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A new construction on randomized message-locked encryption in the standard model via UCEs

基于UCEs的在标准模型下可证明安全的随机化消息锁定加密的新构造

Abstract

We present a new primitive of randomized message-locked encryption (MLE) in this paper and define a new security model for it. The new primitive, named message-locked encryption3 (hereafter referred as MLE3), is actually a variant of randomized message-locked encryption (Bellare et al. Eurocrypt’13). In order to prevent trivial attacks, our primitive admits a semi-trusted server, which is allowed to hold a secret key of public key encryption (PKE), to verify the correctness of a tag. The new security notion, called privacy chosen-distribution attacks3 (PRV-CDA3), requires that a ciphertext generated by encrypting an unpredictable message and another ciphertext (possible invalid) chosen randomly from a ciphertext space are indistinguishable. Compared with the priori proposed security notion, privacy chosen-distribution attacks (PRV-CDA) (Bellare et al. Eurocrypt’13), which requires that two ciphertexts generated by encrypting two unpredictable messages are indistinguishable, the security notion we propose is much stronger. Based on the new primitive, under the blackbox reductions, we put forward a novel construction which achieves both privacy chosen-distribution attacks3 (PRV-CDA3) and strong tag consistency (STC) securities in the standard model via universal computational extractors (UCEs) (Bellare et al. Crypto’13). In addition, our scheme also provides the validity-testing for ciphertext.

中文摘要

本文中, 我们提出了一个新的随机化消息锁定加密原型(称作 “MLE3”),并为其定义了一个新的安全模型。该原型实际上是Bellare等人最初提出的随机化消息锁定加密的一个新变种。为了阻止平凡攻击, 我们允许持有公钥加密方案私钥的半可信服务器, 验证一个标记的正确性。新的安全模型即PRV-CDA3要求通过正常加密算法产生的密文和从密文空间随机选取的密文(可能是无效的)不可区分。和Bellare等人提出的PRV-CDA安全模型(其仅仅意味着两个有效密文的不可区分)相比较, 我们提出的安全模型更强。基于新的模型, 在黑盒规约下, 使用UCEs技术, 我们提出了一个在标准模型下可证明安全的、同时具有PRV-CDA3和STC安全性的随机化消息锁定加密方案。另外, 我们的方案还具有密文有效性检测的性质。本文创新点在于, 首次提出了在标准模型下可证明安全的随机化消息锁定加密的完整构造和安全证明, 该方案同时达到了PRV-CDA3和STC安全性, 其安全性高于同类方案的安全性, 例如Bellare等人提出的随机化消息锁定加密。

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Correspondence to Kefei Chen.

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Cite this article

Wang, H., Chen, K., Qin, B. et al. A new construction on randomized message-locked encryption in the standard model via UCEs. Sci. China Inf. Sci. 60, 052101 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-015-1037-2

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Keywords

  • message-locked encryption3 (MLE3)
  • universal computational extractors (UCEs)
  • privacy chosendistribution attacks3 (PRV-CDA3)
  • strong tag consistency (STC)
  • standard model

关键词

  • 消息锁定加密3(MLE3)
  • 通用计算提取器(UCEs)
  • 秘密选取分布攻击3(PRV-CDA3)
  • 强的标记一致性(STC)
  • 标准模型(SM)