Abstract
In his book The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology, Jonathan Kvanvig argues that there is an interchangeability of personal and doxastic justification, which ‘blocks the quick route to virtue epistemology’. To prove that personal justification is reducible to doxastic justification, he utilizes λ-calculus expressions that aim to show the logical equivalence of the two notions of justification. In this paper, I argue that he has made an illegitimate move in his translation of the ordinary talk of personal justification into λ-expressions because his translation involves both an elimination from and an addition to the ordinary language. Pace Kvanvig, there is no logical equivalence of personal to doxastic justification. So, his argument for the reducibility of personal to doxastic justification founders. More importantly, since he has failed to disprove that personal justification is irreducibly primitive, he hasn’t shown that the prospects for virtue epistemology are ‘hopeless’.
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References
Kvanvig, J.L. (1992). The intellectual virtues and the life of the mind: on the place of the virtues in contemporary epistemology. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Acknowledgements
My thanks goes to Chris Menzel for helping me with the λ-calculus and to Kelly Clark for reading an earlier draft of this paper.
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Salim, E. Kvanvig on Reducing Personal to Doxastic Justification. Philosophia 50, 699–702 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00394-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00394-8