Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Reliabilism says that knowledge must be produced by reliable abilities. Abilism disagrees and allows that knowledge is produced by unreliable abilities. Previous research strongly supports the conclusion that abilism better describes how knowledge is actually defined in commonsense and science. In this paper, I provide a novel argument that abilism is ethically superior to reliabilism. Whereas reliabilism unethically discriminates against agents by excluding them from knowing, abilism virtuously includes them.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. My student Tuneer Mondal coined the ingenious term “preliability” for the portion of the gap approaching the threshold of reliability.

  2. I entertain the objection, and the subsequent follow-up, at an anonymous referee’s behest.

References

  • Becker, K. (2009). Reliabilism. Retrieved January 17, 2014, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/reliabil/

  • Benton, M. A. (2014). Knowledge norms. Retrieved January 2014, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/kn-norms/

  • BonJour, L. (2002). Epistemology: classic problems and contemporary responses. Rowman & Littlefield

  • Bricker, A. M. (2018). Visuomotor noise and the non-factive analysis of knowledge. University of Edinburgh

  • Bricker, A. M. (2020). The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: an EEG study. Cognition, 203, 104412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104412

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buckwalter, W., Rose, D., & Turri, J. (2015). Belief through thick and thin. Nous, 49(4), 748–775

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. (2019). Knowledge and truth: a skeptical challenge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9280-7

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. (2020). Knowledge, adequacy, and approximate truth. Consciousness and Cognition, 83, 102950

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an uncertain world. Oxford University Press

  • Gautama. (200AD). Nyāya Sūtras. (B. D. Basu, Ed., V. S. scholars, Trans.). Allahabad: Sudhindranatha Vasu

  • Goldman, A. I. (2012). Reliabilism and contemporary epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Greco, J. (2010). Achieving knowledge: A virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hawthorne, J., & Stanley, J. (2008). Knowledge and action. Journal of Philosophy, 105(10), 571

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murray, D., Sytsma, J., & Livengood, J. (2013). God knows (but does God believe?). Philosophical Studies, 166(1), 83–107. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0022-5

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Myers-Schulz, B., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2013). Knowing that P without believing that P. Nous, 47(2), 371–384

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Phillips, J., Buckwalter, W., Cushman, F., Friedman, O., Martin, A., Turri, J., et al. (2020). Knowledge before Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1–37

  • Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2015). Unreliable knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90(3), 529–545. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12064

  • Turri, J. (2009). Knowledge as achievement, more or less. Presented at the Epistemic Goodness Conference, Norman, OK

  • Turri, J. (2010). Unreliable knowledge. Presented at the Central States Philosophical Association, Detroit, MI

  • Turri, J. (2012a). Abilism and reliabilism. Presented at the Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ

  • Turri, J. (2012b). Review of: Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, by John Greco. Mind, 121(481), 183–187

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2013). The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion. Cognition, 129(2), 279–291

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2015a). From virtue epistemology to abilism: theoretical and empirical developments. In C. B. Miller, M. R. Furr, A. Knobel, & W. Fleeson (Eds.), Character: new directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology (pp. 315–330). Oxford University Press

  • Turri, J. (2015b). Unreliable knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90(3), 529–545

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2015c). Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision. Synthese, 192(12), 4009–4030

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2016a). A new paradigm for epistemology: from reliabilism to abilism. Ergo, 3(8), 189–231

    Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2016b). Knowledge as achievement, more or less. In M. Á. F. Vargas (Ed.), Performance epistemology (pp. 124–134). Oxford University Press

  • Turri, J. (2016c). Knowledge and the norm of assertion: an essay in philosophical science. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. Retrieved from http://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/397/knowledge-and-the-norm-of-assertion--an-essay-inphilosophical-science

  • Turri, J. (2017a). Epistemic situationism and cognitive ability. In M. Alfano, & A. Fairweather (Eds.), Epistemic situationism (pp. 158–167). Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2017b). Experimental, cross-cultural, and classical Indian epistemology. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 34(3), 501–516

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2017c). Experimental work on the norms of assertion. Philosophy Compass, 12(7), e12425

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2018a). Primate social cognition and the core human knowledge concept. In M. Mizumoto, S. Stich, & E. McCready (Eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world: linguistic and cultural diversity and epistemology (pp. 279–290). Oxford University Press

  • Turri, J. (2018b). Virtue epistemology and abilism on knowledge. In H. Battaly (Ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology (pp. 309–316). New York: Routledge

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2020). Truth, fallibility, and justification: new studies in the norms of assertion (pp. 1–12). Synthese

  • Turri, J. (2021). Truth, perspective, and norms of assertion. In P. Henne, & S. Murray (Eds.), Advances in experimental philosophy of action. New York: Routledge

    Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (under review). Skepticism and the spectrum of ability: solutions for the arbitrariness objection to fallibilism. University of Waterloo

  • Turri, J., & Buckwalter, W. (2017). Descartes’s schism, Locke’s reunion: completing the pragmatic turn in epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(1), 25–46

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J., Friedman, O., & Keefner, A. (2017). Knowledge Central: A Central Role for Knowledge Attributions in Social Evaluations. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 70(3), 504–515

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J., & Park, Y. (2021). Knowledge and belief in Korean. Philosophical psychology

  • Turri, J., Buckwalter, W., & Rose, D. (2016). Actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments. Thought: a Journal of Philosophy, 5(3), 212–222

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

For helpful feedback and discussion, I thank Bob Beddor and Angelo, Geno, and Sarah Turri. This research was supported by the Canada Research Chairs Program and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, N2L3G1, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    John Turri

Authors
  1. John Turri
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John Turri.

Additional information

Publisher’s note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Turri, J. Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology. Philosophia 50, 1495–1501 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00513-z

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00513-z

Keywords

Search

Navigation