Abstract
There are some fundamental—i.e., essential—differences between conceptual change theory and a rigorously applied discourse approach to the question of what and how people know. In this rejoinder, I suggest that the differences are paradigmatic because, among others, the units of analysis used and the data constructed are irreconcilably different. I now have abandoned my hopes for a collaborative extension of the two approaches, which I articulated not so long ago. I conclude that as alternative paradigms, conceptual change and discursive approaches will co-exist until one of them dies with its proponents.
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Notes
As another example of the greater power of discursive approaches, this sentence plays on multiple semantic registers (e.g., life, living, and dying [for which “pass away” is a euphemism]) and is not easily handled by conceptual change concerned as it is with literal sense.
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Roth, WM. A question of competing paradigms?. Cult Stud of Sci Educ 3, 373–385 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11422-008-9097-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11422-008-9097-x