Abstract
The All or Nothing Problem is a paradox developed in recent debates about effective altruism. One argues that the paradox can be resolved by rejecting some of its claims in favor of parallel conditional claims. Another contends that the correct solution to the paradox is to reject a wrong bridge principle that is assumed in it. A third draws a distinction between two moral realms, and suggests that the paradox is only of limited relevance to some assertion of effective altruism because it may not exist in certain moral realm. In this article, I argue that those solutions to (analyses of) the All or Nothing Problem is unsatisfactory, and propose an alternative solution. Firstly, I challenge their reasons for a claim in the paradox. Secondly, I propose a holist deontological solution to the All or Nothing Problem. Finally, in order to understand the true nature of the problem, I carry out an analysis of the underlying causes of its more general form.
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Notes
See Joe Horton, “The All or Nothing Problem,” Journal of Philosophy, CXIV, 2 (February 2017): 94–104.
Ibid., p. 94.
See Theron Pummer, “Whether and Where to Give,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 44, 1 (Winter 2016): 77–95; Theron Pummer, “All or Nothing, But if not All, Next Best or Nothing,” Journal of Philosophy, CXVI, 5 (May 2019): 278–291; Thomas Sinclair, “Are We Conditionally Obligated to Be Effective Altruists?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 46, 1 (Winter 2018): 36–59.
Horton, “The All or Nothing Problem,” p. 96.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 99.
Ibid., pp. 96–100.
Ibid., pp. 96, 97.
Pummer, “Whether and Where to Give,” p. 87, italic in the original.
Sinclair, “Are We Conditionally Obligated to Be Effective Altruists?,” p. 48.
Ibid., p. 50.
Ibid., p. 52.
See William J. FitzPatrick, “The Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility,” Philosophy Compass, 7, 3 (March 2012): 183–196, at p. 183, italic in the original.
It is important to stress that both the value and disvalue are associated with the single act of saving only one child per se, rather than either the child whom you save or the child whom you let die.
For those who argue that an act that is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy can still be morally wrong, I would say that at least in the case in question, if the act of saving only one child is not blameworthy, then it appears to be morally permissible.
Horton, “The All or Nothing Problem,” p. 97.
Ibid.
I admit that the possibility is low, thus when the sacrifice needed is not substantial, such as getting your clothes dirty or costing you a few hours, you should morally save the children.
Similarly, Sinclair correctly points out that Horton has a “background presumption of an optimizing default”. See Sinclair, “Are We Conditionally Obligated to Be Effective Altruists?,” p. 45.
Pummer, “All or Nothing, But if not All, Next Best or Nothing,” pp. 281–284.
Ibid., p. 289.
Ibid.
Sinclair, “Are We Conditionally Obligated to Be Effective Altruists?,” pp. 45–49.
Ibid., pp. 45–59.
Ibid., pp. 45–56.
Ibid., pp. 56–57.
Ibid., p. 58.
In response to Sinclair’s critique of him and Horton, Pummer just appeals to intuition. That seems unsatisfactory, especially in not addressing the differences between emergency rescue and charitable giving. See Pummer, “All or Nothing, But if not All, Next Best or Nothing,” p. 291.
Sinclair, “Are We Conditionally Obligated to Be Effective Altruists?,” pp. 52–53.
Ibid., p. 55.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 54, italic in the original.
If you disagree with the claim, then I shall argue that your moral standard is too demanding.
Here “almost” is to rule out the possibility that the person you help is doing something wrong and your help is necessary for the completion of it; “genuinely” is to rule out those acts which are pretended to help but actually aim to harm. Clearly, neither possibility occurs in the collapsing building case.
Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1, 3 (Spring 1972): 229–243, at p. 231.
Stealing bread, as a Wrong Act, can be a morally permissible act if you are to be starved to death and have no other way to get any food.
See Pummer, “All or Nothing, But if not All, Next Best or Nothing,” p. 280. The absurd conclusion is: One will be wrong in doing nothing because one considers seriously both sacrificing arms to save a child and keeping arms, and one will not be wrong in doing nothing because one considers seriously only keeping arms.
Horton, “The All or Nothing Problem,” p. 101.
Ibid.
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Jin, H. A Holist Deontological Solution to the All or Nothing Problem. Philosophia 49, 2067–2079 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00345-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00345-3