Abstract
This paper builds a micro-behavior model of central bank and financial institutions from the perspective of property-rights. By analyzing the theoretical model and the practice, we conclude that, in the framework of the present financial stabilization policies in China, the central bank’s functions of monetary policy and financial stabilization are enslaved to financial institutions. Thus, central bank independence has been damaged because of the actual property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions. The policy implication is to cut off the property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions.
摘要
从产权角度出发, 建立中央银行和金融机构的微观行为模型, 通过分析和考察理论模型和现实情况, 认为在中国当前金融稳定政策的框架下, 由于中央银行与微观金融机构事实上的产权关系, 其货币稳定和金融稳定职能均受制于微观金融机构, 独立性受到损害。 为了保持中央银行的独立性, 必须切断其与微观金融机构的产权关系。
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Translated from Caijing wenti yanjiu 财经问题研究 (Research on Finanical and Economic Issues), 2007, (6): 3–9
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Huang, S., He, K. Property-rights, financial stabilization policies, and central bank independence. Front. Econ. China 3, 24–37 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11459-008-0002-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11459-008-0002-z