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Cube attacks on round-reduced MORUS and Gimli

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61802119).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Mathematics and Statistics, Hubei Key Laboratory of Applied Mathematics, Hubei University, Wuhan, 430062, China

    Siwei Chen, Zejun Xiang, Xiangyong Zeng & Shasha Zhang

Authors
  1. Siwei Chen
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  2. Zejun Xiang
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  3. Xiangyong Zeng
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  4. Shasha Zhang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Zejun Xiang.

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Conclusion

This study introduces a new method to efficiently search for cubes in the preprocessing phase of cube attack based on division property. We observed that the high-degree monomials present in the second stage can help the attackers identify cube variables. If the cube variables are selected from the corresponding positions indicated by those high-degree monomials, there is a high probability to result in linear superpolys. For this method to be proven effective, we applied it to two authenticated encryptions, MORUS and Gimli, and we reached the longest rounds under practical attack scenario for both ciphers.

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Chen, S., Xiang, Z., Zeng, X. et al. Cube attacks on round-reduced MORUS and Gimli. Sci. China Inf. Sci. 65, 119101 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-019-2742-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-019-2742-6

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