Abstract
This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail. We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen.
摘要
通过讨论一个农村集体产权(或农业合作经济)的演进过程, 发现无论是联产承包制的演进, 抑或是市场化过程中的农村合作经济的演进, 都从不同侧面说明产权的多元属性在决定合约结构与组织形态中的关键地位。 在多个农户投入要素存在着强互补性的情况下, 联合(集体)产权同样是可以选择的。
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Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94
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Cui, B., Deng, H. The nature of land property rights and contract options in institutional changes: A case study of cooperation economy. Front. Econ. China 4, 250–264 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11459-009-0014-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11459-009-0014-3
Keywords
- cooperative economy
- nature of land property rights
- contract choice
- collective property rights and its attribute
- principle of efficiency supreme