A novel anti-detection criterion for covert storage channel threat estimation
This work was supported by Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61379048, 61672508, U1636213), and Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)/State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA) International Partnership Program for Creative Research Teams.
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