Impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis on the LED lightweight cipher in VANETs

  • Wei Li
  • Vincent Rijmen
  • Zhi Tao
  • Qingju Wang
  • Hua Chen
  • Yunwen Liu
  • Chaoyun Li
  • Ya Liu
Research Paper
  • 77 Downloads

Abstract

With the expansion of wireless technology, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are emerging as a promising approach for realizing smart cities and addressing many serious traffic problems, such as road safety, convenience, and efficiency. To avoid any possible rancorous attacks, employing lightweight ciphers is most effective for implementing encryption/decryption, message authentication, and digital signatures for the security of the VANETs. Light encryption device (LED) is a lightweight block cipher with two basic keysize variants: LED-64 and LED-128. Since its inception, many fault analysis techniques have focused on provoking faults in the last four rounds to derive the 64-bit and 128-bit secret keys. It is vital to investigate whether injecting faults into a prior round enables breakage of the LED. This study presents a novel impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis on a prior round. A detailed analysis of the expected number of faults is used to uniquely determine the secret key. It is based on the propagation of truncated differentials and is surprisingly reminiscent of the computation of the complexity of a rectangle attack. It shows that the impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis could successfully break the LED by fault injections.

Keywords

VANETs LED lightweight cipher impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Research Council KU Leuven (Grant No. OT/13/071), National Key Basic Research Program of China (Grant No. 2013CB338004), National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61772129, 61472250, 61402286, 61672347, 61402288), Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (Grant No. 14ZZ066), Shanghai Natural Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 15ZR1400300, 16ZR1401100), European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant No. H2020-MSCA-ITN-2014-643161 ECRYPT-NET), Open Research Fund of State Key Laboratory of Information Security (Grant No. AGK20170X), National Cryptography Development Fund (Grant No. MMJJ20170214), Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and China Scholarship Council (Grant No. CSC201403170380).

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Copyright information

© Science China Press and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wei Li
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
  • Vincent Rijmen
    • 2
  • Zhi Tao
    • 1
  • Qingju Wang
    • 4
    • 5
    • 2
  • Hua Chen
    • 6
    • 2
  • Yunwen Liu
    • 2
    • 7
  • Chaoyun Li
    • 2
  • Ya Liu
    • 8
    • 4
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and TechnologyDonghua UniversityShanghaiChina
  2. 2.imec-COSICKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium
  3. 3.Shanghai Key Laboratory of Integrate Administration Technologies for Information SecurityShanghaiChina
  4. 4.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiChina
  5. 5.Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer ScienceTechnical University of DenmarkKgs. LyngbyDenmark
  6. 6.Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of SoftwareChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  7. 7.College of ScienceNational University of Defense TechnologyChangshaChina
  8. 8.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringUniversity of Shanghai for Science and TechnologyShanghaiChina

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