Abstract
In this paper, a power allocation problem based on the Cournot game and generalized Nash game is proposed. After integrating dynamic average consensus algorithm and distributed projection neural network through singular perturbation systems, a normalized Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is presented to solve the proposed power allocation problem in a distributed way. Combine Lyapunov stability with the singular perturbation analysis, the convergence of the proposed algorithm is analyzed. A simulation on IEEE 118-bus confirms that the proposed distributed algorithm can adjust the power allocation according to different situations, while keeping the optimal solution within the feasible set.
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This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61673107), and the Jiangsu Provincial Key Laboratory of Networked Collective Intelligence (Grant No. BM2017002).
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Fu, Z., Yu, W., Lü, J. et al. A distributed normalized Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm for power allocation among micro-grids. Sci. China Technol. Sci. 64, 341–352 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11431-019-1538-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11431-019-1538-6