Cryptanalysis of PRIMATEs

Abstract

PRIMATEs is a family of authenticated encryption design submitted to competition for authenticated encryption: security, applicability, and robustness. The three modes of operation in PRIMATEs family are: APE, HANUMAN, GIBBON with security levels: 80, 120 bits. APE is robust despite the nonce misusing. In this study, we revise the algebraic model and find new integral distinguishers for both PRIMATE permutation and its inverse permutation. Moreover, we construct a zero-sum distinguisher for full 12-round PRIMATE-80/120 permutation with the 2100/2105 complexity, improving over previous work. We also perform an integral attack on 8-round finalization of APE-80/120 with 230 chosen messages. The key recovery process is optimized using the FFT technique presented by Todo and Aoki. Our work is the best attack against APE, demonstrating the practical attack on 8-round finalization of APE-80. The new integral distinguishers apply to create forgeries on 5/6-round finalization of APE and HANUMAN that require 215/230 chosen messages, which is the first forgery attack against APE and HANUMAN.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by National Cryptography Development Fund (Grant No. MMJJ20170102), National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61572293, 61502276, 61692276), Major Scientific and Technological Innovation Projects of Shandong Province (Grant No. 2017CXGC0704), National Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (Grant No. ZR2016FM22), and Open Research Fund from Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Computer Network (Grant No. SDKLCN-2017-04).

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Correspondence to Wei Wang.

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Li, Y., Wang, M., Liu, W. et al. Cryptanalysis of PRIMATEs. Sci. China Inf. Sci. 63, 112106 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-019-1507-1

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Keywords

  • PRIMATEs
  • APE
  • HANUMAN
  • integral distinguisher
  • key recovery attack
  • forgery