效的论辩武器; 在《逻辑哲学论》中陷入践言冲突的维特根斯坦, 在后期则走出了这一陷阱, 并运用践言冲突方法治疗哲学的疾病, 使之成为普遍的哲学方法。 通过对践言冲突的内涵及其典型案例的分析, 我们可以看到这一方法在驳斥极端相对主义、 怀疑主义中发挥了关键性作用, 从而为哲学范式的重新奠基提供了方法上的支持。