Government size, market-orientation and regional corruption: Evidence from the provincial level panel data

Abstract

Using a panel data at the provincial level during the period of 1989–2004, this paper examines the effects of social and economic factors such as government scale, privatization, openness, and education on regional corruption. Applying a fixed-effect model and IV estimation, we find that government size positively affects the incidence rate of corruption, and the effect becomes larger with the increase in the size of the core department of the government. 1% increase in the core department of the government leads to a 0.68%–1% increase in the number of corruption cases. While the proportion of FDI is positively associated with the corruption of regional officials, the ratio of the import and export trade to GDP is negatively associated with corruption. The impact of privatization on corruption is ambiguous. We also identify the significant impacts of the size and structure of the government expenditure on corruption.

摘要

运用中国 1989 年至 2004 年的省级面板数据, 系统考察了地区政府规模、 民营化、 经济开放程度、 教育水平等社会经济因素对官员腐败的影响。 通过运用固定效应模型和工具变量方法, 发现: 政府规模的扩大会增加地区腐败案件的发生率, 而核心政府部门规模的影响更为明显, 党政部门规模上升1%至少会带动腐败犯罪案件提高0.68%–1%。 FDI 比例的提高会增加地区的官员腐败水平, 而进出口比例的提高却有助于降低地区的腐败水平。 民营化程度的影响却不确定。 我们还发现政府支出规模和结构也对一个地区的官员腐败产生显著影响。